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Leaders of political parties are the most well-known and recognisable politicians in the 
UK. Party leaders dominate political coverage as the face of their party. Due to the level of 
attention that party leaders receive, voters can quickly evaluate leaders and these evaluations 
are widely assumed to provide part of the explanation for voter behaviour. Analysis in this 
thesis furthers the understanding of party leaders by examining leaders in three distinct 
contexts. I examine: long-term changes in voters’ evaluations of leaders from 2014-2017; how 
significant leader effects were during the 2015 and 2017 general election campaigns; and how 
the role of leaders has been framed in the analysis of election outcomes presented in election 
night broadcasts since 1955. 
This thesis progresses the study of leadership evaluations beyond the consideration 
of which leadership traits may be the most important, to consider the durability of voters’ 
leadership evaluations over time. I investigate change in leadership evaluations in thirteen 
waves of the British Election Study (BES) Internet Panel that covers a three-year period. 
Results suggest that once voters’ evaluations of party leaders become established, they 
remain remarkably stable thereafter. Furthermore, I find that voters distinguish between 
outgoing and incoming leaders of the same party, advancing arguments that leaders can 
appeal to voters independently from the party they lead, at least in the short-term. Evidence 
presented in this thesis also furthers the arguments that voters compare leaders of different 
parties when forming their evaluations. 
I investigate leader effects on voter behaviour during the 2015 and 2017 UK general 
election campaigns. It is well-documented that leaders dominate contemporary campaigns, 
but it is less clear that leaders can affect vote choice during this period of frantic campaigning. 
I explore whether changes in leader evaluations during the campaign ultimately affect voters’ 
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party choice. Changes to the evaluations of party leaders only have a marginal effect on most 
voters, as most voters predictably support a party that aligned with their pre-campaign 
attitudes. However, based on the analysis of pre-campaign attitudes, I identify a sizable group 
of voters whose vote choice is more strongly affected by changes to leader evaluations. These 
effects were found to be stronger on this group of voters in 2017, relative to 2015, where 
leadership evaluations also changed more dramatically over the campaign. 
While researchers have increasingly recognised leader effects on voter behaviour, I 
investigate how leaders are used to explain election results in broadcasts and whether this 
reflects trends in the academic literature. I analyse each BBC election broadcast from 1955-
2017, finding party leaders occupy a substantial proportion of discussion in modern 
programmes. Modern broadcasts of election results seek to explain the election outcome 
almost instantly after polls have closed and place leaders at the forefront of their coverage. 
Greater emphasis is placed on the campaign performance of party leaders when interpreting 
the results and speculation begins about the resignations of losing leaders. Participants in the 
broadcasts increasingly consider leaders to be responsible for election outcomes, especially 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
 Leaders of political parties are amongst the most recognised public figures in the UK. 
YouGov (2020) found that the top ten most well-known politicians are either current or 
former leaders of political parties. Forming an opinion about party leaders is an extension of 
a natural process used every day to evaluate people for a variety of reasons (Bittner 2011). In 
the modern media landscape, leaders personify the party they lead. Alongside achieving 
contemporary fame, UK party leaders are considered to be influential in the decisions made 
by voters. However, while we know that leaders matter, questions remain about whom they 
matter to and when they matter the most. Similarly, contextual factors surrounding specific 
elections, such as the competitiveness of the election, are likely to determine the size of 
leadership effects on vote choice. 
 Despite a large body of existing work that examines a wide range of potentially 
important leadership traits and characteristics, relatively little is known about the durability 
of voters’ evaluations of leaders. Consequently, I examine whether leadership evaluations are 
stable over a three-year period and, if they do change, what could explain this. After 
investigating long-term changes in leadership evaluations, I consider the effect of short-term 
changes in leader evaluations during two general election campaigns. In particular, I examine 
whether party leaders have a pivotal role in convincing ‘floating’ voters. Lastly, I examine 
seventeen election night broadcasts to determine how party leaders are understood to have 
affected the outcome. Election night broadcasts offer a unique insight into how leaders are 
held accountable for election results, how this accountability has developed over time, and 
whether the level of accountability for leaders changes when elections are decisive or closely 
contested. Examining leaders in these distinctive contexts provides the opportunity to assess 
their role and the nature of leadership effects in different stages of the election cycle. 
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 My investigation of party leaders takes advantage of methodological advancements 
enabled by longitudinal data. Longitudinal data continues to be rare in election studies. In 
particular, I utilise a thirteen-wave subset of a nineteen-wave internet panel from the British 
Election Study (BES). Using this data source provided an opportunity to examine party leaders 
with a wider set of statistical techniques and, critically, investigate individual-level change. 
Furthermore, I construct an original set of textual data from BBC election night broadcasts 
from 1955-2017, covering seventeen elections, providing an original dataset to analyse party 
leaders. As I outline later in this thesis, new approaches to data collection and the utilisation 
of panel studies are necessary to enable a greater understanding of party leaders.  
 My thesis makes three primary findings that relate to the role, effect and evaluations 
of party leaders. Firstly, I find voters’ evaluations of leaders are mostly stable over time and 
find little evidence that suggests specific voter characteristics, theorised in the existing 
literature, lead to less stable evaluations of party leaders. The most substantial change in 
evaluations comes from new leadership, indicating that voters distinguish between 
predecessor and successor, and also distinguish between party and leader. New leaders can 
develop an appeal that is separate from their party and preceding leader. Additionally, 
evidence is found that, beyond new leadership, change in the leadership evaluations of one 
leader are associated with changes in evaluations about rival leaders. These results indicate 
that voters compare leaders of the main political parties when adjusting their evaluations. 
Secondly, I find that changes in leadership evaluations have a strong effect on convincing a 
sizable minority of persuadable voters during general election campaigns. Successful 
conversion of these voters could change the outcome of an election. My analysis illustrates 
the importance of first identifying which voters could be persuaded during the campaign, 
because most voters do not alter their vote choice during the campaign, before assessing the 
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impact of leaders. The level of change in evaluations can and does differ between campaigns, 
with the 2015 and 2017 elections illustrating differences in leadership effects. My third and 
final primary finding is that leaders have become a central part of election night broadcasts 
and are used to explain the unfolding election result. Over subsequent broadcasts, party 
leaders are increasingly highlighted when explaining election outcomes and their campaign 
activities are discussed at length. Election broadcasts from the 1980s to the present represent 
a distinctive shift in analysing the personal appeal of party leaders and attributing greater 
responsibility for the result to them. 
 
Hypotheses and the Approach of this Thesis 
 
 Driven by existing theoretical debates regarding party leaders and facilitated by new 
methodological approaches, where prior studies have faced limitations, this thesis builds on 
existing research. Three hypotheses were developed to analyse party leaders, (1) evaluations 
of party leaders will vary over time, (2) change in leadership evaluations during general 
election campaigns affects vote choice and (3) party leaders are central figures in the 
explanations of modern elections during election night. These hypotheses are developed to 
understand the durability of leadership evaluations, effects of leadership evaluations on vote 
choice and how leaders are understood to have affected the outcome of elections during 
results programmes. 
My first hypothesis investigates the stability of evaluations over time (2014-17) for the 
leaders of four political parties. Do certain characteristics of voters, such as being an 
‘unsophisticated’ voter, not identifying with a political party, or consuming high levels of 
televised media lead to unstable evaluations? Each of the four political parties I examine 
changed their leader during the waves of this panel. I examine whether new incumbents have 
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a significant impact on changes in leadership evaluations, or if evaluations remain stable 
because newcomers lead the same party as outgoing leaders. In addition, I investigate 
whether changes in evaluations occur relatively as rival leaders operate in a highly 
comparative and competitive environment. My second hypothesis examines the influence of 
leadership evaluations on vote choice within the framework of campaign effects. I examine 
how accurately vote choice can be predicted in general elections, based on voters’ pre-
campaign attitudes, and assess if the inclusion of leadership evaluations results in greater 
accuracy. I determine that a substantial minority of voters are persuadable during campaigns. 
Changes in leadership evaluations during the campaign have a significant effect in convincing 
persuadable voters. The third and final hypothesis tests whether party leaders have become 
central to immediate explanations of election outcomes. I investigate how the discussion of 
party leaders has developed from early election night broadcasts in the 1950s into the 
twenty-first century. This hypothesis examines the amount of coverage given to party leaders 
and analyses whether leaders are considered to be responsible for their party’s election 
result. Different aspects of party leaders are tracked in the coverage providing a detailed 
understanding of changes over time.  
 To test the hypotheses outlined above, I take advantage of opportunities provided by 
rich quantitative panel data and an original qualitative dataset. A detailed rationale is 
provided in the methodology chapter of this thesis, but it is worth outlining several important 
advantages here. Previous studies have highlighted the reliance on cross-sectional data when 
researching leaders. Longitudinal data has been identified as particularly useful for studying 
disputed aspects of leadership effects. The British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) is a 
unique source of information about party leaders. The number of waves that the panel runs 
for is unparalleled in national election studies and facilitates analysis of individual-level 
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changes, such as the evaluations of party leaders. The design of the BESIP enables several 
advanced methodological techniques to be used, such as multilevel models and machine 
learning approaches, thereby assisting to produce new contributions regarding party leaders. 
The number of respondents interviewed in the BESIP presents a further advantage, 
particularly when developing predictive models of vote choice where it is highly desirable to 
split the sample. Furthermore, the size of the BESIP provides considerable flexibility when 
investigating sub-sections of voters during Chapter Five. Data collection is primarily 
structured around two general elections, providing an excellent opportunity to examine 
campaign effects. A ‘rolling thunder’ research design within the campaign waves allows 
researchers to analyse the campaign on a daily basis. Taken altogether, these data and 
methods culminate in an original approach to the study of party leaders. 
 To complement the BESIP data, I use BBC election night transcripts to provide an 
original analysis on how party leaders are used to explain election results. The prominence of 
party leaders during general election campaigns (Deacon et al. 2017; Gaber 2013; Karvonen 
2010) and how political parties can frame their campaign strategy around leaders (Bale and 
Webb 2018; Seawright 2013) has received noticeable attention in the literature. However, 
few studies have examined how party leaders are used when the outcome of elections is 
explained and interpreted. Previous studies have highlighted the richness of election night 
broadcast data (Lauerbach 2007; Marriott 2000; Schieß 2007) but have often been 
encumbered by difficulties in collecting and processing this data. Analysing election night 
broadcasts over time provides an opportunity to analyse trends over a substantial period of 
time. Additionally, analysing textual data from broadcasts provides the opportunity to 
examine different aspects of text that relate to leaders, such as, their campaign performance 
or the positive effect of their personality on the election outcome. A thematic analysis of 
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election night transcripts is conducted to provide an insight into how the discussion of leaders 
changes from the immediate post-war period to contemporary elections. 
 
Contribution to the Study of Party Leaders 
 
I confine the scope of my thesis to examining party leaders in the UK. Institutional 
factors in the UK provide party leaders with a heightened importance relative to other 
politicians, creating the conditions for strong leader effects. Leaders from the two largest 
parties have received greater attention from researchers examining leader effects because 
these leaders are the only realistic candidates for Prime Minister at each election (Blais 2013; 
Van Der Eijk and Franklin 2009; McAllister 2013). Institutional arrangements in the 
Westminster system include a formal opposition leader, affording significant resources to the 
party leader who holds this office and providing an important mechanism for holding the 
Prime Minister to account. These arrangements lead, in turn, to a natural tendency for voters 
to compare the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition when evaluating them 
individually (Mughan 2015). Yet, whilst there are good theoretical grounds to assume that 
voters evaluate leaders relatively, few empirical studies have demonstrated that British 
voters make such comparative evaluations (Mughan 2015). I widen the analysis by 
considering evaluations of Liberal Democrat and UKIP leaders, examining the importance of 
interactions between major and minor party leaders during a period when smaller political 
parties were growing in support (Bogdanor 2016). The share of the Conservative and Labour 
vote in general elections had continually declined since 1970, reaching 67.2% in the 2015 
election, before strongly resurging to 82.4% in 2017 (Prosser 2018). Therefore, there is good 
reason to investigate which leaders are important to voters when they make their 
evaluations. 
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There has been thoughtful research on the importance of specific leadership traits 
that voters prioritise when assessing leaders (Bittner 2014; Clarke et al. 2004; Costa and 
Ferreira da Silva 2015; Goren 2007; Hayes 2005), but there has been little consideration about 
whether evaluations change over time. To investigate this issue, I examine the stability of 
voters’ initial evaluations of party leaders. If voters solidify their evaluations of leaders 
relatively quickly, then the first impressions of party leaders would be pivotal to developing 
their electoral appeal. Investigation at the individual level is necessary to provide answers as 
to why evaluations change over time.  
It is worthwhile investigating whether some sections of the electorate change their 
evaluations more dramatically than others. Some voters may change their opinions of leaders 
frequently, while others hold very fixed opinions. Three groups of voters who may be 
influenced more by party leaders are ‘unsophisticated’ voters (Clarke et al. 2009a; Gidengil 
2013; Mughan 2015; Rico 2014), voters with no party identification (Barisione 2009; Blais 
2013; Butler and Stokes 1974; Campbell et al. 1960; Rico 2014) and ‘floating’ voters (Bearnot 
and Schier 2012; Mayer 2007; Russo 2014). Voters that have these characteristics are 
considered to give greater emphasis to party leaders when making electoral choices. Voters 
who are not guided by party identity may change their opinions of leaders to a greater extent 
than partisans. This finding may be especially important as non-partisans now make up a 
greater section of the UK electorate than in the past (Mellon 2016; Mughan 2009). 
Researchers have often cited ‘unsophisticated’ voters as a group in the electorate that is 
reliant on leadership evaluations to make vote choices (Gidengil 2013; Rico 2014). 
Determining whether ‘unsophisticated’ voters with lower levels of political attention or 
political efficacy change their opinion of leaders would provide further evidence on this 
subject where researchers have come to divergent conclusions.  
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Modern election campaigns provide good conditions for leaders to have strong effects 
on vote choice. During contemporary general election campaigns, voters have an abundance 
of information to assess the performance and personality of leaders (Deacon et al. 2017; 
Gaber 2013; Karvonen 2010). The evaluation and performance of party leaders can be 
influential in three campaign effects: reinforcement, activation and conversion. However, the 
growth of ‘late deciders’ in the British electorate, may signal that conversion and activation 
have become more important because an increasing proportion of voters decide their vote 
late in the campaign (Fisher 2018; McAllister 2013; Russo 2014). In turn, leaders could play a 
bigger role in activating and converting voters during the campaign. While more voters may 
finalise their vote choice during a later stage of the campaign it does not necessarily mean all 
these individuals are persuadable. Using predictive models, I attempt to quantify the number 
of persuadable voters and determine the effect of party leaders on these voters. 
Understanding whether changing evaluations during the campaign effects vote choice for 
persuadable voters is an important contribution to research on party leaders. 
 The campaign is the final opportunity for leaders to affect the choices of voters but, 
how is the result understood on election night? I specifically examine how leaders are 
discussed in the immediate explanations that take place on election night. This analysis 
develops the wider understanding on the subject by examining the aspects of party leaders 
that are considered important, their perceived effect on vote choice and whether this mirrors 
the findings of academic research on leader effects (Clarke et al. 2016; Holmberg and 
Oscarsson 2013; Mughan 2009, 2015). The primary function of election night broadcasts is to 
present the results to viewers (Lauerbach 2013; Orr 2015; Ross and Joslyn 1988) but 
explanations of why parties won or lost inevitably follows. Previous attempts by researchers 
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to consider post-election narratives are by no means extensive, hindered by time consuming 
processing of textual data (Marriott 2000; Patterson 2003; Schieß 2007). 
Election night dynamics have been highlighted in recent studies of UK elections 
(Cowley and Kavanagh 2016, 2018; Kavanagh and Cowley 2010) but the purpose of these texts 
is to provide a historical overview of the election. Narratives developed from post-election 
coverage of results are important in framing the initial understandings of the election result 
(Cathcart 1997; Hale 1993; Mendelsohn 1998). The immediacy of the broadcasts is important 
because explanations of the election are recognised long before detailed academic analysis is 
undertaken and published in series such as Britain Votes and the Nuffield election studies. I 
examine the perceived impact of leaders on voters by analysing broadcasts from seventeen 
general elections, examining how the focus on leaders changes over time and analysing the 
specific elections where leaders are considered to have a greater or lesser impact on the 
outcome. If elections are deemed ‘winnable’ there could be greater responsibility attributed 
to leaders for their party’s failure or success. 
 There have been several methodological challenges in researching the importance of 
party leaders. One of the most persistent challenges to researchers examining party leaders 
is the difficulty in isolating the effect of leaders from other effects, in particular, from party 
identification (Costa Lobo 2014). There is considerable difficulty in achieving separation in 
practice, though researchers have used increasingly complex methods and quasi-
experimental frameworks in order to achieve as much separation as possible (van Holsteyn 
and Andeweg 2010; Huber 2014). Concerns about how party identification is measured in the 
British electorate only add to the difficulty in separating partisanship from leadership 
evaluations (Bartle 1999; Clarke et al. 2009b). This thesis does not attempt to fully isolate 
leadership evaluations from other variables. True separation of these effects is unlikely to be 
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achieved in practice despite the application of increasingly complex statistical methods 
(Whiteley et al. 2016). Attempts to establish definitively which variable is the primary driver 
of vote choice is likely to oversimplify the inter-relationship between key variables and further 
nuances, such as the characteristics of voters (Bellucci, Garzia, and Lewis-Beck 2015; Garzia 
2012; Whiteley et al. 2016).  
To address this common issue in the research of party leader effects, the quantitative 
analysis in this thesis leans heavily on analysing individual-level changes in attitudes. 
Concentrating on the change in leader evaluations helps to disentangle evaluations from 
feelings towards political parties. Barisione (2009) highlighted the importance of 
complementing findings about party leaders gathered from cross-sectional analysis with 
qualitative, panel and multilevel techniques. Several studies have begun to take advantage of 
panel studies that enable an innovative analytical framework when examining party leaders 
(Berz 2020; Johnston, Hartman, and Pattie 2019; Mellon et al. 2018). My thesis utilises panel 
data to explore party leaders by analysing the change in evaluations over time and the effect 
of these changes on vote choice.  
Divergent conclusions over leadership effects have been drawn by researchers who 
often only examine a single election. Mughan and Aaldering (2018) have argued that most 
studies attempt to generalise findings beyond the specific context of a single election rather 
than within a particular country. The possibility of extending the analysis in this thesis to more 
elections and countries is limited by the availability of high-quality panel data. Analysis 
presented in this thesis directly compares the findings of campaign effects in the 2015 and 
2017 general elections. Comparing effects in these two elections provides an opportunity to 
test the size of effects in different circumstances. Contextual factors relating to individual 
elections, such as policy differences between major parties, may reduce or increase the 
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effects that party leaders have in modern elections (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2013). Given 
that different party leaders fought the 2015 and 2017 UK general elections, and the elections 
were fought under different circumstances, the size of leader effects may be drastically 
different. Consideration of the wider political environment is crucial when drawing 
conclusions about the effect of leaders, especially as the context of an election can contribute 
to them having greater or lesser salience (Mughan and Aaldering 2018).  
 
Structure of the Following Chapters 
 
Chapter Two reviews the literature surrounding how voters formulate evaluations of 
party leaders, their impact on vote choice and the coverage they receive in the media. I 
outline explanations of how leadership evaluations are formed, the reasons why evaluations 
could be constructed relatively with rival party leaders, and which traits voters consider 
important when evaluating leaders. Theoretical explanations of the role of leaders on voter 
behaviour have evolved from a peripheral to an influential position, especially in the wider 
context of dealignment from political parties and reconsideration of the conceptualisation of 
partisanship. I examine how party leaders have come to dominate political coverage, 
especially during general election campaigns, and consider the potential impact of leaders 
within the literature of campaign effects. Next, I summarise previous attempts to analyse 
election night broadcasts, the uniqueness of the event, and its suitability for examining the 
role of leaders in explanations of election outcomes.  
Chapter Three sets out the hypotheses of this thesis in detail and outlines the 
methodological choices made in order to test them. I explore each of these hypotheses in 
detail, explaining how they were developed from theoretical and empirical research. I detail 
the methodological approach taken to test these hypotheses and utilise the available data. 
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The unique opportunities for researching party leaders are provided by the BESIP and I 
present the benefits of analysing this data for this thesis. Moreover, I describe the process of 
compiling the original data set of election night transcripts and the approach to analysing this 
data. Methodological advancements provide opportunities to examine the effect of party 
leaders from alternative perspectives. I provide an overview of these methods and techniques 
in this chapter and reserve more technical discussion of individual methods for the Research 
Methods Appendix.  
Chapter Four is the first empirical section of this thesis. Using thirteen waves of the 
BESIP, it examines how stable, or otherwise, leadership evaluations were during a turbulent 
period in British politics (2014-17), testing why evaluations were more or less likely to change. 
I analyse the stability of evaluations using path models. New leadership and general election 
campaign waves were theorised as events that could cause greater changes in evaluations. 
Results show that only new leadership has a significant impact. Furthermore, I examine 
whether leadership evaluations are made relatively, by testing whether changes in 
evaluations are associated with changes about other leaders. Relative effects are consistent 
in each case examined. I consider whether voter characteristics can explain the stability or 
fluidity of evaluations, concentrating on party identification, ‘unsophisticated’ voters and the 
consumption of televised political media. These effects are relatively weak but, contrary to 
expectations, there is some evidence to suggest that party identifiers are more likely than 
non-party identifiers to change their evaluations of leaders.  
After examining the stability of leadership evaluations over a longer time period in 
Chapter Four, I focus in greater detail on short-term changes made during general election 
campaigns in Chapter Five. In this chapter I examine how evaluations of party leaders 
contribute to improvements in the accuracy of predictive models for Labour and Conservative 
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vote choice in the 2015 and 2017 general elections. Findings suggest the majority of voters’ 
party choice is predictable before the campaign has begun and that feelings about party 
leaders are important in producing accurate predictions. Predictive models allow three 
campaign effects (reinforcement, activation and conversion) to be calculated and results 
show that reinforcement is the largest effect. It illustrates that the majority of voters do not 
change their vote choice during campaigns. The chapter then turns to focus on ‘persuadable’ 
voters and investigates whether changes in the evaluations of leaders during the campaign 
can influence this section of the electorate. Examination of values from predictive models 
help identify persuadable voters, whom I collectively term ‘goldilocks’ voters. Under further 
testing, I demonstrate how changes in leadership evaluations during the campaign are 
influential in explaining these voters’ eventual vote choice.  
The last empirical chapter considers the role of party leaders in election night 
broadcasts. I establish there has been a steady increase in the focus of leaders during 
broadcasts from 1955-2017. Leaders evolve from being rarely mentioned figures in early 
coverage, to headline characters in modern coverage where the contribution of leaders on 
the election results receives close attention. In addition to the overall level of coverage 
increasing over the time period, the subjects of discussion surrounding party leaders have 
changed too. Discussion and questioning of leaders shift towards evaluating their campaign 
performance, potential future leadership challenges and ultimately whether they are 
responsible for the election results. My analysis details how these themes progress over time, 
as party leaders feature heavily in the initial understanding of election outcomes. 
My concluding chapter provides a summary of the key findings from this thesis and 
establishes the key contributions it makes to the theoretical and empirical understanding of 
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party leaders. I then discuss future opportunities to examine party leaders, based on the 
findings from this thesis, and outline some potential starting places for such work.  
  
 23 
Chapter 2 : Reviewing the Literature on Leaders: Evaluations, 
Elections and Effects 
 
Research on the subject of party leaders in the UK has been approached from a variety 
of angles, ranging from identifying the most important aspects or traits of party leaders to 
debates about whether leaders even influence voter behaviour. Leaders are naturally of keen 
interest to political scientists as the head and the public face of their parties. Leaders are 
naturally elevated because of their position, but even more so by the media environment 
they operate in. With this disproportionate level of coverage, it is unsurprising that leaders 
can evoke strong feelings from the electorate.  
While most researchers would agree that voters have strong feelings about leaders, 
the issue of whether leaders influence the decisions of voters is more contentious. Early 
theories of voter behaviour argued the role of leadership evaluations was a peripheral issue 
for most voters (Butler and Stokes 1969, 1974). Instead, these scholars explained voter 
behaviour largely with reference to voters’ partisan attachments to political parties and class 
identity (Butler and Stokes 1969; Pulzer 1968). Only in the absence of strong alignment to 
parties and clear ideological division would leaders be influential (Blais 2013; Holmberg and 
Oscarsson 2013). In contrast, the valence theory of voting places evaluations of leaders firmly 
at the centre of voters’ personal electoral calculus (Clarke et al. 2004, 2009a; Whiteley et al. 
2013). From this perspective, parties seeking to win elections require leaders who are judged 
to be competent by voters. In every UK election since 1983 the leader of the largest party had 
more favourable evaluations than the defeated leader. Party leaders have received greater 
attention when explaining the behaviour of voters, but significant questions remain about 
precisely who leaders are important to, and when leaders are important.  
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In this chapter I set out the building blocks for an examination of the role and effect 
of party leaders in the current political landscape. Through evaluating the literature on 
leaders, I establish a theoretical framework in this chapter that guides the subsequent 
empirical analysis. I begin by examining the role of party leaders in theoretical models of voter 
behaviour, before identifying structural developments in the electorate that prompted a 
reassessment of the role of leaders. Specifically, I discuss the effect of declining partisanship 
in the British electorate and how specific voter characteristics are considered to contribute 
to stronger leader effects. The process of how voters evaluate leaders is outlined, including 
which leadership traits are the most important and whether evaluations are made 
comparatively between rival leaders. I conclude from this discussion that leaders are unlikely 
to affect each voter in the same way. In the next section, I detail the role of UK leaders in 
modern general election campaigns, how campaign effects can be estimated and the 
potential influence of leaders on ‘floating’ or undecided voters. The penultimate section 
considers the role of election night broadcasts in establishing post-election narratives, 
including their importance in establishing political capital for leaders. I identify this event as 
an under-researched aspect of the electoral cycle. Finally, I evaluate and identify the 
methodological challenges researchers have faced when studying leader effects, explaining 
the limitations of using cross-sectional data to examine party leaders. My review of the 
relevant literature identifies aspects of leaders where new research would contribute to an 
improved understanding of their role and effect. 
Three primary points are established in the following literature review. Firstly, there 
are conceptual challenges when investigating party leaders. Disentangling leaders from their 
party and establishing the direction of causality has proved cumbersome. I suggest panel data 
is particularly useful to researchers when dealing with these challenges. In addition, modern 
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election studies with large sample sizes facilitate the analysis of sub-sections of the electorate 
where party leaders may have a stronger effect. The literature review considers the reasons 
why it is unlikely that leaders would have a uniform effect on voters. Secondly, widening the 
timeframe for examining leaders beyond studying their effect using cross-sectional data from 
individual elections would be useful. Few studies have considered the dynamics of leadership 
effects over a substantial inter-election period and for multiple elections. Investigating 
individual-level changes in evaluations over the broader election cycle could identify voters 
who are most responsive to leaders and when changes in evaluations occur. Considering the 
post-election explanations for the outcome of elections can provide further insights on party 
leaders, particularly as data can be gathered retrospectively. Election night broadcasts 
provide an opportunity to establish political capital and shape the political narrative that 
explains election results. Thirdly, the availability of panel data has constricted previous efforts 
to investigate party leader effects. Many studies analysing the effect of leaders on vote choice 
reach conflicting conclusions because they rely on a single cross-sectional study. Post-election 
narratives are identified as a useful additional source to complement survey data but have 
rarely been utilised because of issues relating to processing large amounts of text. As a 
consequence, researchers examining post-election narratives rarely consider more than one 
election. 
 
Party Leaders in Theories of Voting Behaviour and the Mitigating Effect of Party 
Identification 
 
 Early analyses of voting behaviour theorised that opinions of party leaders had little 
effect on voters, though more recent theories have placed greater emphasis on leaders. This 
section considers four theories of voter behaviour: the Michigan model, the sociological 
model, rational choice model and the valence model. I outline the role of party leaders in each 
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of these explanations of voter behaviour to consider how their importance has developed in 
different theories of vote choice.  
The first models of voting behaviour were developed in the United States. In The 
American Voter, Campbell et al. (1960) emphasised the importance of long-term factors such 
as attachments to social groups and partisan identity in determining party choice. The 
theoretical approach derived from this work is widely labelled as the Michigan model because 
of the authors’ association with the University of Michigan. Partisanship is a voter’s 
psychological attachment to a party (Campbell et al. 1960). This psychological attachment is 
considered separate from both past voting history and being a registered supporter of a party 
(in the United States context) (Campbell et al. 1960; Hutchings and Jefferson 2018). Party 
identification provides voters with continuity when interpreting political events and is a cost-
effective mechanism for making political choices (Denver, Carman, and Johns 2012). As such, 
partisan voters do not need to develop detailed ideological rationales to respond to political 
issues or events (Bowler 2018). Partisan attachment is considered a stable factor and highly 
influential on vote choice. Campbell et al. (1960) acknowledged that voters evaluate the 
personal attributes of presidential and congressional candidates images independently from 
the party they represent. Favourable opinions of Dwight Eisenhower from registered 
Democrats in both the 1952 and 1956 US Presidential elections, in a time of widespread 
Democratic partisanship, were identified as important to his electoral success (Campbell et 
al. 1960). However, the authors of the Michigan model conclude that evaluations of 
presidential candidates do not ultimately outweigh a voter’s partisanship identity. While 
candidates change between elections, parties endure.  
The first major national analysis of the behaviour of British voters was conducted by 
Butler and Stokes (1969, 1974), using data from the first British Election Study (BES) for the 
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1964 General Election. Previous studies of voter behaviour had focused on specific localities 
within the UK (specifically Bristol, Glossop and Greenwich) but were inherently limited by 
their research design and were therefore unable to generalise findings for the national 
electorate (Benney, Grey, and Pear 1956; Birch 1959; Milne and Mackenzie 1954, 1958). 
Butler and Stokes adopted several components of the Michigan model, to which Stokes had 
also contributed. In particular, they reached similar conclusions about the effects of long-
term attachments, seeing these as central to understanding British voter behaviour (Butler 
and Stokes 1969, 1974).  
In a period where most British voters were attached to parties and class, Butler and 
Stokes (1974, 1969) suggested that opinions of leaders were unlikely to have a major effect 
on most voters. An individual’s party identification arises from a socialisation process. In 
essence, a voter’s party identification is forged in childhood, as a by-product of the class and 
party identifications of their parents and strengthens as they move through adulthood. While 
‘short-term’ influences, including feelings about leaders, are also accounted for, they are 
considered to be of relatively minor importance compared to the forces driving long-term 
alignment with political parties. Butler and Stokes’ conclusion was that leaders were ‘easily 
outweighed by other issues and events of concern to the public; including the movements of 
the economy’ (Butler and Stokes 1974, 386). The potential of leader effects was considered 
by Butler and Stokes through isolating a small sub-section of voters in their sample who 
identified with one party but had more favourable opinions of a leader from a rival party. 
Party choice of these ‘conflicted’ voters was investigated further to see whether party 
identification or leadership evaluations was the dominant effect (Butler and Stokes 1974; 
Denver, Carman, and Johns 2012). Only 15% of ‘conflicted’ voters converted to a rival party 
where they evaluated the rival leader higher than their own (Butler and Stokes 1974, 367). 
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With some of this analysis conducted in the 1960s and 70s their approach was restricted to 
analysing a simple matrix, populated by a small sub-sample of voters. Nonetheless, their 
findings do illustrate the potential for party leaders to be impactful on some voters, even if 
this was a small number of voters in 1974 where the electorate was more strongly aligned to 
class and party identification.  
Absence of strong attachment to political parties provides the opportunity for short-
term influences, such as leader or candidate evaluations, to factor more heavily in voters’ 
decisions regarding party choice. Socio-economic changes in Britain during the late twentieth 
century have challenged aspects of Butler and Stokes’ theory of voter behaviour. Historically, 
the British electorate was strongly aligned with political parties and class identities (Butler 
and Stokes 1969; Pulzer 1968). In the 1960s 40% of the electorate were considered to have 
very strong attachments to political parties and as few as 10% of voters held no party 
identification (Denver, Carman, and Johns 2012). Recent studies suggest these figures have 
been inverted. Only 8% of the population strongly identified with a political party in 2018, but 
39% of the population held no party identification (British Social Attitudes 2018). An 
electorate with a substantial number of non-partisans creates the potential for leaders to 
have larger effects on voters. 
Dealignment from political parties and class identities is not confined to the UK and 
has been observed across electorates in Western Europe (Costa and Ferreira da Silva 2015). 
However, it is important to consider whether voters could realign around new political issues. 
It has been suggested that Brexit may have provided a new ideological realignment in the 
electorate (Gamble 2018; Mellon et al. 2018). This implies voters’ identifying as a ‘remainer’ 
or a ‘leaver’ could be more important to understanding their voting behaviour than their 
attachment to political parties. This argument of realignment around Brexit has been 
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challenged by other researchers who view the realignment as the product of wider and longer 
socio-economic changes in the UK rather than an immediate realignment following the 2016 
EU referendum (Jennings and Stoker 2017). It is important to consider that other identities, 
in addition to party identification, may influence leader evaluations. 
 How researchers gather and measure levels of party identification presents additional 
problems. Party identification is often treated as a cause of voter behaviour rather than a 
consequence (Bartle 1999). An alternative perspective is that party identification is secondary 
to vote choice, with responses to questions that measure party identification simply reflecting 
an individual’s vote intention. Researchers using cross-sectional election studies are unable 
to investigate the durability of partisanship over time. Multiple studies that examine panel 
data indicated that voters who hold durable, long-term attachment to parties are a smaller 
proportion of the electorate than it may appear when examining figures from cross-sectional 
data (Brynin and Sanders 1997; Clarke et al. 2009b). Brynin and Sanders (1997) found that 
36% of the British Household Panel Study sample changed vote identification between 1991-
1993. Furthermore, Brynin and Sanders found that after constructing separate models that 
explained vote choice and party identification, the two were ‘virtually indistinguishable’ 
(1997, 74). These findings are problematic for explanations of voting behaviour that consider 
partisanship as a durable voter characteristic and the theoretical understanding that voters’ 
party identification is distinguishable from their vote choice. Findings about the durability of 
partisanship has implications for understanding leader effects because party identification is 
often considered the primary barrier to these effects occurring. Fluid attachments to political 
parties increase the possibility that leaders may influence voters’ attachments to parties and 
be more susceptible to changing their evaluations of party leaders (Clarke et al. 2004, 2009a; 
Whiteley et al. 2013).  
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An additional issue in measuring party identification is how the questions are 
presented to survey respondents. The question that asks respondents about their party 
identification in the BES first introduced in 1964 was adapted from the party attachment 
question in the American National Election Survey. There is, invariably, a trade-off for 
researchers to consider when retaining longstanding survey questions that allow changes to 
be tracked over a long period of time. However, subtle differences in the British formulation 
of the question may lead to an overestimation in how many voters identify with a political 
party (Heath and Johns 2016). Unlike the American and Canadian version of the question, 
there is no prompt in the question for voters to identify as independents or non-identifiers 
(Blais et al. 2001). Attempts to measure partisanship using wording that provides a prompt 
for non-partisans suggest that data from the BES may drastically underestimate the 
percentage of non-partisans in the electorate (Blais et al. 2001; Brynin and Sanders 1997). 
Furthermore, Bartle raises the important point that questions about party identification 
follow vote intention or choice questions in the order of the BES survey, leading to the 
suggestion that voters are simply replicating their vote response (Bartle 1999). These 
arguments suggest the British electorate could have more fluid attachments to political 
parties. When responding to questions about party identification, voters may be more 
influenced by their current vote choice or evaluations of party leaders, rather than their 
‘attachment’ to political parties. The absence of stable party identification under the Butler 
and Stokes model leads to greater opportunity of ‘short-term’ influences, such as party 
leaders to affect British voters.  
Rational choice theories of voter behaviour place little emphasis on evaluations of 
candidates and leaders. Where scholars transfer economic theories of rational choice to the 
study of elections, voters are assumed to make calculated, informed decisions that weigh up 
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the costs and benefits of available parties (Dowding 2018). In essence, voters are expected to 
use their vote in the way that maximises the benefits, and minimizes the costs, to themselves 
(Denver, Carman, and Johns 2012). Voters assess the position of each party’s economic 
policies, traditionally about the level of redistribution, to guide their vote choice. The rational 
choice model of voter behaviour works when there are economic differences between parties 
but does not work effectively with other cleavages in society.  
Spatial models of British voter behaviour incorporate numerous cleavages in society 
beyond economics to explain voter behaviour. While Downs (1957) theorised that left-right 
ideology effectively encompassed the series of cleavages in society, other policy issues have 
been considered. Class, regionalism and occupation are all identified by McLean (1982) as 
being important to understand the positional issues of British parties. Voters are expected to 
support the party their views align with. Attempts have been made to incorporate voters’ 
evaluations of party leaders into spatial models. Adams (2001) explains there will be some 
voters who will be motivated to vote for a party based on comparisons of competing party 
leaders, even when rival parties are more attractive on policy grounds. Spatial models of voter 
behaviour were particularly useful in Britain when there were clear ideological divisions and 
policy goals between the two major parties (Clarke et al. 2004). When major parties converge 
on the centre ground and voters recognise their similarity, they can lose votes to third parties 
(Green 2015). Spatial models may be effective when parties are distinctively different in 
policies offered to the electorate but are noticeably less effective when parties converge in 
the centre. In this way, voters may consider other factors to decide their vote choice when 
the majority of the electorate are broadly in agreement about policy outcomes.  
Valence theory argues that vote choice is based upon the performance and 
competence of parties and leaders. Greater importance is attributed to performance when 
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parties and voters generally agree on the desirable outcomes of key issues, such as the 
provision of improved health care, but there are differences in how parties and candidates 
aim to achieve these goals (Dowding 2018). Political parties competing on valence issues can 
use a competent and trustworthy leader as one strategy to persuade voters that their party 
will deliver on policy goals and manage public services effectively (Holmberg and Oscarsson 
2013). In addition, parties will be keen to emphasise valence issues that voters believe would 
be implemented successfully. Clarke et al. (2004) place the competence and performance of 
parties and leaders at the centre of their theory of voter behaviour. Clarke et al. (2004, 2009a) 
contend that voters are more irrational and impressionistic than is argued in rational choice 
models. Valence explanations of voter behaviour draw from psychological literature about 
heuristics. Heuristics are a mental shortcut, which in a political context, help voters avoid a 
costly procedure of gathering and processing substantial amounts of information in an 
intricate political world where events rapidly develop (Whiteley et al. 2013). Instead voters 
use general cues to assess whether political actors will perform well and deliver on salient 
issues (Clarke et al. 2004, 2009a). Heuristics enable voters to make electoral choices without 
having to engage with significant levels of information about competing political parties. As 
such, heuristics have been described as having a “less is more effect”. Even if voters could 
access an abundance of information, doing so would be costly for the individual to process 
and would lead them to the same conclusion (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2011). 
The valence model is not without criticism. Evans and Chzhen (2016) tested the 
assumptions of valence theory using longitudinal data with the purpose of establishing the 
direction of causality between party choice and key valence variables. Evans and Chzhen 
(2016) conclude that party and leader performance had no significant effect on vote choice. 
These findings were rebuffed from the principal authors of the valence model who argued 
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the criticism was invalid on both empirical and theoretical grounds (Whiteley et al. 2016). 
Whiteley et al. (2016) argue in the empirical test of the valence model conducted by Evans 
and Chzhen, they excluded key variables of leader images and voters’ assessments of which 
party would be the ‘best’ at addressing their most important issue. These are two key 
indicators of performance that were absent from the model. Moreover, on theoretical 
grounds, they argue their valence model theorises a reciprocal relationship between several 
key variables, such as party identification and leadership evaluations. In other words, the 
valence variables identified by Whitely et al. (2016) are pieces of a puzzle that explain vote 
choice. A single piece of the puzzle will not provide an adequate explanation of vote choice. 
The valence model places assessments of leaders at the centre of explaining voter 
behaviour, in contrast to other models that give little or no consideration to leaders. 
Proponents of the valence model argue ‘How better, then, to crystallize one’s view of a party 
than by making a judgement about the character and competence of its leader?’ (Clarke et al. 
2004, 9). Voters do not have to understand the process of how the party would achieve their 
policy goals, but would be confident that leaders would be effective in achieving these goals 
(Whiteley et al. 2013). The valence model suggests a stronger link between the evaluations 
of party leaders, performance of political parties and partisan identity. Clarke et al. (2009a) 
explain that their understanding of party identification fits with Fiorina’s (1981) ‘running tally’ 
argument that party identification is an assessment of the performance of parties and their 
leaders. Whitely et al. (2013) outline that strength of partisanship differs within the electorate 
but do treat partisanship as a fixed independent variable. However, they differentiate that 
there are many strong and consistent party identifiers in the electorate, but others have more 
flexible attitudes to party identification.  
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Which Voters do Leaders Affect? 
 
 Party leaders are unlikely to have a uniform effect on the electorate. Researchers have 
theorised that specific subgroups of voters may be influenced more by leaders when deciding 
their vote. In this section I outline which groups of voters have received particular attention 
from scholars.  
‘Unsophisticated’ voters is a term attributed to voters who use leader evaluations to 
decide their vote choice (Mughan 2015). Rico (2014) highlights that ‘unsophisticated’ has 
become linked with voting based on candidate evaluations or personality following some 
initial research on this subject in The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960). Campbell et al. 
found that 20% of respondents in their 1956 survey did not comment upon any issues of 
policy but that 40% of this sub-group of voters did have an opinion on the presidential 
candidates. Although Campbell et al. (1960) do not label these individuals as unsophisticated, 
they found individuals in the group had lower levels of education relative to their wider 
sample. The connection between difficulty in understanding political events and processes, 
and voting based on how individuals feel about candidates or leaders was established. Voting 
based on policy concerns was seen as a sophisticated approach to making political decisions, 
while voting based on leaders was unsophisticated or irrational (Clarke et al. 2009a; Gidengil 
2013; Rico 2014). However, mixed evidence has been found regarding a link between the 
sophistication of voters and leadership effects. Other studies have found that leaders are 
more important to those with high levels of political knowledge than those with lower levels 
(Gidengil 2013; Rico 2014; Whiteley et al. 2013). Voters with higher levels of political 
knowledge could give greater weight to leadership evaluations because they are conscious of 
how important leaders of government are. There is also no consensus on the direction of 
causality between voter sophistication and leadership evaluations. Do ‘unsophisticated’ 
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voters require leadership evaluations to make electoral decisions or do using leadership 
evaluations make a voter ‘unsophisticated’? Whilst there is no conclusive link, 
‘unsophisticated’ voters continue to be identified as a possible sub-section of the electorate 
that may be more greatly affected by leaders (Blais 2013; Mughan 2015). 
Another group of voters that are considered more susceptible to leader effects are 
those who consume high levels of televised political coverage. Coverage of politics is thought 
to be increasingly personalised because of a greater focus on leaders (Mughan and Aaldering 
2018). Focus on the activities of party leaders or their performance has come at the expense 
of policy discussion (Hayes 2009). Televised coverage is considered to be especially influential 
because leaders dominate this audio-visual medium. Even when news stories are not about 
party leaders, broadcasters often add visual images of party leaders in stories about their 
party (Mughan and Aaldering 2018). Contextually, UK broadcast media provide even greater 
coverage of leaders during election campaigns, offering voters easy access to an abundance 
of information about leaders (Gaber 2013). The introduction of televised debates between 
UK party leaders further contributes to election campaigns structured around these huge, 
leader-focused media spectacles (Deacon et al. 2017). Voters that consume televised political 
coverage, in contrast to other sources of news, give greater significance to party leaders 
because the information they consume is dominated by them (Lenz and Lawson 2011). While 
the disproportionate focus on party leaders observed by researchers provides good reason to 
investigate a relationship, the empirical evidence on whether consuming televised political 
coverage leads to greater leader effects remains inconclusive (Rico 2014). Further 
investigation might investigate whether voters with high consumption of television actually 
change their opinion of party leaders and that greater consumption does not simply reinforce 
existing views.  
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Party leaders are also theorised as having a greater effect on voters who do not 
identify with a political party. In the absence of attachment to a political party to guide vote 
choice, provides a greater opportunity for other factors, such as feelings about party leaders, 
to have a greater influence (Barisione 2009; Costa Lobo 2014). This rationale is consistent 
with the Michigan model and the conclusions of Butler and Stokes because the absence of 
partisanship provides greater opportunities for ‘short-term’ factors to affect voters (Butler 
and Stokes 1974; Campbell et al. 1960). Individuals without partisan attachments might 
consider greater political options and use their opinions about leaders to help guide their 
political decisions, especially when there are few clear policy differences between political 
parties (Blais 2013; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2013). This argument is particularly powerful 
within the valence model of voting, as leader evaluations offer voters a cost-effective 
heuristic for their vote choice (Clarke et al. 2004). British voters have become increasingly 
volatile over the last 50 years. Voters with weak or no party identification are more likely to 
vote for a different party in the next election than the previous election, compared to stronger 
partisans (Fieldhouse et al. 2020). Greater numbers of non-partisans in the electorate creates 
a more volatile electorate (Heath 2018) and also increases the potential for stronger leader 
effects on these voters. In other words, voters with weak or no party identification are more 
inconsistent with their political choice, opening up the possibility to be persuaded by leaders. 
Greater numbers of voters with either weak or no party identification create the conditions 
for more widespread leader effects.  
 
What is Important About Leaders and When? 
 
 The potential impact of leaders is constrained by the institutional and electoral 
political system of a country, in addition to its current political setting (Blais 2013). For 
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instance, leaders are found to be more important to catch-all parties, as opposed to class-
mass or denominational parties (Costa Lobo 2008). While voters in Westminster systems do 
not directly elect party leaders, they nevertheless create the conditions for strong leader 
effects. Westminster systems are structured around two main rival parties and thus only two 
leaders have a realistic chance of becoming Prime Minister (Curtice and Blais 2001; McAllister 
2013). First-past-the-post helps squeeze smaller parties, with their leaders having effectively 
no chance of becoming Prime Minister. These dynamics intensify interest in the activities, 
performance and characteristics of the leaders of the two largest parties. Heavy exposure also 
carries risk for leaders because, whilst leaders can gain from the attention, they can also lose 
out from the intense focus if they perform badly. Both the Prime Minister and the Leader of 
the Opposition have a considerable platform and resources to build support in anticipation of 
a general election (Van Der Eijk and Franklin 2009). Voters are aware that one of the leaders 
of the two largest parties will lead the next government, so evaluations of these leaders are 
the most important. 
It is important to recognise that British voters are unlikely to evaluate leaders in 
isolation because the Westminster system pits the leaders of the two largest parties against 
each other. As such, voters are likely to make their evaluations about leaders relatively – 
between the two potential options for Prime Minister (Mughan 2015). Relative evaluations 
discussed in the psychology literature, but not in a political context, indicate that individuals 
are unlikely to make absolute evaluations and instead consider potential alternatives when 
forming assessments about other people (Goffin and Olson 2011). In this case, leaders may 
only need to ‘beat what is in front of them’; they do not need to be a spectacular leader in 
their own right. Evidence of relative assessments from voters is not overwhelming but is an 
important consideration in understanding the impact of leader evaluations on voters. 
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Additionally, there has been little consideration of relative evaluations for the leaders of 
smaller parties in Britain. Leaders of smaller parties could be more important to voters 
deciding between voting for one of the two main parties and a minor party. It is also important 
to distinguish relative evaluations from negative effects arguments, where disliking leaders is 
considered more influential than liking a leader. However, there is minimal evidence to 
support this argument (Aarts and Blais 2011). Scholars have explained how voters judge 
leaders by how closely they fit their ‘prototype’ of an ideal leader, ‘Generally, the more the 
candidate matches the ideal, the more positively he or she will be perceived by voters’ 
(Bittner 2014, 58). Bean and Mughan (1989) have argued that judging leaders against an ideal 
set of qualities may not be generalisable beyond presidential systems, especially in 
Westminster systems where leaders are connected to the images of the party they lead. 
Additionally, it is reasonable to expect the most desirable qualities will differ between voters, 
and over time, as voters’ priorities change between elections. 
While voters make assessments of party leaders, leaders only have a limited time in 
office and when leaders change, voters must evaluate new leaders afresh. The impact of a 
party changing from one leader to another has been examined in a variety of ways. Often 
studies examine differences in policy and performance between the predecessor and the new 
leader (Bynander and ’t Hart 2006; Foley 2009; Harmel et al. 1995; Worthy and Bennister 
2020). Leaders are often replaced when they fail to take their party into government or keep 
them in government (Andrews and Jackman 2008), a tendency that is even more likely to 
occur in Westminster systems (So 2018). Occasionally, new leaders become both leader of 
their party and Prime Minister. Worthy (2016; Worthy and Bennister 2020) examines these 
cases and identifies that ‘take-over’ prime ministers on average have less time in power, often 
fail to win re-election and are more likely to lead a divided party. The circumstances in which 
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individuals become party leaders could therefore be influential in how voters assess their 
suitability to hold office.  
Few studies have investigated the effect that leadership change has on the electorate 
(Brown 1992; Johnston, Hartman, and Pattie 2019; Stewart and Carty 1993). Older studies 
have been constrained because high-quality data that captures leadership change and its 
effect on voters was unavailable. For example Brown’s (1992) study relies on cross-sectional 
data from private polling companies to determine whether the change from Thatcher to 
Major had an observable effect on Conservative vote intention. Panel data provides an 
opportunity to investigate the individual-level changes of voters. Johnston, Hartman and 
Pattie (2019) utilise panel data to analyse differences in voters’ evaluations between old and 
new leaders of the same party. Differences in evaluations are then used to explain voter 
behaviour at the 2017 General Election. Other studies have examined how new leaders 
provide an opportunity for voters to re-evaluate the left-right ideological positions of political 
parties and reaffirm or change their vote choice (Fernandez-Vazquez and Somer-Topcu 2019). 
Investigating the effect of leadership change on individual-level evaluations provides an 
opportunity to examine whether leadership evaluations are conditioned by attachment to 
the political party they lead. The extent to which leadership change is recognised by electors, 
and affects their evaluations, could provide greater insights into how voters construct their 
evaluations of party leaders. 
Academics have sought to establish which leadership traits are the most important to 
voters (Huber 2014; Shephard and Johns 2008). Personality and competency are two 
umbrella terms that have dominated investigations into which traits matter the most. 
Generally, personality traits capture the character of the leader, whereas competency traits 
capture the performance of leaders. However, there is no consensus on the terminology 
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intended to capture the different dimensions of the leader, and the national election surveys 
across Western Europe use a variety of terms to capture assessments of these two traits 
(Costa and Ferreira da Silva 2015). For example, Costa and Ferreira Da Silva (2015) classify a 
range of personality traits under the umbrella term of ‘warmth’ toward leaders. Evaluations 
of personality can be made relatively quickly and instinctively by voters. Quick evaluations are 
possible because voters are likely to assess leaders by an instinctive method, the same 
process they use to judge people ‘everyday’ (Capelos 2010). On the other hand, Clarke et al 
(2004, 2009a) suggest that competence is the most significant criterion for party leaders 
because voters want a government that can deliver on their policy agenda. Voters may be 
less concerned about the personality of a Prime Minister when a government is managing the 
country effectively. It is worth considering that the importance of specific traits may vary 
between voters. Leaders that score highly on ‘emotional’ personality traits were most 
relevant in explaining voter behaviour (Costa and Ferreira da Silva 2015). However, other 
studies have found that more favourable assessments of competence were specifically more 
important in explaining vote choice for right-wing parties (Bittner 2011). Analysis continues 
on identifying the underlying traits of party leaders that are most important to voters.  
Other contextual factors are important when analysing voters’ party leader 
evaluations. The connection to the party being led can affect which traits are important to 
voters. Evaluations are affected by the relationship of the leader and their party, leading 
voters to assess the traits of leaders based on stereotypical associations from the party they 
lead (Bittner 2014; Goren 2007; Hayes 2005). For example, presidential candidates for the US 
Democratic Party are conventionally associated with compassion and empathy, while 
Republican presidential candidates are typically considered stronger leaders (Hayes 2005). 
Associations between party images and their leaders are likely to be stronger in Britain with 
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no directly elected executive. Whilst their study focused on MPs rather than party leaders, 
Johns and Shephard (2007) found evidence of gender stereotyping of candidates when 
constructing evaluations. Findings suggested that female MPs were considered ‘warmer’ and 
male MPs were considered to be ‘stronger’ and that differences in gender evaluations were 
consistent when controlling for partisanship (Johns and Shephard 2007). Therefore, how 
voters assess specific leadership traits could be influenced by the gender of party leaders and 
stereotypical associations with the party they lead. 
Research into the effect of different traits in the UK has been constrained by the 
availability of data on this subject. British Election Study (BES) Internet Panel survey data from 
2014-17 includes only one explicit question that evaluates leaders for each wave of the study, 
asking respondents how much they like or dislike a leader (British Election Study 2018). 
Previous iterations of BES, such as the 2010 British Election Study internet panel (British 
Election Study 2010) included questioning respondents about a range of leadership traits, 
including ‘competency’, ‘trust’ and ‘responsiveness’. However, these specific traits have only 
been included sporadically in the latest version of the study that began in 2014. The omission 
of these variables is likely due to the transfer of the leadership of the BES from the University 
of Essex and University of Texas at Dallas to the universities of Manchester, Oxford and 
Nottingham for the 2015 election. Exploring the importance of traits beyond those listed in 
the BES can be done by using an experimental framework, which allows researchers to 
determine the specific traits that respondents are asked about when evaluating candidates 
(Johns and Shephard 2007; Shephard and Johns 2008). Furthermore, researchers have 
demonstrated that like-dislike evaluations of party leaders effectively provide a summary of 
individual attributes (Clarke et al. 2009a; Whiteley et al. 2013). Clarke et al. (2016) have 
demonstrated like-dislike evaluations of leaders are the most powerful individual predictor 
 42 
of vote intention, signalling that like-dislike evaluations are very useful to researchers. Clarke 
et al. (2009a) explain respondents’ evaluations of specific traits were unlikely to differ 
substantially from general assessments of likeability.  
Whilst the like-dislike evaluations may be effective summaries, the omission of 
questions about specific leadership traits means that it is difficult to investigate whether some 
leadership traits have become more important in recent elections. For example, studies of 
the 2005 UK General Election present more nuanced explanations of leader effects, pointing 
to the trustworthiness of Tony Blair being more important than other traits in 2005 (Evans 
and Andersen 2005; Stevens and Karp 2012). Both sets of findings suggested that specific 
leadership traits can gain or lose salience due to the contextual factors in an election. 
Following the 2003 war in Iraq and the 2009 MPs expenses scandal, the integrity and 
responsiveness of leaders was considered to be more important than their knowledge or 
competence (Stevens, Karp, and Hodgson 2011). Reliance on like-dislike evaluations within 
the current BES framework has not dampened the analysis of leader effects in the UK but 
does limit the possibilities of research (Johnston, Hartman, and Pattie 2019; Mellon et al. 
2018).  
 
Understanding Campaign Effects and Party Leaders During General Election 
Campaigns 
 
 Campaigns aim to mobilize potential voters, particularly those sympathetic to a party’s 
or candidate’s beliefs and values (Schmitt-Beck 2007). During election campaigns voters 
become more knowledgeable about politics, even if exposure to campaign activity is brief 
(Norris and Sanders 2003). Election campaigns provide opportunities for parties to maximise 
their vote while media focus on their activities is heightened. However, early models of voting 
behaviour in the US and Britain suggested that election campaigns were unlikely to change 
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the outcome of elections (Butler and Stokes 1974; Campbell et al. 1960; Lasarsfeld, Berelson, 
and Gaudet 1948; Schmitt-Beck 2007). With voters guided by strong attachments to political 
parties, campaigns were considered to have little chance of changing the choices of many 
voters. Some scholars even described campaigns as ‘more like end-games at chess, putting 
the final touches on a predictable outcome’ (Harrop and Miller 1987, 228). In other words, 
campaign efforts simply funnel the vote in a predictable direction.  
Theories of campaign effects have developed from the US literature on this subject. 
The argument that campaigns had ‘minimal effects’ on voter behaviour was tested by Finkel 
(1993) at three presidential elections (1980-88). He concluded that pre-campaign attitudes 
could predict vote intention for 80-85% of voters. Once changes in attitudes from the 
campaign were accounted for in the same model, they only led to a slight improvement in 
accuracy. Similar results were found for German federal elections (Finkel and Schrott 1995). 
In both the US and Germany, the predominant effect from the campaign was reinforcing the 
views of existing voters rather than convincing voters to switch. More recent field 
experiments found no evidence that campaign contact increased the number of voters that 
changed their vote choice (Kalla and Broockman 2018). Both the theoretical models of voting 
behaviour and evidence-based studies in the US have suggested that campaigns are unlikely 
to have either significant effects on individual voters or change the election outcome.  
 Campaign activities are unlikely to affect voters in a consistent way. Scholars have 
classified three different campaign effects: reinforcement, activation and conversion. Voters 
who are ‘reinforced’ during the campaign have their pre-existing views reaffirmed by the 
events of the campaign (Schmitt-Beck 2007). Reinforcement could be negative about rival 
parties or positive about the party a voter supports. Reinforcement may not be a particularly 
exciting campaign effect, but it is important to achieve high turnout among ‘core’ supporters. 
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Individuals activated by the campaign are considered to hold a latent predisposition to vote 
for a party. Events of the campaign activate this disposition as a time of heightened political 
activity (Finkel 1993; Schmitt-Beck 2007). For example, a voter may be generally supportive 
of the Labour Party, but considered voting Liberal Democrat when the campaign started, 
before returning to Labour by polling day. Typically, the effects of reinforcement and 
activation are more difficult to measure, but continue to be important to the outcome of 
elections (Erickson and Wlezien 2012; Fisher 2018). The final campaign effect is conversion. 
Viewed as ‘the holy grail of campaign effects’, conversion occurs when an elector switches 
from voting for one party to another (Erickson and Wlezien 2012, 9). It is considered the most 
powerful effect because it not only adds to a party’s total votes but also takes votes away 
from their rivals. Such effects can be observed with access to panel data that records pre-
campaign vote intention and post-campaign vote choice. However, for conversion effects to 
take place, it requires voters to be undecided or open to changing their vote during the 
campaign. Taken together, reinforcement, activation and conversion effects offer a clear 
framework for assessing the influence of the campaign on voters. 
A growing number of British voters are considered to be ‘late deciders’, meaning these 
voters who decide their vote choice during the campaign and create the possibility of larger 
conversion effects (Fisher 2018; McAllister 2003). ‘Floating’ voters are another group that 
may be greatly affected by conversion. This highly coveted group is often referenced without 
explanation of the characteristics that differentiate floating voters from other voters (Russo 
2014). Some explanations have been provided, such as being weak partisans with no 
ideological leaning, or voters that regularly switch parties from one election to the next 
(Bearnot and Schier 2012; Mellon 2016). Mayer (2007, 359) provides a theoretical definition 
of a ‘swing’ voter as someone who is ‘not so solidly committed to one candidate or the other 
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as to make all efforts at persuasion futile’. This definition provides a useful basis for 
conceptualising a highly sought-after group of voters. 
 It is worthwhile considering three contextual points that could impact campaign 
effects. Firstly, not all election campaigns will be influential and affect the result of an 
election. Parties and candidates that are unpopular leading into the campaign are unlikely to 
achieve a decisive breakthrough during the campaign (Fisher, Cutts, and Fieldhouse 2011). 
The level of support between candidates and leaders should be competitive to observe 
campaign effects (Erickson and Wlezien 2012). Secondly, parties must have an effective 
strategy for targeting their campaign resources. If elections are considered to be close where 
popular parties have similar levels of support, those that are effective in targeting their 
resources in specific seats or districts will result in more visible effects (Fisher 2018). 
Middleton (2019, 2014) has outlined how party leaders strategize which constituencies they 
visit during a campaign, with the purpose of maximising their party’s vote in that locality. 
Thirdly, the electoral system influences potential campaign effects. Parliamentary elections 
can be more predictable from opinion polls a year out from polling day, in contrast to 
presidential elections which are more difficult to predict months before the election (Jennings 
and Wlezien 2016). This is because attachments to parties are considered more durable than 
attachments to individual candidates. In close majoritarian parliamentary elections, shifts in 
votes towards one particular party in key constituencies can change the entire outcome of 
the election, even if this constitutes a small number of votes overall (Denver, Carman, and 
Johns 2012). For leaders to have an influential effect on the outcome in such circumstances, 
convincing huge swathes of the electorate is not necessary. 
The media environment of modern election campaigns is highly conducive to party 
leaders influencing voters. As I outlined previously, the focus on leaders is heightened during 
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modern general election campaigns through leader-centric televised programs (Deacon et al. 
2017; Gaber 2013; Harrison 1992; Mellon 2016). Political parties adjust their media strategies 
accordingly, if they believe their leader to be a vote winner. As the media content about party 
leaders places greater emphasis on the personality of leaders, often at the expense of policy, 
parties scheme to emphasise the positive points of their leader’s personality (Gaber 2013; 
Mazzoleni 2000). The Conservatives placed David Cameron’s personality at the forefront of 
their 2010 campaign to ‘decontaminate’ the Conservative Party brand (Seawright 2013, 167), 
while the ‘strong and stable’ leadership of Theresa May was thought to be one of the party’s 
most valuable assets in 2017 (Cowley and Kavanagh 2018). Leaders can attempt to transform 
their reputation during campaigns in an effort to persuade or reassure voters to support their 
party. Such a strategy does not always go to plan and in the case of Ed Miliband in 2015 there 
were only minor improvements (Fielding 2015). Additionally, reputations and popular 
perceptions of leaders can crumble, as in the case of Theresa May in 2017 (Bale and Webb 
2018; Cowley and Kavanagh 2018). The appeal of leaders can be used during modern election 
campaigns in concentrated effort to influence vote choice before polling day. 
The professionalisation of election campaign teams suggest that political parties 
recognise their fortunes can change decisively over a few weeks. The growth in political 
campaigns being run by public relations professionals, rather than party officials, is evident 
across advanced democracies (Kavanagh 1995; Mughan and Aaldering 2018). 
Professionalisation of electioneering, and television becoming the primary medium of 
political information, have contributed to a reassessment of campaign effects (Schmitt-Beck 
2007; Sunshine Hillygus and Jackman 2003). The campaign teams of UK political parties are 
now highly professionalised, with special advisors directing campaigns to the discomfort of 
some party officials (Farrell and Webb 2003; Kavanagh 1995; Sinclair and Atkinson 2017). 
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Politicians and their costly campaign teams would disagree with any suggestion that political 
campaigns only serve to funnel voters to a predetermined destination (Erickson and Wlezien 
2012). The attitude of political parties to election campaigns directly conflicts with scholars’ 
arguments that campaigns have minimal effects (Butler and Stokes 1969; Finkel 1993). It is 
worth considering that highly professionalised campaign operations from a political party 
may only serve to cancel out the campaign efforts of rival parties. However, with access to 
panel data it is possible to observe the churn of campaign effects, even if this does not 
translate to changes at the aggregate level of party support. 
 
Evidence of Leadership Effects from Recent Elections 
 
 Investigations into the effect of party leaders have arrived at contradictory 
conclusions. Some have argued there is little evidence to suggest that evaluations of party 
leaders have a strong effect on voters’ choices (Bartle and Crewe 2003; Curtice and Blais 2001; 
King 2002). Other studies have found convincing evidence that party leaders have a strong 
effect in explaining vote choice (Clarke et al. 2016; Mughan 2009, 2015). Mughan and 
Aaldering (2018) suggest that contradictory conclusions are likely as studies often examine 
the effects of leaders in a single election, with the context of the elections being highly 
important in shaping how significant party leader effects can be. While the context of each 
election can affect how influential leaders are on vote choice, leader effects remain ‘sizeable 
and non-trivial’ (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2013, 35).  
 Recent leaders in the UK have received particular attention from researchers exploring 
the effect of leaders on voter behaviour. Tony Blair has received notable attention in this 
regard. A reputation of competency and popularity for Blair among the electorate meant he 
was an electoral asset to the Labour Party, whilst competing against a series of Conservative 
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leaders deemed to be less competent (Andersen and Evans 2003; Foley 2008). Even after 
being Labour leader for eleven years and Prime Minister for eight of those, Blair continued to 
have a lead over his Conservative rival Michael Howard in the 2005 General Election (Clarke 
et al. 2006; Norris and Wlezien 2005). John Major was also considered to be a vote winner for 
the Conservatives in 1992, leading them to a surprise victory against Labour and Neil Kinnock 
(Clarke, Ho, and Stewart 2000; Sanders 1992). Much attention was given to Nick Clegg during 
the 2010 campaign, where he transformed popular perceptions of his own image and his 
party’s standings rose dramatically in the polls. Clegg quickly became his party’s most visible 
electoral asset and his approval rating reached 77% net satisfaction (Fisher, Cutts, and 
Fieldhouse 2011; Kavanagh and Cowley 2010). This period was aptly dubbed “Cleggmania”, 
but despite Clegg’s rising approval ratings the Liberal Democrats lost seats in 2010, as 
ineffective local campaigning did not capitalise on Nick Clegg’s national performance (Fisher, 
Cutts, and Fieldhouse 2011). Many studies of party leaders in the UK have examined 
leadership effects in explaining the outcome of a single election.  
Examinations of the 2015 and 2017 general elections gave considerable attention to 
the appeal of party leaders in explaining the outcomes. David Cameron won a small majority 
in 2015 at the expense of Ed Miliband in an election considered too close to call. Though he 
was not a particularly popular leader, Cameron achieved a reputation for competence and as 
someone who could make tough but fair decisions (Byrne, Randall, and Theakston 2017; 
Whiteley et al. 2013; Worcester et al. 2016). Cameron’s net satisfaction ratings were healthy 
by historic standards, but most importantly remained comfortably higher than Ed Miliband’s 
for the duration of the 2010-15 parliament (Worcester et al. 2016). Ultimately, most voters 
considered Ed Miliband was a less safe option than Cameron to be Prime Minister (Fielding 
2015). Two fifths of the Labour electorate thought Miliband was not ready to become Prime 
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Minister on the eve of the 2015 election (Worcester et al. 2016). A notable section of the 
electorate believed there was something inherently wrong with Miliband, as his attempts to 
change voters’ perceptions of his abilities over the campaign came up short (Fielding 2015; 
Gaber 2017). Issues with Miliband’s leadership, set alongside the relatively good evaluations 
enjoyed by Cameron, were understood to contribute to the Conservative victory (Cowley and 
Kavanagh 2016; Geddes and Tonge 2015).  
Theresa May retained high leadership ratings after becoming Prime Minister in July 
2017 and with a consistent lead in leadership evaluations in the polls, she was expected to be 
a vote winner for the Conservatives (Denver 2018). The Conservatives were so confident in 
May’s personal appeal that their campaign was entirely focused around their leader (Bale and 
Webb 2018; Heath and Goodwin 2017). Conservative expectations of a relatively easy victory 
were buoyed by the fact that the veteran left-winger Jeremy Corbyn had become leader of 
the Labour Party and was recording very low favourability scores from voters. The unexpected 
dynamic of the 2017 election was the reversal in fortunes for the leaders (Smith 2017). As the 
campaign progressed, May became increasingly unpopular, while Corbyn became 
increasingly more popular (Mellon et al. 2018). Corbyn’s personal campaign approach 
contrasted to the rigid persona of May’s performance (Goes 2018). The substantial change in 
the assessments of party leaders over a short period of time provides a fairly unique case to 
examine the effect of leaders. The 2015 and 2017 elections therefore provide distinctive cases 
for examining the role and effect of party leaders on voter behaviour.  
 
Narratives from Election Night: Explaining Election Results and the Role of Party 
Leaders 
 
Media narratives explaining the outcomes of UK elections originate during live 
broadcasts of election results. Programmes begin to convey and describe the results to the 
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viewers as votes are counted (Lauerbach 2013; Orr 2015; Ross and Joslyn 1988). Explanation 
follows the presentation of results, which serves as an initial analysis of the results. Narratives 
which emerge on election night can frame the legacy of an incumbent, define an outgoing 
government, and establish political capital for parties and leaders (Cathcart 1997; Hale 1993; 
Mendelsohn 1998). The immediate nature of these explanations could be consequential for 
how election results are interpreted. Contemporary explanations of election outcomes begin 
seconds after the polls have closed with the reaction to the exit poll prediction long before 
the analysis of election study surveys can take place. In the 2017 broadcast, commentators 
explained that Labour did better than expected because a ‘Youthquake’ had taken place, 
meaning that turnout had increased unexpectedly among younger voters. The term 
‘Youthquake’ became so central to the political narrative that in 2017 it was named Oxford 
Dictionary’s ‘word of the year’. Following Prosser et al.’s analysis of survey data they 
concluded that the reported Youthquake as a myth (British Election Study Team 2018; 2020), 
while other researchers responded to reassert the case that the youth vote had made a 
significant and discernible difference (Sloam and Henn 2019; Stewart et al. 2018; Sturgis and 
Jennings 2020). The Youthquake example illustrates how competing explanations of the result 
can be proposed by academics long after the narrative has been established.  
The nature of election night broadcasts means explanations develop over the night, 
as more results are reported, and begin to describe national outcomes in greater detail. 
Election night broadcasts are the first time that political commentators and politicians reflect 
on the reasons that contributed to the election outcome. On election night, political actors 
react to individual constituency results and to the emerging evidence of the overall 
performance of their own, and rival parties. This presents a unique dynamic where politicians, 
broadcasters and commentators must react to the results in ‘real time’. The unique features 
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of election night have been highlighted by several researchers. Marriot’s (2000) study details 
the distinct nature of these broadcasts in connecting the ‘centre’, in the form of the BBC 
studio, to the ‘periphery’ of a multiplicity of outside broadcast locations (such as election 
counts, party headquarters and party leaders’ homes). Lauerbach (2013, 2007) evaluates the 
purpose of UK election night broadcasts in comparison to public and private broadcasters, 
and offers comparisons with Germany and the United States. 
The BBC has broadcast televised general election results programmes since 1950, 
presenting individual constituency results and the wider outcome (Crick 2018). The 1997 UK 
General Election broadcast received widespread attention because of the decisiveness of 
Labour’s landslide victory following 18 years of Conservative government. Cathcart (1997) 
accounts the entirety of the night in 1997, albeit from a journalistic view point rather than an 
academic study. Cathcart’s focus is on capturing the drama of Labour’s historic landslide, 
attributing a significant section to Blair’s triumphant speech to a jubilant Labour victory party. 
Dedicated mobile camera crews were deployed to follow the leaders of the three main parties 
by 1997, allowing broadcast journalists in the studio to track their movements across the 
night (Marriott 2000). The decision to follow the movements of party leaders with mobile 
camera crews signals their importance to the producers of the broadcast. Lauerbach (2007) 
explains that the announcement of Labour’s victory in 1997 would mark the end of John 
Major’s leadership of the Conservative party and begin the internal struggle to replace him. 
Furthermore, Lauerbach (2007) identifies how broadcasters frame the exit poll around the 
Labour leader as, ‘Tony Blair is to be Prime Minister’, rather than the Labour party winning 
the election. Each of these studies on the 1997 election have highlighted the particular 
attention given to leaders during the broadcast. Academic study into election night 
broadcasts in the US have used textual data to study the discussion of character traits of 
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presidential candidates. Most notably Ross and Joslyn (1988) describe how on election night 
in 1984, Walter Mondale’s character was discussed in a positive tone, marking a dramatic 
change from the campaign where he was consistently criticised. Scholars have identified how 
leaders are considered to be important on election night, yet they have not engaged in a 
systematic study of the role of leaders in the broadcasts and how they are used to explain the 
election results. 
The principal authors of the Nuffield Series on UK General Elections, Cowley and 
Kavanagh (2016, 2018; Kavanagh and Cowley 2010) have dedicated a chapter to the events 
of election night from 2010 – 2017. The primary focus of these chapters is a chronological 
account of the night as a whole, focusing on behind-the-scenes reactions and activities, 
although Cowley and Kavanagh also highlight some key moments from election results 
programs. Particularly, the authors outline how politicians attempted to control the narrative 
of the outcome during these broadcasts. Opinion polling in 2015 suggested that either Labour 
or the Conservatives could form the next government and politicians were briefed to engage 
in a ‘battle for legitimacy’ during election night broadcast. The ‘battle’ centred around 
whether David Cameron could remain in number 10 even if the Conservatives did not win a 
parliamentary majority (Cowley and Kavanagh 2016, 214). Furthermore, Cowley and 
Kavanagh draw on information from sources within each party leader’s team to describe the 
very different reactions of Cameron and Miliband to the initial 2015 exit poll prediction. Again 
in 2017, the authors place their emphasis on behind-the-scenes reactions from the main party 
leaders to the exit poll announcement and unfolding results. In each of these elections, the 
principal exit poll projection was that no party would have an overall majority, heightening 
the level of drama as politicians attempted to influence the narrative in explaining the 
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election. These accounts of election nights provide a sense of the dynamics during the 
broadcast but do not provide a methodical analysis of the broadcast. 
Scholars have highlighted the value of the content from election night broadcasts but 
often cite the difficulty of gathering and processing the large amounts of available text (Schieß 
2007). For this reason, many in the UK and US have confined their studies to only one or two 
elections (Lauerbach 2007, 2013; Marriott 2000; Patterson 2003; Ross and Joslyn 1988). 
However, the content of election night broadcasts has been identified as a valuable data 
source for researchers to examine a range of features during this unique event, including the 
centrality of leaders to explanations of the election outcome. Importantly, these programmes 
remain widely watched in the UK despite concerns about declining viewing figures (Coleman 
2002), with estimates for 2015 and 2017 suggesting that the average audience for the 
duration of BBC1’s election night coverage was over 4 million at both elections (Press Gazette 
2017; The Guardian 2015). Election night broadcasts remain a unique and popular media 
event. A careful consideration of textual data from these broadcasts would contribute to a 
fuller understanding of how party leaders are understood to have affected the election 
outcome by examining their role within such broadcasts.  
 
Challenges in the Study of Party Leaders 
 
 One of the primary concerns when examining the effect of party leaders in relation to 
voter behaviour is the difficulty of isolating their effect. Evaluations of party leaders are 
entangled with other important factors that influence voters. Often the primary concern with 
leader effects is how it becomes fused with the evaluations of parties. As Lobo explains, ‘It is 
extremely difficult to disentangle the two effects – leader and party – since the two are highly 
endogenous’ (2014, 148). Other researchers have highlighted issues in distinguishing the 
 54 
effect of personality traits from long-term structural trends in the UK polity, particularly 
where UK Prime Ministers have become more powerful (McAllister 2013). Isolating the effect 
of party leaders on voters is a challenging task. Arguments that are based on explaining the 
effect of the party leader can be greeted with scepticism. Critics may argue that evaluations 
of leaders are simply a reflection of the broader evaluations of political parties (Bartle and 
Crewe 2003; Curtice and Blais 2001). While leaders come and go over time feelings towards 
parties remain a long-term driver of vote choice in elections.  
However, the possibility that leaders could change the way a voter feels about a party, 
or be the reason why an individual identifies with the party, might be overlooked. For 
example, Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the Labour party caused a surge in membership of 
the party, but these newer members identified themselves as ‘Corbynistas’ first and Labour 
Party identifiers second (Pickard 2018). King’s (2002) approach distinguishes between the 
direct and indirect effects of party leaders. Indirect effects can be understood as leaders 
affecting voters by something that they have done, for example modernising their party or 
changing policy direction (Foley 2009; Worthy 2016). Direct influences are understood as 
leaders affecting voters because of something that he or she is. A more convincing 
explanation is that leaders and parties have a reciprocal causal relationship between the 
policies of the party and the image of their leader (Bellucci, Garzia, and Lewis-Beck 2015; 
Garzia 2012). In other words, both the evaluations of political parties and their leaders matter 
when understanding vote choice. Distinguishing the impact of leaders’ personalities and 
characteristics is an ongoing challenge for researchers interested in leader effects. 
 Much research on examining the effect of party leaders is based on cross-sectional 
data. Using cross-sectional data, which after all is a snapshot in a specific time point, may 
conceal some of the intricacies of leadership effects. Most studies, while they have a unique 
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research question, follow a fairly fixed methodological approach that uses standard 
regression techniques to examine leader effects using cross-sectional data.1 Redirecting 
analysis of leadership effects using panel data may provide greater insights. Barisione (2009, 
p. 493) has highlighted the substantial reliance on cross-sectional data in the field, suggesting 
‘it would be more valuable for research to focus at the same time on qualitative (or qualitative 
experimental) techniques, longitudinal (or panel) designs, comparative methods, and 
multilevel techniques.’ Studying individual-level change requires data collected in specific 
time frames, with scholars like Garzia (2012), producing models on pre- and post-election 
panel data to examine the influence of leaders. Examining leader evaluations over time can 
provide numerous advantages. Panel data allows researchers to examine leadership 
evaluations in both individual-level change and differences between other respondents 
(Preißinger and Schoen 2016). This provides an effective methodological approach to analyse 
the importance of leaders relative to other factors because change in leader evaluations is 
specific to the individual (Johnston, Hartman, and Pattie 2019; Mellon et al. 2018). Panel data 
can also be utilised to examine aggregate-level changes between waves of a particular study 
(Preißinger and Schoen 2016). The flexibility of the data provides researchers with a range of 
opportunities to examine vote behaviour and political attitudes.  
Election studies are increasingly designed with panel data structures. Modern studies 
have expanded beyond pre, campaign and post-election waves, to develop and provide data 
on a comprehensive time scale rather than the months surrounding one particular election 
(British Election Study 2018; German Longitudinal Election Study 2017; Pollard and 
Mendelsohn 2016). The availability of longitudinal data expands the range of analytical 
 
1 See the following studies for examples (Andersen and Evans 2003; Goren 2007; Mughan 2009; Stevens, Karp, 
and Hodgson 2011) 
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techniques available to researchers. Utilising opportunities provided by the internet to create 
panels of respondents can also increase the size of the samples because it is a cost efficient 
way of collecting data (Bryman 2016; Fieldhouse and Prosser 2018). It is then possible to 
examine sub-sections of particular interest to researchers in greater detail. Using longitudinal 
data to inform analysis of party leader effects provides an opportunity to examine their 




 This chapter has outlined how party leaders have an important role in many aspects 
associated with elections, in addition to decisions about vote choice. I established during the 
chapter that early theories of voter choice argued voters’ feelings towards party leaders had 
minimal effects on vote choice. Party identification and alignment to social groups were 
considered to minimise the potential effects from leaders. In the context of class and partisan 
dealignment, it has become more widely accepted that leaders could be influential in 
affecting voter behaviour. Research has indicated that leaders are unlikely to have a uniform 
effect on voters, with non-partisans, unsophisticated voters and high consumers of televised 
political news theorised to use leader evaluations more when deciding their vote. It is clear 
that, in addition to the characteristics of the British electorate, the media environment, and 
Westminster political system contribute to greater opportunities for leaders to be impactful. 
Most scholars have acknowledged that leaders are influential in contemporary UK elections, 
even if the salience of leaders varies between elections. The effect of party leaders is likely to 
have a complex relationship with vote choice and a nuanced influence over the electorate. 
 How leaders are evaluated by voters remains more difficult for researchers to provide 
a definitive answer on, particularly as specific traits may gain importance during certain 
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elections. Voters are likely to evaluate leaders naturally when they are exposed to 
information about them, but whether this is done against any well-defined criteria of an ideal 
leader seems unlikely. Most work in this regard has been done in a quasi-experimental 
framework, with participants making assumptions about fictional leaders rather than actual 
one. There has been less analysis of how individual feelings towards leaders develop over 
time, with longitudinal data on this subject remaining relatively scarce. Examining the stability 
of evaluations will provide important insights into whether voters make drastic adjustments 
about leaders in the light of new evidence or whether the first evaluations voters make of 
leaders remain stable.  
 Modern campaigns centre around leaders of political parties. Debate still exists about 
whether campaign events affect the decisions made by voters at the ballot box, but it is clear 
that media attention is disproportionately focused around the leaders of political parties. This 
tendency has only become exacerbated in election campaigns since 2010 that include 
televised leader debates. In addition, if parties consider their leader to be an electoral asset, 
they may choose to focus even more on these leaders during the campaign. Campaigns may 
provide an opportunity for leaders with weaker evaluations to transform their reputation 
over a few weeks. Specifically, leaders are likely to want to improve their evaluations among 
voters that could convert during the campaign whilst at the same time also reinforcing their 
core vote. If leaders are able to convince this key group of voters during the campaign, then 
it pinpoints the specific circumstances where party leaders impact vote choice.  
 The actions of leaders and their performance during the campaign are considered 
important details in explaining the outcome of elections. Long running series such as Britain 
Votes, Britain at the Polls and the Nuffield Series on general elections have documented how 
leaders help explain the outcome of elections. In order to provide highly detailed accounts of 
 58 
each election these explanations are not available until months after polling day. Instead 
explanations of the results begin almost immediately, with results programmes on election 
night providing the first initial understandings of the results. While researchers have found it 
difficult to utilise these broadcasts in their analysis, it has been demonstrated that parties will 
attempt to shape the narratives of the election that are first developed during the broadcast. 
Party leaders have been identified as important actors during election night broadcasts, 
despite researchers detailing problems collecting and analysing this data. In the few British 
election broadcasts analysed in greater detail, leaders have received interest from scholars 
but as these elections are analysed in isolation, there is no context on whether leaders have 
always retained this role in the broadcasts.  
 Having detailed important areas in the existing literature where further research 
would contribute to a greater understanding of the role and effect of party leaders, the next 
chapter outlines the methodological approach to undertake this analysis. I present the core 
objectives of this thesis, the hypotheses tested, and the methodological approach undertaken 
to provide a greater understanding of party leaders.  
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Chapter 3 : Research Design, Methods and Approach 
 
As previous research has shown, investigating the role and effect of party leaders is 
complex. Difficulties in disentangling leaders from other effects and the political context can 
lead to divergent conclusions (Barisione 2009; Mughan and Aaldering 2018). The aim of this 
thesis is to provide a fuller understanding of leadership evaluations, their effect on vote 
choice and the role of leaders for explaining election outcomes. Leaders are investigated in 
three distinct political contexts in this thesis. First, over a three-year period from 2014-2017 
that includes two general elections. Second, during the campaigns for the 2015 and 2017 
general elections. Third, in the immediate post-election environment of election night 
broadcasts. A central hypothesis is developed in relation to each context, with additional sub-
hypotheses developed to investigate further nuances in the effects and role of party leaders. 
The purpose is to examine fundamental aspects of party leaders and also to provide greater 
evidence about individual election results. While I have outlined that leaders are under-
researched in some respects, this study aims to build upon the cumulative knowledge about 
party leaders through utilising methodological advancements and gathering new data on the 
subject. Advances in methodological approaches and survey designs are outlined as a 
necessary step to provide a more detailed understanding about leader effects. These 
opportunities make it possible to analyse party leaders from new angles and in different 
contexts.  
To answer the hypotheses outlined in this chapter, I provide a summary of the data 
and methods used to test them. The British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) is used 
extensively in this thesis. I describe the richness of this dataset and its appropriateness for 
analysing questions about voters’ assessments of party leaders and the effect of leaders on 
voter behaviour. Taken together, the size of the BESIP and the number of waves in which the 
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survey was completed, represent a unique opportunity to analyse party leaders. Reliable 
panel data, such as the BESIP, widens the available methodological approaches when studying 
party leader effects. Multilevel models, path models and machine learning approaches can 
utilise different aspects of the longitudinal research design and contribute new insights about 
party leaders. Each of these approaches is described in detail in this chapter to answer specific 
research questions. To examine the role of party leaders in the post-election narrative it was 
necessary to create a new data set of BBC election night transcripts. Transcripts were 
analysed thematically to maintain the nuances of the broadcast data, while providing a 
detailed and comparative study of party leaders. The analysis is complemented by descriptive 
statistics that provide useful summaries that present trends in the data.  
 This chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I outline and discuss each hypothesis, 
embedding it within the relevant literature. Following this, I describe the research design and 
data analysis techniques that are used to test the hypotheses and answer the research 
questions posed by this thesis. Next, I present the quantitative and qualitative data that were 
selected for analysis. The characteristics of the BESIP are outlined and the suitability of using 
the panel to analyse leader effects is explained. Details about the specific statistical methods 
used to analyse the quantitative data follow. The chapter then moves to the qualitative data, 
how the election night transcripts were gathered, and the level of information retained in the 
transcript. The chapter concludes by reviewing the process undertaken to analyse the 
transcripts. 
 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 
Party leaders have a dominant role in modern politics and have a complex relationship 
with voters. As a result, the effects and role of party leaders are highly nuanced, requiring the 
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careful construction of hypotheses. Box 3.1 sets out each of the hypotheses that are tested 
in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. The first hypothesis examines how voters’ 
leadership evaluations change over time, while the second examines how these changes 
affect vote choice during the campaign; and the third hypothesis examines how leaders are 
used to explain the outcome of elections during election night. The hypotheses seek to extend 
existing knowledge about leader effects, with a particular emphasis on seeking to identify 
causal relationships between variables.  
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Box 3.1: Hypotheses and sub-hypotheses
 
 
Evaluations of leaders will vary over time. 
The point in the electoral cycle when data is collected will affect how much evaluations 
change. 
Where new party leaders are evaluated for the first time, there will be greater 
change in evaluations.  
During general election campaigns, there are greater changes than baseline 
changes in evaluations of leaders.  
Evaluations of party leaders are stable during waves where there is no leadership 
change or general election campaign. 
Changes in leader evaluations are relative to changes of rival leaders. 
The size of change in leadership evaluations will differ between voters. 
Voters with weak or no party identification will have greater changes in 
evaluations. 
Voters with lower levels of education, or who find it difficult to understand 
politics, will have greater changes in evaluations. 
Voters that use television as their source of political information will have greater 
changes in evaluations.  
 
Changes in leadership evaluations during general election campaigns affect vote choice 
How voters feel before the campaign will largely predict their actual vote choice. 
Pre-campaign leadership evaluations have a strong effect on vote choice. 
Changes in leadership evaluations during the campaign improve predictions of vote 
choice. 
Most voters are unlikely to change vote choice, irrespective of changes in 
leadership evaluations seen over the campaign. 
The effect of leadership evaluations will differ across voters and elections 
Of the voters who do switch during the campaign, change in leadership evaluations 
explain this choice. 
Voters susceptible to converting during the campaign will have moderate pre-
campaign views. 
Change in leader evaluations during the campaign will be more moderate in 2015 
than 2017 and the effect of evaluations will reflect the level of change. 
 
Party leaders are central figures in the explanations of modern elections during 
election night 
Discussion and focus of party leaders increase over time. 
Party leaders are central to the immediate understandings presented by 
broadcasters in explaining results. 
Greater focus is given to leadership succession, performance and characteristics 
of leaders during modern coverage. 
Modern election night broadcasts examine the performance and characteristics 
of leaders during the preceding campaign. 
Actions of leaders are blamed and praised by participants when explaining the 
outcome of elections. 
 63 
Individual evaluations of party leaders will vary over time 
 The first hypothesis is framed to examine whether voters’ leader evaluations change 
over time and investigate causes of this change. Originally determined to be a ‘short-term’ 
factor by Butler and Stokes (1969, 1974), leader evaluations were seen to be guided by long-
term attachments to parties and this suggested that voters’ feelings about leaders would be 
stable. Do voters make up their mind about a leader and stick with it or are they responsive 
to political events and update their evaluations accordingly? Leaders are now considered to 
play a larger role in most voters’ electoral choices than in the past (Clarke et al. 2016; Costa 
Lobo 2014) but there has been little investigation into individual-level changes in evaluations 
over time. Two significant political events that could produce change in evaluations are new 
leadership of a party and the intensive general election campaign period. New leadership 
provides an opportunity for voters to examine a new leader, re-examine their competitors 
and boost the popularity of the party (Brown 1992; Fernandez-Vazquez and Somer-Topcu 
2019; Johnston, Hartman and Pattie 2019; Stewart and Carty 1993). Because television 
coverage of modern elections typically diverts ever more attention to leaders, voters are 
exposed to an increase in campaign coverage of leaders that may prompt them to adjust their 
evaluations (Berz 2020; Cowley and Kavanagh 2018; Gidengil 2013; Mughan and Aaldering 
2018). 
 If evaluations do change, it raises another important question: are evaluations 
changing in isolation or relative to other leaders? It is important to investigate changes in the 
evaluations of rival leaders to provide a greater understanding about how voters evaluate 
leaders. Previous evidence suggested that relative assessments between the leaders of the 
largest two parties are likely, but there has been little consideration of minor party leaders 
(Goffin and Olson 2011; Mughan 2015). Examining whether leadership evaluations change in 
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relation to multiple leaders will provide a greater understanding of the dynamics of these 
evaluations. This argument contrasts with other studies that suggest voters compare leaders 
against ideal-type criteria (Bittner 2014); instead voters pick the best of the available options.  
 Changes in evaluations are unlikely to be uniform across the electorate. Three sub-
hypotheses were developed to test whether voters with particular characteristics changed 
their evaluations to a lesser or greater extent. First, voters with no party identification are 
expected to change their leadership evaluations to a greater extent. Voters with weak or no 
party identification lack a strong long-term attachment to a political party that would guide 
their attitudes; instead these voters may look to party leaders to help determine their vote 
choice (Barisione 2009; Blais 2013; Costa Lobo 2014). Voters with strong attachments to 
parties are unlikely to change their evaluations of leaders because they support the wider 
party. Alternatively, leaders may be irrelevant to how individuals decide their vote choice. 
Second, voters who find it difficult to understand politics are more likely to show greater 
changes in evaluations. This hypothesis tests the ‘unsophisticated’ voter argument, where 
studies have argued that ‘less sophisticated’ voters are more likely to use leaders as a heuristic 
shortcut, than their ‘sophisticated’ counterparts (Clarke et al. 2009a; Gidengil 2013; Rico 
2014). Other evidence has led to the contrasting conclusion that those with higher levels of 
political knowledge are more affected by leaders (Rico 2014; Whiteley et al. 2013). I attempt 
to provide some clarity on this contentious issue. Third, voters that consume greater televised 
political coverage are expected to lead to greater changes in leader assessments. As televised 
political coverage disproportionately focuses on leaders (Gaber 2013; Mughan and Aaldering 
2018), voters who consume more of this coverage will gain more information about them 
(Lenz and Lawson 2011). These voters may adjust their evaluations in accordance with the 
greater political information they consume.  
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Change in leadership evaluations during general election campaigns affects vote choice 
UK general election campaigns are short, often only a month long, with little time for 
pre-existing views to be changed (Butler and Stokes 1974; Harrop and Miller 1987). The first 
set of sub-hypotheses for this section assess whether pre-campaign leadership evaluations 
are fundamental to explaining vote choice at general elections. If most voters have stable 
political opinions that do not change during campaigns, it will be relatively easy to predict 
individuals’ party choice for an election based on their pre-campaign attitudes. The next set 
of hypotheses examine the impact of adding change in leadership evaluations during the 
campaign and whether this helps explain vote choice. Isolating changes in evaluations is 
important because it separates differences that occur during the campaign from individuals’ 
baseline assessments of leaders (Finkel 1993; Finkel and Schrott 1995). Despite modelling 
changes that occur during the campaign, it is likely that most individuals will vote for the same 
party they intended to vote for before the campaign started. In other words, the primary 
campaign effect observed is likely to be a reinforcement of pre-existing views (Finkel 1993; 
Wlezien and Erikson 2002). This does not mean that reinforced voters have static opinions 
during the campaign but that their opinions would not change significantly enough to alter 
their vote choice, or that tentative initial preferences become stronger during the campaign. 
Moderate changes to leadership evaluations can assist in reaffirming vote choice or activating 
pre-disposed attitudes to vote for a party (Erickson and Wlezien 2012).  
Nevertheless, voters that do convert during the campaign are of particular interest to 
researchers and political parties (Erickson and Wlezien 2012; Fisher 2018). The final set of 
hypotheses propose that changes in leadership evaluations are essential to explaining why 
voters convert to another party during the campaign. However, in order for voters to be 
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converted during the campaign, they must first be susceptible to conversion. Voters with 
entrenched attitudes are highly unlikely to be converted during the campaign (Schmitt-Beck 
2007). Voters that are not decisively supportive of one party leading into the campaign have 
greater potential to change during the campaign. I hypothesise differences between 2015 and 
2017 in how effective changes in leadership evaluations are to voters who convert to another 
party during the campaign. Not all campaigns are influential (Erickson and Wlezien 2012), and 
the 2015 and 2017 elections serve as two contrasting elections to analyse. Initial assessments 
of these campaigns have outlined the dramatic aggregate changes in 2017 but only moderate 
changes for 2015 (Goes 2018; Mellon et al. 2018; Smith 2017). Comparative investigation of 
individual-level changes during these campaigns would provide further answers about the 
impact of the campaign on the outcome.  
 
Party leaders are central figures in the explanations of modern elections during election night 
 Explanations of electoral outcomes begin immediately during election night television 
coverage (Cathcart 1997; Hale 1993; Mendelsohn 1998). This hypothesis tests whether 
leaders of political parties are increasingly placed at the heart of those explanations and how 
leaders are understood to have influenced vote choice. Assessing how this trend has 
developed over time provides additional insights. I also examine the different aspects of party 
leaders that broadcasters focus upon during the coverage. Differences in the language used 
between elections has been studied in US broadcasts but not in UK broadcasts (Frankovic 
2003; Patterson 2003). Analysing how leaders are discussed during election night provides 
key information about which aspects of party leaders broadcasters highlight during the 
coverage. Researchers have argued that election campaigns are increasingly personalised and 
these hypotheses test whether the explanation of election outcomes have also become 
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personalised (Deacon et al. 2017; Gaber 2013). As a consequence, are leaders praised or 
blamed for the election results? Similarly, how much attention is attributed to the leaders’ 
campaign performance when broadcasters are explaining the outcome? Testing these 
hypotheses from a dataset of seventeen elections provides an opportunity to examine how 
these trends develop over time. Each election has a unique context that may increase the 
focus on leaders during the broadcast. By examining change over many elections, I investigate 




I use a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques to test my 
hypotheses. Analysing qualitative and quantitative data provided many benefits to 
investigate party leaders at different stages of the electoral cycle (McQueen and Knussen 
2002). When investigating leadership effects on voters, the research is dominated by the 
analysis of British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) data. The extensive time period of the 
panel provides an opportunity to research leaders across the ‘long campaign’ and the ‘short 
campaign’. The public availability of the BESIP allowed me to target my resources to leverage 
findings from the data using a range of methods. In the case of the qualitative data, I 
determined it was necessary to compile a new data set in order to test the hypotheses 
outlined in the previous section. Studying how leaders are portrayed in post-election 
narratives naturally lends itself to analysing qualitative data, with election night broadcasts 
identified as a useful data source to test the hypotheses. The complexity of studying party 
leaders is well documented and the approach taken in this thesis aimed to provide a nuanced 
analysis that utilised the best available data.  
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My approach aimed to provide a more comprehensive analysis compared to previous 
studies of party leaders. As outlined in the literature review, often researchers restrict their 
investigation of leaders to a single election or to only analysing party leaders using cross-
sectional data gathered close to polling day (Mughan and Aaldering 2018). The British Election 
Study (BES) provides publicly available data that is far superior in quality than I could have 
collected, in total covering two general elections over a three-year period. As with all 
secondary data sources the survey data was not tailored to my research, but this was a 
necessary trade-off given the representativeness of the sample and multi-wave design. 
Importantly, the data here analyses more than one election and the longitudinal design 
facilitates advanced research techniques that have been identified, but not conducted by, 
other researchers (Barisione 2009). Similarly, the qualitative data set constructed for this 
analysis is notably larger than previous studies that have analysed election night coverage. 
Election night broadcast data was collected from elections dating back to the 1950s up until 
2017. Gathering and cleaning the text from broadcasts was time-consuming but necessary to 
analyse post-election narratives. Widening the number of broadcasts used allowed trends 
relating to party leaders to be tracked over time. Textual data from election night broadcasts 
provided an important opportunity to analyse the role of party leaders beyond survey data.  
 
Selection of Quantitative Data 
  The ongoing British Election Survey Internet Panel (BESIP), at the time of writing, is a 
nineteen-wave study, covering the period February 2014 – December 2019. I use the first 
thirteen waves of this panel that ran from February 2014 – June 2017. The longitudinal design 
of the study enables analysis of leaders over time and at specific points in the electoral cycle. 
BESIP data facilitated the use of a greater range of possible methodological techniques to 
 69 
analyse leaders than has been possible in previous studies (Barisione 2009; Garzia 2012). The 
BESIP longitudinal design has been effectively utilised by other researchers, producing 
insightful findings on leaders (Johnston, Hartman and Pattie 2019; Mellon et al. 2018). The 
size of the sample, design of the panel and quality of data provide a unique opportunity to 
examine individual-level evaluations of party leaders over a substantial time period. This 
section provides an overview of the qualities and structure of the BESIP. A more complete 
description of the data, its management and manipulation are presented in the Research 
Methods Appendix sections 1 and 2 but this section provides a summary of the main 
characteristics.  
BESIP data is structured around several major electoral events, with the details of 
these events noted in Table 3.1. Data was gathered flexibly by researchers who attempted to 
keep as many individuals in the panel as possible, but also include new individuals who may 
be in the study for only one or several waves (British Election Study 2018). This approach was 
to offset the inevitable panel attrition of the 30,569 respondents that completed the first 
survey. As a result, while the panel includes those who completed all thirteen waves, a series 
of smaller sub-panels exist that cover a smaller section of waves. A variety of weights are 
available in the BESIP to maintain the representativeness of the sample when studying 
different sections of the panel. Table 3.1 provides a complete overview of fieldwork dates for 
each wave. With the data structured around electoral events, the difference between 
fieldwork dates varies substantially. For instance, some waves follow on immediately after 
the previous wave has finished, while others do not begin for some months after the previous 
wave. I use the panel in two ways. Firstly, thirteen waves of the panel are analysed in Chapter 
Four to examine changes in leader evaluations over time. Secondly, in Chapter Five, particular 
focus is given to the pre-campaign, campaign and post-campaign waves of the 2015 and 2017 
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UK general elections. The BESIP has a unique design to accommodate the electoral events in 
the time covered and can be used flexibly by researchers. 
Table 3.1: British Election Study Internet Panel (W1-W13) Fieldwork Information 
Wave Dates Notes 
1 20th February – 9th March 
2014 
 
2 22nd May – 25th June 2014 Immediately follows European Parliament and Local 
Elections 22/5/14. 
3 19th September – 17th  
October 2014 
Immediately follows Scottish independence 
Referendum 18/9/14. 
4 4th March – 30th March 2015 Pre-Campaign Wave: 2015 UK General Election 
5 31st March – 6th May 2015 Campaign Wave: 2015 UK General Election 
6 8th May – 26th May 2015 Post-Campaign Wave: 2015 UK General Election 
7 14th April – 4th May 2016 Devolved Elections 5/5/16.  
8 6th May – 22nd June 2016 Campaign Wave: 2016 EU Referendum Campaign. 
9 24th June – 4th July 2016 Post-Campaign Wave: 2016 EU Referendum 
Campaign. 
10 24th November – 12th 
December 2016 
 
11 24th April – 3rd May 2017 Pre-Campaign Wave: 2017 UK General Election. 
12 5th May – 7th June 2017 Campaign Wave: 2017 UK General Election 
Campaign. 
13 9th June – 23rd June 2017 Post-Campaign Wave: 2017 UK General Election. 
 
There are four notable advantages of using the BESIP for this study. First, the dataset 
provides a notably large sample size of 30,000 respondents for each wave, facilitating analysis 
on sub-groups of interest, whilst keeping the sample representative. Even when filtering for 
respondents that complete all thirteen waves of the survey the sample size remains high (n = 
5,300). However, it is important to be aware that this represents a significant level of attrition 
over such a long period of time. Second, high quality panel data remains rare in most national 
election studies and is crucial in opening up new methodological avenues for researchers. 
New methods are necessary for examining the role of leaders from different perspectives. 
Third, the dataset covers a comprehensive timescale with evaluations of party leaders 
recorded for all thirteen waves. Finally, the inclusion of a ‘rolling thunder’ design for 
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campaigns allows this activity to be studied on a daily level, with weights included to support 
this. Data of this quality is typically only available from secondary sources that have significant 
resources, like the British Election Study, which have substantial resources and make the data 
publicly available.2 
 The primary variable analysed from BES data in this thesis is ‘how much do you like or 
dislike each of the following party leaders?’. Respondents score their feelings on an eleven-
point scale ranging from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like). In each wave, respondents 
are asked to evaluate the leaders of the largest political parties, and if the respondent lives in 
Wales or Scotland, the leader of the nationalist parties too.3 This a long-standing question 
within the BES series. Responses to this question have been recognised as powerful 
summaries of voters’ feelings about leaders, meaning it is an important variable for analysing 
the effect of leaders (Clarke et al. 2009a, 2016; Stevens and Karp 2012). Significantly, for this 
research, respondents are asked the question in each wave of the survey, facilitating a wider 
number of available research methods. Other questions that ask about different leadership 
traits are not included in every wave of the survey. Therefore, the omission of questions about 
specific traits limits the analysis to studying the effect of leaders through summary 
evaluations. In an ideal world, summary evaluations and specific traits would be available in 
every wave, and although this is not the case for the BESIP, it does not outweigh the significant 
opportunities to analyse leaders over the course of the panel. 
A range of variables are used to investigate the hypotheses tested in this thesis and 
full details of each variable are presented in section 2 of the Research Methods Appendix. I 
identified potential problems with how party identification is captured in the BES in Chapter 
 
2 For further information on the BES research design see research methods appendix section 2.2.  
3 Respondents in the England are not asked about the leaders of nationalist parties 
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Two (Bartle 1999; Blais et al. 2001). Nevertheless, I determined it was important to include 
these measurements as an important control variable in my analysis. Criticism of leader 
effects arguments has maintained that party identification overrides leadership evaluation 
(Bartle and Crewe 2003; King 2002). The omission of party identification in the analysis could 
overinflate the influence of leaders and remains an important part in explanations of vote 
choice. Other important variables incorporated into the statistical analysis are identified at 
the beginning of each chapter. Much of the analysis in Chapter Four investigates within 
person change. As such, new variables were created to measure individual-level change 
between each wave of the panel. ‘Change’ variables of party leader evaluations form the 
dependent variable in some of the analysis in Chapter Four and are an important explanatory 
variable in Chapter Five. Other change variables were calculated for respondents, such as 
change in the strength of party identification, and incorporated into the analysis where 
relevant. Individual level changes in this panel provides a distinct way of analysing the role 
and effect of party leaders.  
 
Analysis of Quantitative Data 
All quantitative analysis and visualisation presented in this thesis was conducted in R. 
R is powerful statistical software used by a wide variety of non-academic and academic 
researchers. The flexibility of the software’s open source design allows users to develop 
statistical packages to enhance the capabilities of R for addressing specific research problems 
(R Project 2020). I identify when I have used specific packages to conduct my analysis. In 
addition to data analysis, R provides a sophisticated environment to manage, manipulate and 
store a range of datasets and objects. Effective handling of complex data, such as the BESIP, 
required specific training to use R, and additional packages, competently. In addition, it was 
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necessary to complete theoretical and practical training for the specific research techniques 
used in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. The following section provides an overview of the 
analytical techniques used in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, explaining their suitability for 
analysing the data and research objectives. Again, my aim is to provide an overview in these 
sections, with more technical details of each method, and their limitations, presented in the 
research methods appendix, sections 1.3 – 1.6.  
Chapter Four employs path and multilevel models to analyse individual level changes 
in leadership evaluations over the panel. Path models are a type of structural equation model 
and are constructed in R using the Lavaan package (Rosseel 2018; Singer and Willett 2003). 
The degree of stability in individual-level evaluations of party leaders is analysed across the 
thirteen waves of the panel. The data is structured to analyse the effect of previous leadership 
evaluations on current waves, while controlling for variables that are likely to influence 
evaluations, for example party identification. The temporal ordering of path models is 
intuitive and presented in the figure below; it details how variables in different waves are 
regressed on each other. Figure 3.1 outlines an example structure of this model showing how 
waves are regressed on each other, with arrows for direct effects. Figure 3.2 outlines how 
indirect effects can be calculated through a mediating variable. Multiplying the direct effect 
(a) with the direct effect (b) provides the indirect effect of leadership evaluation t+1 on 
leadership evaluation t+3. Adding this indirect effect to the direct effect (c) provides the total 
effect. Investigating the mediated effects of variables and calculating the total effect provides 
a fuller understanding of the stability of leadership evaluations (Holahan and Holahan 1987; 
Marsh 1990; Streiner 2005). 
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Figure 3.1: Visualisation of the Structure of an Example Path Model 
 
Figure 3.2: Visualisation of Indirect and Direct Effects in Path Models 
 
Multilevel models (MLM), or hierarchical regression models, are designed to 
accommodate multiple levels of structure in a single comprehensive model (Steenbergen and 
Jones 2002). For instance, datasets with a longitudinal design can be viewed as having a two 
level structure, with the top level comprising the fieldwork wave and the lower level being 
made up of the respondents nested within these waves (Steele 2008). MLM statistical analysis 
was conducted using the lme4 (Bates et al. 2015) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, and 
Christensen 2017) packages. The dependent variable modelled in Chapter Four is individual 
change in leadership evaluations. Investigating change in leader evaluations for the same 
respondents in different waves naturally violates the assumption of linear regression that 
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respondent to ensure standard errors and estimates are calculated to account for the 
interdependence between observations (Bell and Jones 2015; Persson 2012). 
I provide a visualisation of the data structure in Figure 3.3 where responses from 
individuals belong to a specific wave because questions are answered within a particular 
context. Employing MLM techniques enables analysis of individual-level measurements over 
time whilst observing the specific context during each fieldwork period. Put another way, the 
model estimates the average level of ‘within’ person change in leadership evaluations over 
the panel, while using explanatory variables to examine the level of change between people 
and between different waves of the panel. Previous research has treated BES panel data as a 
multilevel structure to assess how likely voters are to change their vote choice during an 
electoral cycle (Ferrao Barbosa and Goldstein 2000; Yang, Goldstein and Heath 2000). The 
result is a powerful analysis that reflects the complexities of the data and in doing so 
investigates effects from different levels of the data within a single model. 
Figure 3.3: Visualisation of a Multilevel Model Structure 
 
 
Statistical analysis presented in Chapter Five uses a machine learning (ML) approach 
to investigate the effect of leader evaluations on vote choice by constructing models with the 
purpose of predicting vote choice. The glmnet package is used to create ML algorithms and 
models (Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani 2010). ML models are used primarily to make 
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predictions, but can also be utilised to investigate causal relationships (Baćak and Kennedy 
2019). ML was determined to be particularly useful for predicting party choice from 
respondents and identifying individuals that the model struggled to make accurate 
predictions about. Machine learning is often associated with artificial intelligence, which 
might prompt images of all-knowing supercomputers that make autonomous decisions, 
requiring little human intervention. This perception of ML is far from reality and even though 
algorithms are trained to make predictions, these require considerable human expertise in 
order to be successful (Boelaert and Ollion 2018). Many standard quantitative techniques can 
be incorporated into ML frameworks. However, what separates ML from traditional 
techniques is the ability utilise the learnt information of the model and test it on unseen data 
(Boelaert and Ollion 2018; Lantz 2015). There is a danger of overloading algorithms with 
masses of variables, where predictive accuracy may be high, but it becomes difficult to make 
sense of the relationships between variables. Avoiding the creation of ‘kitchen sink’ models 
was a primary consideration, and as a result, the models only contain key variables outlined 
in Chapter Five. The use of ML techniques is growing in political science and offers further 
opportunities for analysis but has not yet become a common approach (Hindman 2015).  
A general framework for machine learning is presented in Figure 1.5. For more detail 
about ML approaches, see section 1.5 of the Research Methods Appendix. The flowchart 
begins with the raw BESIP dataset. The data was then cleaned, and important features of the 
data were identified. After settling on the dependent and independent variables, the original 
data set is split into Train and Test sets. Splitting the data provides two advantages in the 
analysis. Firstly, it prevents overfitting to the data available to researchers as this can inflate 
the predictive value of the resulting model. Secondly, it ensures that the resulting model can 
be tested on different observations than the model was trained on originally. Ultimately, 
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splitting the data keeps the results generalisable and provides greater validity (Hindman 
2015). After developing a ‘learning algorithm’, in this case a regression formula, the formula 
is combined with the Train set to create the Train model. Under inspection this model would 
look similar to normal regression models with estimated coefficients to explain variation in 
the dependent variable. Next, using information from the Train model, predictions are made 
about the unseen test data. As the Test set has both the actual and predicted values, the 
accuracy of predictions can be scored and subsequently evaluated.  
Splitting the dataset is even more important when new observations cannot be 
gathered easily. Ideally, predictions would be made on new observations gathered by 
researchers so that the original data set can be used in its entirety, creating the most well 
informed model (Boelaert and Ollion 2018; Bonica 2018). However, high quality survey data 
is expensive and often beyond most researchers’ resources, including my own, so options are 
often limited in gathering new data. Moreover, opportunities to gather data under the same 
conditions are highly unlikely, given that the political context can change rapidly, rendering 
any additional data of limited value to the researcher’s original aims. The size of the BESIP 
allows the data to be split without sacrificing the quality of the model. 
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Figure 3.4: Machine Learning Approach Flow Chart 
 
 After evaluating the model, it is important to cross-validate the initial findings by 
repeating the process from the split data stage. By re-randomizing which respondents go into 
the Train and Test sets, the rest of the process can be repeated. Using a different selection of 
respondents to form the Train model provides an assessment of whether the sample impacts 
the performance of the model. Cross-validating performance adds another layer of reliability 
to the findings if variation in performance is negligible. For the models presented in Chapter 
Five, I repeat the process 100 times to confirm additional reliability of the findings. Accuracy 
can be compared across each iteration, providing a range of predictive accuracy from the 
model.  
  Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) is the regression method 
used to train the ML model. LASSO regression is similar to OLS regression but places additional 





















model like those found in conventional regression models. Instead, estimates from 
insignificant variables are shrunk to exactly zero. Constraints in the regression formula help 
ensure the model is not overfitted by shrinking coefficients, with the objective of creating 
parsimonious models that are simple to interpret (Andrews 2019; Hindman 2015). The output 
of LASSO models looks familiar to those who are used to examining coefficients from standard 
regression models. Further details about LASSO regression are available in Research Methods 
Appendix 1.6. 
 
Selection and Collection of Qualitative Data 
To investigate the role of party leaders in post-election explanations of electoral 
outcomes a textual dataset of seventeen elections was created. Textual data from BBC 
election night broadcasts from 1955-2017 were compiled. Data were collected from three 
sources YouTube, C-Span and Box of Broadcasts.4 Combined, these three sources contained 
raw transcript data developed from the audio from each election broadcast. YouTube 
transcripts are developed from the site’s automatic-speech recognition software (YouTube 
2018), which automatically generated transcripts for elections from 1955-2010, with the 
exception of the 2005 election, which was taken from C-Span who have their own speech 
recognition software. Autonomous automatic speech recognition systems are recognised as 
providing efficient transcription with an acceptable level of error (Novotney and Callison-
Burch 2010). While transcripts required cleaning, their accuracy remained high enough to be 
useful and their availability was crucial for maintaining the scope of the study. For the 2015 
and 2017 elections, transcripts were available via Box of Broadcasts and formed by 
aggregating subtitles that accompanied the live broadcast. As expected, these transcripts 
 
4 Specific URL links for BBC Election Night broadcasts are listed after the bibliography 
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were higher in accuracy than automated transcripts, although numerous errors remained. 
Therefore, while an excellent basis for each transcript was available, each still required 
significant cleaning.  
The first hour of each broadcast is a verbatim transcript, while specific sections later 
in the broadcast were only cleaned once I had identified that the section was related to party 
leaders. Additionally, each transcript mined from YouTube consisted of one continuous block 
of text. Speakers were not differentiated or identified, so these were identified manually 
during the cleaning process. This process was necessary to understand the structure of the 
data. Maintaining the quality, breadth and length of all transcripts was a key objective in light 
of previous research that highlighted difficulties collecting election night data (Marriott 2000; 
Schieß 2007). Of course, the breadth of transcripts could be expanded further to include 
coverage from competing broadcasters. However, I decided that this would add little further 
value and it would have required significant additional resources to gather and process the 
extra data. Overall, the amount of data gathered was ambitious in scope but remained 
manageable to process.  
One notable characteristic of broadcast coverage is that BBC broadcasts increase in 
length over time. Differences in the length of broadcast are stark when comparing 1955 and 
2017, but this contrast is a product of incremental change. Over time, the BBC has 
progressively increased the length of the broadcasts. Viewers of modern election coverage 
would be forgiven for not knowing when coverage ends, as it seamlessly moves into news 
coverage the following day. To keep the length of the transcripts manageable I do not analyse 
coverage past 6am.5 As such, transcripts of recent elections are naturally longer than older 
 
5 For a full explanation of how this process was managed see research methods appendix section 3.2 and the 
‘Dimbleby rule’ 
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ones. It is important to acknowledge the difference in broadcast length when making direct 
comparisons between specific elections. There is, however, a remarkable level of continuity 
in the transmissions over the 62-year period. High profile BBC journalists have presented and 
participated in election night coverage since the beginning. David Dimbleby presented every 
election results programme from 1979-2017. Additionally, psephologists have held notable 
positions in the coverage, providing expert analysis of the results. For instance, David Butler 
contributed to every election broadcast from 1950-1979 (Crick 2018). The primary purpose 
of election night coverage remains the same as when it was first broadcast, to describe and 
explain the election results.  
 
Analysis of Qualitative Data 
Coding and analysis were conducted in NVivo. As a form of computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) it provided notable benefits in managing the 
substantial amount of data and organising the codes within a single interface (Bazeley and 
Jackson 2013; Spencer et al. 2014). Retrieving data across seventeen transcripts would be an 
arduous task without this software. Critics of CAQDAS may argue that it quantifies qualitative 
data although providing counts and statistics is helpful in demonstrating the presence of 
themes when a large amount of data has been analysed (Silverman 2010). Visualising trends 
through numeric figures when examining variation over time is also highly intuitive and 
should not be sacrificed for fears of ‘simplifying the data’. Visualisation of the data was 
completed by importing data into R. 
 Cleaned transcripts of BBC election night coverage were coded thematically to 
synthesise this substantial and complex textual data (Bazeley and Jackson 2013). Initial codes 
were developed inductively from the data by analysing a subset of elections (1959, October 
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1974, 1997 and 2017) to create the initial codes for the remaining transcripts. This hierarchy 
remained fluid and was refined several times during the analysis to account for the 
complexities of the data (Bryman 2016). The final coding hierarchy used a combination of 
descriptive, attitudinal and explanative codes with descriptions of these codes available in 
sections 1.4 and 1.5 of the Research Methods Appendix. Multiple codes could apply 
simultaneously to a single section of text to provide a multileveled analysis of the data 
(Saldana 2012). For example, multiple codes can be used on a single section of text to describe 
the content of the text (leader’s personality), the sentiment of the text (positive or negative) 
and who said it (the group of actors they belong to). The final coding structure incorporates 
terminology from the existing literature on party leaders in the UK to bridge codes into wider 
themes and existing theories. This assists in linking themes to the relevant hypotheses and 
sub-hypotheses.  
Thematic analysis was considered the most appropriate technique to evaluate and 
identify macro-level trends, providing interpretation of sequences within the data (Spencer 
et al. 2014). Previous research adopted different approaches, synthesising the textual and 
visual data to provide a summary of election night data (Lauerbach 2013; Marriott 2000). Two 
important considerations of the data lent themselves to thematic analysis. Firstly, the size of 
the data available and secondly, the range of elections covered. The development of themes 
was achieved through a reflective coding process, linking codes together into wider themes 
(Punch 2013). Thematic analysis kept the research concentrated while working with a data 
source that could be used to analyse a variety of subjects. The themes discussed in Chapter 
Six examine the overall level of coverage given to party leaders, how they were discussed 





This chapter has outlined the research design that underpins my thesis, including the 
hypotheses that are tested, the data sources used and the analytical approach. The 
hypotheses presented here aim to contribute to existing theories and findings on party 
leaders following the identification of existing gaps in the literature discussed in Chapter Two. 
My study contributes to the literature on how voters form leadership evaluations by analysing 
change in evaluations over time. I also examine how impactful leadership evaluations are 
during general election campaigns, contributing to the wider field of voter behaviour and 
campaign effects. Lastly, I analyse the role of leaders during election night broadcasts and 
evaluate whether the results are framed around the success or failure of leaders.  
I draw upon two unique sources of data to test the outlined hypotheses. Firstly, the 
BESIP is a comprehensive and high-quality survey that facilitates longitudinal analysis of 
leader evaluations. Opportunities to analyse individual level changes in leadership 
evaluations over thirteen waves is a unique aspect of this study and the focus of the next 
chapter. For the 2015 and 2017 general elections a pre-campaign wave, campaign wave and 
post-election wave were gathered. These three waves allow for a sophisticated analysis of 
leader effects during the campaign in Chapter Five. In addition, the large sample size allowed 
for greater concentration on the subgroups identified in this chapter. Secondly, the creation 
of an original qualitative dataset of election night transcripts was generated to provide an 
analysis of party leaders during this unique event. Seventeen election night broadcasts 
represent a substantial increase in the number of elections covered relative to previous 
studies that have used similar data. Analysis in Chapter Six focuses on analysing the overall 
coverage of party leaders, discussion of leaders’ performance and whether leaders are held 
responsible for the election outcome. The number of elections covered, and the detail 
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contained within the transcripts enables trends to be analysed over time, while teasing out 
the specifics of individual broadcasts.  
In order to effectively utilise the available data and test the hypotheses presented at 
the beginning of this chapter, I have detailed the methods used in the empirical chapters of 
this thesis. Naturally, methods were selected to answer the specific research questions and 
those most appropriate to the data. With substantial amounts of broadcast text to analyse, I 
chose to provide a macro-level analysis of party leaders in Chapter Six. These are supported 
by excerpts from transcripts and descriptive statistics to provide summaries of the data. A 
wide range of statistical techniques were available for analysing the BESIP. Chapter Five uses 
a Machine Learning framework to assess the role of party leaders in predicting vote choice 
and to determine the size of campaign effects for the 2015 and 2017 General Elections. Based 
on this analysis, I then identify persuadable voters to determine whether leaders have a 
significant effect on these voters. The next chapter begins the empirical analysis in this study 
by examining the stability of leadership evaluations over thirteen waves of the panel using 
path and multilevel models over thirteen waves of the BESIP.   
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Chapter 4 : Fluid or Stable? Leadership Evaluations During a Turbulent 
Period of British Politics (2014-17) 
 
Party leaders are among the most visible politicians in the UK. Voters naturally form 
opinions about their character and evaluate their performance. While numerous studies have 
sought to examine how much these evaluations impact on vote choice, fewer studies have 
looked at individual-level change in evaluations over a substantial period of time (Barisione 
2009), with most focusing on the aggregate impact (Bartle and Crewe 2003; Clarke et al. 2004, 
2009a; King 2002). There is even less research that considers the impact of new leadership on 
British voters (for examples, see Berz 2020; Johnston, Hartman, and Pattie 2019). Examining 
individual-level changes in leadership evaluations provides an opportunity to investigate how 
evaluations of leaders develop and when changes in evaluations occur over the electoral 
cycle.  
For instance, when the incumbent leader changes, do voters distinguish between new 
leaders and their predecessors or does the electorate paint new leaders with the same 
partisan brush as the previous leader? Previous research has often examined new leadership 
through the lens of institutional changes in party organisation and policy rather than 
considering its effect on leader evaluations (Bynander and ’t Hart 2006; Foley 2009; Harmel 
et al. 1995; Worthy 2016; Worthy and Bennister 2020). Are changes in leadership evaluations 
correlated with changes in other leaders, or are they made in isolation? Findings from 
previous studies have indicated that voters are most likely to determine leaders’ suitability 
for office by comparing between available leaders (Goffin and Olson 2011; Mughan 2015) but 
questions remain over which leaders voters are comparing between. For example, Mughan 
(2015) focused on comparisons between Labour and Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat, and Conservative and Liberal Democrat leaders in the UK 2005 General Election. 
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Lastly, are some sub-sections of the electorate more likely to change their evaluations of party 
leaders? Voters with no party identification, ‘unsophisticated’ voters and those voters who 
consume high levels of televised political coverage are all groups considered to be more likely 
to change their evaluations of leaders (Blais 2013; Gaber 2013; Lenz and Lawson 2011; Rico 
2014; Whiteley et al. 2013).  
 This chapter analyses thirteen waves of the British Election Study Internet Panel 
(BESIP) to provide answers to these questions. The BESIP is superior to other previous data 
sets used to analyse the effect of change of new leadership on voters, with more recent 
studies demonstrating how panel data can utilise individual level changes in evaluations (Berz 
2020; Johnston, Hartman, and Pattie 2019). Previous investigations of leadership change have 
been reliant on aggregated data (Brown 1992; Sanders 1993; Stewart and Carty 1993). 
Importantly, BESIP data covers a period when all of the main UK-wide political parties 
changed their leader. To analyse changes in leadership evaluations over the breadth of this 
panel, path and multilevel regression models are used to investigate the stability of 
evaluations. I provide an overview of attitudes towards party leaders before testing potential 
effects through these models.  
The results of this analysis are outlined in this chapter. Leadership change has a 
considerable effect on changes in individual feelings about leaders, and this effect is greater 
than changes to the evaluations during general election campaigns. These findings suggest 
that voters differentiate between new leaders and their predecessors, allowing new leaders 
to develop their own personal appeal, independent of their party. Evidence of effects were 
not uniform across the leaders examined and in this analysis were not applicable to Paul 
Nuttall’s new leadership of UKIP. However, outside of leadership change, results suggest that 
leadership evaluations are highly stable across multiple waves of the panel. Furthermore, the 
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analysis provides clear evidence that voters’ changes in evaluations of one leader is associated 
with changes in the evaluations of rival leaders. Such effects are strong and uniform across 
models, providing consistent evidence that voters assess their options in the political 
landscape and adjust accordingly. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that some sub-
sections of the electorate are more likely to change their views than others. I find evidence 
that individuals who identify with a party adjust their leadership evaluations to a greater 
extent than those with no party identification, which contrasts to the expectation that non-
partisan voters would change their assessments the most. There is some evidence that voters 
who find it more difficult to understand politics and voters who consume more televised 
political coverage adjust their evaluations more than other voters.  
 
How Stable Are Leadership Evaluations? 
 
Research on the evaluations of party leaders has centred around which traits and 
characteristics are most influential to voters’ decisions about party choice (Bittner 2014; 
Evans and Andersen 2005; Lobo and Ferreira da Silva 2018; Stevens and Karp 2012). There is 
also a debate regarding whether voters compare leaders against an ‘ideal type’ leader, based 
on a specific criteria, and how the contextual factors from countries’ political systems can 
affect evaluations (Bean and Mughan 1989; Bittner 2014; McAllister 2013). Investigating how 
voters initially evaluate leaders can give some insight into how leadership evaluations are first 
formed. With access to panel data further analysis can examine whether these initial 
evaluations change and, if they do, why they change. In this section, I explore three potential 
reasons why voters may change their evaluations of leaders. 
To answer whether individual evaluations of party leaders vary over time, I test a 
series of hypotheses which are presented in Box 4.1. Each hypothesis is designed to examine 
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a different aspect of this complex subject. The first set of hypotheses test whether events 
such as new leadership or general election campaigns affect evaluations. The second 
hypothesis examines whether voters’ changes in evaluations are connected to changes in 
evaluations of rival leaders. Finally, the third set of hypotheses examine differences between 
sections of the electorate. The findings relating to each hypothesis provide significant insights 
into the dynamics of changing leadership evaluations. 
Box 4.1: Hypotheses and sub-hypotheses on Changes in Leadership Evaluations
 
There is good reason to theorise that evaluations of party leaders may change more 
significantly during periods when general election campaigns are taking place. Substantial 
focus is placed on leaders during modern general election campaigns as they participate in 
televised debates and interviews, giving voters a wealth of information to reassess leaders 
(Deacon et al. 2017; Gaber 2013; Harrison 1992; Mellon 2016). Political parties may heighten 
the focus on leaders further if they choose to employ a campaign strategy that places their 
leader at the centre of their campaign (Cowley and Kavanagh 2018; Seawright 2013). The 
The point in the electoral cycle when data is collected will affect how much evaluations 
change. 
Where new party leaders are evaluated for the first time, there will be greater 
change in evaluations.  
During general election campaigns, there are greater changes than baseline 
changes in evaluations of leaders.  
Evaluations of party leaders are stable during waves where there is no leadership 
change or general election campaign. 
Changes in leader evaluations are relative to changes of rival leaders. 
The size of change in leadership evaluations will differ between voters. 
Voters with weak or no party identification will have greater changes in 
evaluations. 
Voters with lower levels of education, or who find it difficult to understand politics, 
will have greater changes in evaluations. 
Voters that use television as their source of political information will have greater 
changes in evaluations.  
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abundance of information about party leaders, during a time where voters will shortly be 
casting their ballot, may lead to a greater change in individual-level evaluations.  
Studies have analysed the impact of a new party leader from the perspective of 
organisational change and agenda change (Bynander and ’t Hart 2006; Foley 2009; Harmel et 
al. 1995; Worthy 2016; Worthy and Bennister 2020) but rarely from the perspective of the 
voter. While there are a range of reasons why leadership change occurs, in Britain leaders are 
likely to resign if they fail to make sufficient progress in elections, unlike other countries 
where term-limits can force leadership change (Curtice and Blais 2001). Each party in Britain 
has their own specific rules and procedures to choose or elect a new leader. Often, winning 
candidates require the backing of the party elite to stand and the support of paying party 
members to win. Researchers using survey data have found that leadership change can 
explain voter behaviour at general elections (Johnston, Hartman, and Pattie 2019) and 
prompt voters to re-examine the ideological positions of parties (Fernandez-Vazquez and 
Somer-Topcu 2019). Recent studies have illustrated the potential wealth of findings on offer 
when analysing how voters react to new leadership (Berz 2020; Johnston, Hartman, and Pattie 
2019). The extent to which leadership change is recognised by electors, and affects their 
leadership evaluations, is a crucial step in understanding the influence of party leaders on 
voters. 
 Investigating the impact of new leadership is useful in establishing whether leaders 
matter independently beyond party images. As was highlighted in Chapter Two, early voting 
models consistently argued that the role of party leaders in elections was peripheral because 
it was conditioned by strong partisan or class attachment (Butler and Stokes 1974, 1969; 
Campbell et al. 1960). More recently, King (2002) has argued that evaluations of leaders 
simply reflect voters’ evaluations of the parties themselves, with Curtice and Blais (2001), 
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drawing similar conclusions. However, these studies are approaching twenty years old, and 
more recent studies conclude leaders to be an independently important factor (Clarke et al. 
2004, 2009a, 2016; Johnston, Hartman, and Pattie 2019). Even if scholars disagree over the 
effect leaders can have, they recognise the methodological challenge in separating a voter’s 
party evaluations from their leader evaluations (Costa Lobo 2014; Davies and Mian 2010). 
Analysing individual-level responses to new leadership provides an opportunity to isolate 
independent evaluations and assess whether changes simply reflect feelings about the party 
they lead. After all, if leaders reflect party evaluations, then new leadership should not have 
a significant effect on most voters. 
Not all voters are expected to change their leader evaluations to the same extent. 
Party identification is likely to be a mitigating factor on how individuals evaluate leaders. 
Evaluations are naturally affected by an individual’s partisan lens, providing more favourable 
evaluations for leaders of parties they like and being less favourable to the leaders of parties 
they dislike (Bittner 2014; Goren 2007; Hayes 2005). The strength of party identification is 
likely to be important too, with stronger identifiers likely to have the most supportive and 
stable evaluations after leadership change. Non-identifiers in the electorate could be more 
responsive to new leadership because they have fewer long-term factors to influence their 
evaluations (Barisione 2009). Moreover, a large section of the electorate could fall into this 
category, as evidence shows a greater proportion of voters have less stable partisan 
attachments than is reported in regular cross-sectional studies (Clarke et al. 2009; Tilley 
2008). Voters with weaker attachments to political parties are considered to be more 
responsive and could change their evaluations of party leaders more frequently.  
 Evidence relating to the sophistication of voters and party leader effects is mixed and 
by no means definitive (Rico 2014; Whiteley et al. 2013). A common argument within the 
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literature is that ‘sophisticated’ voters give little weight to leader evaluations (Blais 2013; 
Mughan 2015). The theoretical argument is that party leaders provide a heuristic for ‘less 
sophisticated’ voters, enabling voters to make decisions as if they were better informed 
(Clarke et al. 2004). However, considerable debate exists over whether ‘sophisticated’ voters 
ignore leaders because of their apparently greater ability to process complex policy 
information. On the other hand, ‘less sophisticated’ voters use leader evaluations as a 
shortcut to decide their vote choice, and therefore, may change their evaluations more 
regularly as the key factor in influencing their vote choice (Clarke et al. 2009a; Gidengil 2013; 
Rico 2014). Studies have primarily examined the ‘unsophisticated’ argument in the context of 
vote choice at national elections but assessing whether these voters regularly change their 
evaluation of leaders over long periods of time would provide further evidence in establishing 
a link between voter ‘sophistication’ and leader effects.  
 Televised coverage of politics has become increasingly personalised with greater focus 
on the activities of party leaders at the expense of policy discussion (Hayes 2009; Mughan 
and Aaldering 2018). Rico (2014) outlines the importance of television in modern elections 
and details the mixed evidence of TV consumption and leader effects. Voters who consume 
television as their primary source of media information may be more likely to change their 
opinions of party leaders because of the information available (Lenz and Lawson 2011). This 
situation is highly applicable to the UK where party leaders are the disproportionate focus of 
broadcast news (Deacon et al. 2017; Gaber 2013). However, because the formal campaign is 
heavily regulated, smaller parties achieve greater TV coverage than outside the campaign 
which may lead to greater changes in evaluations for leaders of smaller parties during the 
campaign. Furthermore, political coverage is likely to intensify around the time of a leadership 
change and subsequent leadership contest. As television is a platform that leads to greater 
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focus on leaders, voters who watch more political coverage may result in less stable 
evaluations of leaders. 
 Investigating change in voters’ leadership evaluations provides an opportunity to test 
for further evidence of relative evaluations between leaders and whether relative effects are 
found between all party leaders. For instance, when a voter changes their evaluation of the 
Conservative leader, do they also change their evaluation of the Labour, Liberal Democrat 
and UKIP leaders? Mughan (2015) suggested that relative effects between Conservative and 
Labour leaders were likely to be the strongest. Differences in evaluations between leaders of 
the same party between 2015 and 2017 were considered by Johnson, Hartman and Pattie 
(2019) and were successful in explaining vote choice in the 2017 UK General Election. The 
authors measure changes in evaluations collected two years apart but additional data is 
available to give a fuller picture of changes between these two elections. Understanding when 
evaluations are changing, and whether this happens relatively, will provide further insights 
into the dynamics of leadership evaluations.  
 
Approach to Analysing Individual-Level Changes Evaluations 
 
High-quality longitudinal studies are required to study individual change over time. 
Barisione (2009, 493) has highlighted the substantial reliance on cross-sectional data in the 
field, with few studies analysing change in leadership evaluations over a substantial 
timeframe. Garzia (2012) and Berz (2020) have produced multilevel models on pre- and post-
election panel data to examine the influence of leaders. However, analysis that considers a 
wider timescale beyond intense election periods is uncommon. Access to high quality data 
over a time period where political parties elect new leaders facilitates a powerful research 
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design to analyse the effect of party leader change and changes in leadership evaluations over 
time. 
This chapter uses the 5,300 respondents who completed thirteen consecutive waves 
of the BESIP (British Election Study 2018). Thirteen waves of data are an impressive panel to 
analyse change in leader evaluations. To correct for sampling bias and substantial attrition of 
respondents, post-stratification weights were applied to ensure the generalisability of results. 
A comprehensive time frame is covered during the panel, beginning 20th February 2014 and 
finishing 23rd July 2017. This period saw each of the largest British political parties 
(Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and United Kingdom Independence Party) change 
their leaders.  
Table 4.1 provides full details of the data collection for each wave of the study, with 
accompanying notes that detail when leaders resigned and when new leaders were formally 
elected. A notable limitation of this panel is the inconsistency in the time between fieldwork 
dates. For example, fieldwork for some waves began immediately after the last day of the 
previous wave, while in other cases there was an eleven-month gap between waves. This 
inconsistency is significant to this study because the length of time between leadership 
change and the next wave of the study varies. This inconsistency could have implications for 
the findings. For instance, both Tim Farron and Jeremy Corbyn were in the job for nearly a 
year before the study first captured respondents’ assessments of these leaders. By contrast, 
the first survey wave that captured evaluations of Theresa May was four months after 
becoming leader. Paul Nuttall is actually elected leader of UKIP during the fieldwork dates for 
wave 10. Capturing ‘fresher’ feelings toward party leaders could affect how much evaluations 
will change as voters may take time to gather information on new leaders and assess their 
performance as leader.  
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Table 4.1: British Election Study Internet Panel Fieldwork – Leadership Change 
Information 
Wave Dates Notes 
1 20th February – 9th March 
2014 
 
2 22nd May – 25th June 2014 
 
3 19th September – 17th  
October 2014 
 
4 4th March – 30th March 2015 
 
5 31st March – 6th May 2015 
 
6 8th May – 26th May 2015 Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband resign on 8th May. 
7 14th April – 4th May 2016 Tim Farron leader of the Liberal Democrats from 16th July. 
Jeremy Corbyn leader of Labour from 12th September. 
8 6th May – 22nd June 2016 
 
9 24th June – 4th July 2016 David Cameron resigns 24th June, continues as PM until 
11th July. 
10 24th November – 12th 
December 2016 
Theresa May elected as Conservative Party Leader 11th of 
July. 
Nigel Farage resigns 16th September. Returns as acting 
leader 5th October until Paul Nuttall is elected on the 28th 
November. 
11 24th April – 3rd May 2017 
 
12 5th May – 7th June 2017 
 
13 9th June – 23rd June 2017 
 
 
From the four parties examined in this section, each leader that was in place when the 
panel began subsequently resigned following an electoral event. Three leaders resigned 
following electoral defeats and one following electoral success. Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg 
resigned as leader of their respective parties after Labour and the Liberal Democrats lost seats 
at the 2015 UK General Election. David Cameron resigned as Conservative leader after leading 
the Remain campaign to defeat in the 2016 EU Referendum, with Nigel Farage resigning as 
leader of UKIP after securing his longstanding ambition for the UK to leave the EU. The 
opportunity to examine changes in evaluations over this timeframe, with four different 
parties changing leaders, provides an exciting opportunity to examine differences between 
parties.  
 The primary dependent variable used to assess the effect of leadership change is: ‘how 
much do you like or dislike each of the following party leaders?’ (British Election Study 2018). 
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Importantly, these are questions asked during every wave of the study. An additional variable 
was created to capture wave to wave changes in the evaluations of each leader.6 During some 
aspects of the analysis, I focus on the absolute change in evaluations, with negative values 
replaced by absolute values and I indicate where this is done.  
A range of independent variables were included in the model to examine whether 
voter attitudes affected the level of change in leadership evaluations. Standard socio-
demographic control variables: age, gender, education, ethnicity and household income are 
included in each of the models. Standard measures of party identification and strength of 
identification that regularly feature in British Election Study surveys are used. Selecting 
variables that captured political sophistication required more consideration, with previous 
studies using a range of variables to determine which voters are more or less sophisticated. 
These variables are either based on questions asked directly to the respondent or prescribed 
by researchers using respondents’ answers to other questions. Some researchers use 
responses to political knowledge trivia questions to provide a measurement of sophistication 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Larcinese 2007; Singh and Roy 2014; Tillman 2012). In contrast, 
researchers can use responses to survey questions about how often individuals pay attention 
to politics or their stated interest in politics (Aaldering 2018; Clarke et al. 2009a). The BESIP 
includes political efficacy questions and a battery of political knowledge questions so both 
variables can be included in the analysis (British Election Study 2018). These are by no means 
exhaustive measures of political ‘sophistication’ but because there is no consensus for the 
best measurement, I employed political efficacy, political interest and political knowledge 
measures in separate models to examine each variable’s effect.  
 
6 For further detail about how variables were calculated, see research methods appendix sections 2.2 & 2.3 
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A range of methods are used to analyse changes in voter evaluations of party leaders. 
Firstly, I use descriptive statistics to provide an overview of how leadership evaluations 
change over time. Secondly, I construct path models using the Lavaan (Latent Variable 
Analysis) package (Rosseel 2018). The objective is to examine whether previous leadership 
evaluations can explain later evaluations. Thirdly and finally, multilevel models (MLMs) are 
used to provide a comprehensive analysis of why voters’ leadership evaluations change or 
remain stable. MLMs neatly account for wave-level predictor variables and individual-level 
predictor variables when analysing changes in party leader evaluations. They successfully 
account for the interdependence of observations and can model effects from different levels 
of the data structure.  
Following some initial diagnostic testing that indicated a non-normal distribution of 
residuals, a log-transformation of the dependent variable was computed to satisfy this 
condition of the model. The non-normal distribution was likely caused by a substantial 
proportion of the sample who did not change their evaluations at all, and few respondents 
changed their evaluations by more than five points. To make the model consistent in its 
interpretation it was necessary to transform the values. Residual plotting indicated a normal 
distribution following the transformation. Transforming the variable for party leader change 
also alters the interpretation of the model because the values are much lower than the 0-10 
scale of the original variable. The logarithm of party leader change ranges from 0-2.38, so 
effects are reflective of the new numeric range.  
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An Overview of Change in Leadership Evaluations February 2014 – June 2017 
 
This section provides an overview of leadership evaluations across thirteen waves of 
the BESIP. Graphing the party leader change variable and like-dislike evaluations provides an 
initial investigation into trends within the data and how much evaluations change between 
waves. Waves where party leadership has changed are examined in closer detail to observe 
individual change in these waves of interest. As this section outlines, aggregate summaries in 
like-dislike evaluations can mask substantial individual change between waves. The section 
also highlights a noticeably greater change in evaluations following new leadership. 
Figure 4.1 presents the average like-dislike scores for each party leader across the 
panel. Each leader’s evaluation follows a unique path over the thirteen waves analysed. UKIP 
and the Conservatives changed leaders between waves nine and ten, whilst Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats saw leadership change between waves six and seven. Figure 4.1 indicates 
that the new Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders were no more popular than their 
predecessors, with average feelings highly stable over this period. Tim Farron received the 
same average rating as Nick Clegg (3.5), with Jeremy Corbyn’s rating only marginally higher 
(+0.1) than Ed Miliband in wave six. Though Nuttall held a similar likeability score to Farage’s 
in wave ten, his score drops significantly in the following wave, where he becomes the most 
disliked party leader in the time series. Following the resignation of David Cameron, his 
replacement, Theresa May, instantly became the most liked leader in the times series. She 
receives a substantial initial bounce in ratings in wave ten, which then peaks at an average 
score of 5 in wave eleven which, in comparison to the other leaders in the graph, is a very 
good score. Results here therefore suggest that only change in leadership caused an 
immediate noticeable effect on the popularity of one leader, but closer investigation is 
necessary. 
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Figure 4.1: Average Like-Dislike Scores (0-10) for Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat and 
UKIP Leaders in Waves 1-13 of BESIP, February 2014 – June 2017 
 
 
 Figure 4.2 displays the absolute average change in individual party leader evaluations 
to examine whether trends correspond with the aggregate patterns. Figure 4.2 highlights key 
differences between changes in evaluations at the aggregate level and changes at the 
individual level. Absolute change in evaluations are used to examine the overall movement in 
assessments of leaders. After leadership change in each party there appears to be 
substantially greater average change than was seen in other waves of the panel. This effect is 
most pronounced with changes in evaluations of the new Conservative leader, but is also 
clearly visible for Labour, the Liberal Democrats and UKIP. Thus, stability found in the 
aggregate like-dislike ratings masked substantial individual level churn in evaluations. The 
largest change is seen in the Conservative Party leader evaluations. As Theresa May became 
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changes would be observed in her circumstance. The smallest change is observed with 
respect to UKIP leadership change. While the biggest mean change in individual evaluations 
is observed in wave ten, it is not to the same magnitude seen when the other parties changed 
leaders. The change of 1.6 in wave ten is also not distinctively different from the score of 1.4 
in wave two or the score of 1.4 in wave eleven. In each case of leadership change, Figure 4.2 
suggests some initial evidence that substantial re-evaluation occurs when new leaders take 
over. More generally, the graph shows a persistent, baseline level of change in leadership 
evaluations over time. Individual changes in evaluations of a single point is unlikely to signify 
significant changes in how voters feel about leaders. 
Figure 4.2: Absolute Average Change in Individual Like/Dislike Evaluations of Conservative, 




 The previous figures suggested higher stability in evaluations across waves where 
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same evaluations of party leaders as they did in the previous wave. Leadership change waves 
are highlighted in bold. Here, the results demonstrate that substantial sections of the panel 
hold exactly the same evaluations of party leaders as in the previous wave. A substantial 
percentage (around 40%) of the panel provided identical scores to the previous wave and 
demonstrates the level of stability under conditions where the party leader remains the same. 
This contrasts to a smaller, but still notable percentage (around 20 – 25%), of the panel that 
changes their leadership evaluation by more than one point in each wave. Differences in 
evaluations of one point are unlikely to signify any real change in feelings about the leader.  
The smallest percentages in Table 4.2 are found for waves where new leaders of the 
Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats are evaluated for the first time. For both 
the Liberal Democrat and the Conservatives, only 25% of respondents hold the same 
evaluation for the old party leader and the new leader, while this percentage increases slightly 
to 30% of the sample for assessments of the new Labour leader. The difference between the 
stable share when the leader remains the same (around 40%) and the stable share when the 
leader does change (25-30%) is much lower. The proportion of the panel that changed their 
evaluation by more than one point further demonstrates individual-level differences when 
assessing new leaders. When evaluating Theresa May for the first time 43.2% of the sample 
changed their evaluation by more than one point, with the figures being 38.9% and 27.2% for 
Jeremy Corbyn and Tim Farron, respectively. These findings do not apply to UKIP where the 
percentage of respondents remains similar despite new leadership. The least stable wave for 
UKIP is wave two, which followed the 2014 European Parliament Elections, where UKIP polled 
the largest percentage of votes and won the most seats of any party in the UK. Electoral 
success, rather than new leadership, had a greater impact on voters’ evaluations of UKIP 
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leaders. There is no evidence that evaluations of leaders are less stable in waves five and 
twelve, when election campaigns are being fought, than they are at other times.  
Table 4.2: Percentage of Panel Recording No Change in Leadership Evaluations 
Wave Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat UKIP 
2 43.0 41.9 41.3 38.8 
3 44.6 42.1 41.9 41.5 
4 44.1 39.8 40.2 42.4 
5 44.2 40.9 39.0 46.8 
6 46.5 40.4 36.6 45.9 
7 40.6 29.2 25.3 42.4 
8 48.5 43.1 35.6 45.1 
9 43.8 39.5 36.7 45.6 
10 25.9 41.9 35.6 42.7 
11 35.1 41.4 34.3 43.2 
12 43.4 44.7 38.3 49.6 
13 37.8 41.5 39.6 50.6 
 
 These results raise the question about the range and distribution of change in 
evaluations between each wave, especially during waves with new leadership. Figure 4.3 
below provides a visualisation of the ‘typical’ change in leadership evaluations between 
waves. Wave four is used as an example because each leader had led their party for at least 
four years and there are no electoral events during this wave. As the leaders were established 
in their position, it would be expected that leadership evaluations in this wave are highly 
stable and this is clearly the case. 
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Figure 4.3 shows a normal distribution of the change in leadership evaluations, with 
the majority of responses being concentrated around no change and very few respondents 
dramatically changing their evaluations. As such, in this example wave, evaluations are highly 
stable. No change was the most common response for each leader, at least 40% of 
respondents in each case, indicating that a large minority of respondents had fixed views of 
the leaders. When no change is combined with a slight change to more positive (+1) or more 
negative (-1) feelings toward party leaders, it is found that a clear majority of the panel exhibit 
very little or no change in their assessments of leaders. In total, 75.5% of respondents for the 
Conservatives, 69.5% for Labour, 69.1% for the Liberal Democrats and 70.2% for UKIP fall into 
this range. The proportion of voters who radically change their evaluations of the leaders 
during this ‘typical’ period is tiny. Fewer than 3% of respondents changed their assessments 
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of the Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat leaders by a score of 5 or more. However, 
this number is slightly higher for UKIP, at 4.1% of the sample.  
 Figure 4.4 visualises respondent changes in feelings during ‘transition’ waves following 
a new leader taking office. The distribution illustrates considerable differences between these 
waves and those where leadership is stable. The most striking contrast between Figure 4.3 
and 4.4 is the wider spread of values for the leaders. The greater spread of responses is 
illustrated by larger standard deviations for the Conservatives (typical 1.57 vs. 2.77 
transition), Labour (1.69 vs. 2.73), and the Liberal Democrats (1.73 vs. 2.76) but not for UKIP 
(1.81 vs. 1.74). After change in leadership, a noticeable portion of voters changed their 
evaluations by two points or more (positive or negative): 50.8% of the sample for the 
Conservatives, 45.4% Labour and 50.2% for the Liberal Democrats. This compares to a 
noticeably smaller 38.6% for UKIP, with 42.7% of respondents expressing no change towards 
Paul Nuttall as the new party leader. Within Figure 4.4, the graph for the Conservative party 
is more positively skewed, with notable numbers of respondents having more positive 
feelings for Theresa May than David Cameron previously. This compares to the Liberal 
Democrats and Labour where the changes reflect a normal distribution, with negative 
changes and positive changes balancing each other out.  
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 Initial analysis therefore indicates that voters are more likely to change their 
evaluations of party leaders during waves with leadership change. More generally, a 
substantial proportion of voters’ feelings towards leaders are stable, while there is a sizeable 
minority of the sample who shift their views between each wave, even when leadership is 
stable. It is observable from the findings that absolute change in individual-level differences 
are masked when examining aggregate likability ratings. While Tim Farron and Jeremy Corbyn 
were no more popular than their predecessors, there was substantial churn in opinions about 
them compared to their predecessors. The impressive shift in more positive feelings towards 
the Conservative Party leader after Theresa May assumed the role makes the effect more 
noticeable, as clearly seen on both the individual and aggregate levels. By way of contrast, 
there is no initial evidence to suggest evaluations change more during election campaigns.  
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Path and Mediation Analysis 
 
This section offers further evidence that feelings are fairly stable when leadership is 
also stable. Analysis from path models indicates that evaluations can largely be explained by 
prior evaluations about leaders. While I constructed path models that included all thirteen 
waves of the sample, they became increasingly difficult to interpret and provide no additional 
detail to the findings. Therefore, the models presented in this section are for feelings towards 
party leaders in wave four of the BESIP and are used here to illustrate the general effects. 
Wave four took place before the 2015 general election campaign, at a time when each leader 
had been in their role for over four years. I then compare these findings to waves where 
respective periods of leadership change have taken place. Each model is constructed using 
the same variables, the only difference is the time period. Leaders’ like/dislike evaluation are 
used as the dependent variables.  
Previous waves of leadership evaluations are used to explain evaluations in the 
‘current wave’ with party identification, rival leader evaluations and age used as control 
variables. Calculating the indirect effects and total effects of variables provides an 
opportunity to examine how effects are mediated over waves. I demonstrate how prior 
evaluations are highly impactful on later evaluations. Results are presented in a series of 
figures, which only contain the direct effects from previous leader evaluations and are 
represented by arrows and curved lines. Full model outputs with control variables are 
accessible in the Model Output Appendix Tables 1-8. References made in this section to ‘total 
effects’ can be found in the tables mentioned above. For information on how these effects 
are calculated see Research Methods Appendix section 2.3. Findings demonstrate a clear 
disruption in the stability of leadership evaluations for the Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
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Democrat leader evaluations following leadership change. Similar to the exploratory results 
above, there is no effect from leadership change on UKIP leader evaluations.  
Figure 4.5 details the path model for Conservative leader evaluations for waves one 
to four. It details considerable stability in the model, with prior evaluations having very strong 
effects on current ones. Arrows between each of the variables in circles indicate coefficient 
direction and the standardized coefficient estimate is labelled next to it. Each of the previous 
three evaluations had a substantial effect in explaining leadership evaluations in wave four. 
The strongest direct effect on wave four is the evaluations from wave three. This is expected 
considering it is the most recent evaluation. Despite the differences in time, however, wave 
one and wave two, remain strong predictors of leader evaluations in wave four. Also, Figure 
4.5 illustrates the importance of controlling for the effect of previous evaluations as the 
‘immediate’ effect of wave three is smaller than the direct effects recorded before this. Each 
of the coefficients indicates that evaluations of David Cameron are highly stable with each 
past evaluation serving as a very good predictor for the next one. There are sizeable indirect 
effects from wave one (.14) and wave two (.18) evaluations on wave four in Figure 4.5. When 
combined with the direct effects, the overall effect of these variables on wave four is notably 
larger. Total effects of .46 are recorded for wave two and .37 for wave one, distinctly greater 
than the direct effects presented in Figure 4.5. This illustrates the long-term effect of previous 
evaluations of David Cameron on the final wave presented in this model.  
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Figure 4.5: Diagram of Conservative Path Model Coefficients (Waves 1-4) 
 
 Models for other party leaders reflect similar levels of stability. Figure 4.6 presents the 
findings for Labour. Although the size of the effects is slightly smaller than those found in the 
Conservative model, the results nonetheless demonstrate stability between waves. Indirect 
effects calculated from this model provide some further understanding of the long-term 
effects of leadership evaluations. The total effects of wave one (.41) and wave two (.41) are 
higher than the direct effects shown in Figure 4.6. This illustrates the long-term effect of 
leadership evaluations when investigating feelings towards party leaders, as evaluations of 
Ed Miliband remain highly stable. 
Figure 4.6: Diagram of Labour Path Model Coefficients (Waves 1-4) 
 
 
Similar findings are found when examining the stability of leadership evaluations for 






































evaluations in wave four. Once again, when calculating the total effect of variables in wave 
one and wave two on wave four evaluations, there is a greater effect than presented in Figure 
4.7. The total effects of wave one (.39) and wave two (.45) are greater than the direct impact 
they have in predicting evaluations during the wave of interest. Therefore, waves one, two 
and three all have a meaningful effect in predicting evaluations of Nick Clegg in wave four. 
Figure 4.7: Diagram of Liberal Democrat Path Model Coefficients (Waves 1-4) 
 
 
Lastly, for Nigel Farage, the familiar story of stability is mostly but not entirely, 
consistent with the previous models. Overall leadership evaluations are highly stable in Figure 
4.8 but with one deviation from the other models. There is only a slight effect from wave one 
on wave four. The small effect is surprising given the consistency of results in the other 
models. Additionally, given the polarising nature of Nigel Farage, it might be expected that 
evaluations in wave one would remain impactful in explaining evaluations in wave four. A 
possible explanation for the weaker coefficient is wave two coinciding with the 2014 
European Parliamentary Elections where UKIP were enjoying significant media attention and 
doing well in opinion polls. UKIP won the most votes and seats in the EU parliamentary 
election in the UK and it is possible their electoral victory caused a notable change in feelings 
towards the leader. As a consequence, feelings in the first wave were no longer significant in 








showed 61.9% of respondents changed their evaluation of Farage during wave two. 
Regardless of the slight difference between the UKIP model and other models, the wider 
findings remain the same: sizable coefficients from previous waves indicate stability across 
the waves included in the model. 
Figure 4.8: Diagram of UKIP Path Model Coefficients (Waves 1-4)  
 
Next, I examine waves where leadership change has taken place for each party. 
Starting with the Conservative model, I outline that there are critical differences caused by 
new leadership which disrupts the stability of leader evaluations. Comparing Figure 4.9 to 
Figure 4.5, the most striking difference is that the final evaluations of David Cameron in waves 
eight and nine have little effect in explaining evaluations of May in wave ten. The direct effect 
from wave eight is no longer significant, indicating a clear rupture in the stability seen in 
previous models. It is interesting to note that the strongest direct effect on evaluations of 
May in wave ten comes in wave seven. These earlier evaluations of David Cameron, measured 
during April-May 2016, had a stronger effect than in the later waves. Calculating the total 
effect of wave seven only underlines this finding further. In short, transition from Cameron to 
May provides notable short-term disruption to the high levels of stability in evaluations seen 








Figure 4.9: Diagram of Conservative Path Model Coefficients (Waves 7-10) 
 
 
 Turning to the Labour model with new leadership (Figure 4.10), the model displays 
weaker coefficients than under typical circumstances. Direct effects are notably lower on 
wave seven, the first wave of Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership recorded by the study. Weaker than 
usual effects are evident from wave four, five and six. This represents a level of disruption to 
the stability of leadership evaluations but not to the same extent seen in the Conservative 
model. Corbyn’s new leadership of the Labour Party certainly causes a break in the level of 
stability. There is a similar level of disruption in the Liberal Democrat model following new 
leadership (Figure 4.11). The direct effect of feelings towards Clegg in waves four, five and six 
on Farron in wave seven are still noticeable but weaker than in the typical model. The model 
calculates that the short-term coefficient of Clegg in wave six to Farron in wave seven is the 
lowest direct effect. Further evidence is apparent when calculating the total effects of wave 
four (.25) and wave five (.27) on the dependent variable, indicating a greater effect from 
evaluations in previous waves. The long-term effect of leadership evaluations is again evident 
here, which may indicate that leaders of the same party are evaluated similarly by voters, but 
that new leadership provides a temporary disruption following the arrival of a new leader. 
Alternatively, long-term effects may indicate that partisanship continues to have a stable 




















Figure 4.10: Diagram of Labour Path Model Coefficients (Waves 4-7) 
 
Figure 4.11: Diagram of Liberal Democrat Path Model Coefficients (Waves 4-7) 
 
While results for the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat models are similar, 
the greatest disruption is in the Conservative model. The length of time between the last 
measurements of Cameron and first measurements of May is notably shorter than those 
associated with the leadership changes for Labour and the Liberal Democrats. As May became 
both Conservative leader and Prime Minister, assessments may have changed more and more 
quickly because of her greater prominence through holding party and government roles. 
Evaluations during the early months of leadership may be more fluid and result in greater 
disruption to evaluations but a larger sample of leadership change is necessary to conclude 
this. Farron and Corbyn had led their parties for nearly a year by the time the fieldwork had 






































dates, the full effects of leadership change for Labour and Liberal Democrat models may 
therefore be masked because considerable time has passed from when these leaders were 
first elected and when evaluations of them were recorded. Results also suggest that the initial 
disruption in the continuity of evaluations decays fairly rapidly as new party leaders become 
established in their position and evaluations from previous waves continue to have strong 
effects.  
Figure 4.12: Diagram of UKIP Path Model Coefficients (Waves 7-10) 
 
Lastly, turning to the UKIP model, when the leader changes the level of stability found 
in this model is highly similar to the first version of the model. Direct coefficients remain 
strong despite new leadership of the party. Waves seven, eight and nine all have significant 
effects on wave ten. This level of stability is reinforced further when assessing the total and 
indirect effects of wave seven and eight on the dependent variable. Strong indirect effects of 
.24 for wave seven and .21 for wave eight further underline the stability of evaluations. 
Therefore, there appears to be no noticeable change in UKIP evaluations following leadership 
change, confirming the differences between UKIP and other parties observed throughout this 
chapter. Considering the closeness of the relationship between UKIP’s image and the policy 
of leaving the European Union, voters were likely to have such polarised views on the EU 




















evaluations of the party’s leader. Another important consideration that may have contributed 
to the continued stability in the case of UKIP is that 56% of panel respondents chose “Don’t 
know” when asked for their feelings towards Paul Nuttall in wave ten, indicating that a 
majority had not yet formed any clear view of him. Those who did provide a score for Nuttall 
gave very similar scores to Farage in wave nine. 
Table 4.3: R-Squared Estimates for each ‘Typical’ and ‘Transition’ Models 
Party Leader ‘Typical’ Model ‘Leadership Change’ Model Difference  
Conservative 0.82 0.49 -0.33 
Labour 0.75 0.45 -0.3 
Liberal Democrat 0.69 0.31 -0.38 
UKIP 0.73 0.56 -0.17  
 
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the R-Squared estimates of ‘model fit’ for both the 
‘typical’ and ‘leadership change’ models for each party. The table demonstrates consistent 
findings when comparing the typical and leadership change models for the respective parties. 
Each of the leadership change models are less successful in explaining the variation in 
evaluations for new leaders. The R-Squared figures from the typical models illustrate the 
models performance and reflect the strong coefficients that were outlined above. Values are 
noticeably lower in each leadership change model where variation in the first evaluation of a 
new leader was more difficult to explain. Similar drops in R-Squared scores are seen in the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat models, with the biggest difference actually 
coming from the Liberal Democrat model after Farron takes the helm. While there is a decline 
in R-squared figures in the leadership change UKIP model and the typical model, it remains 
the highest performer out of the four cases examined. These results illustrate that previous 
evaluations of party leaders are strong predictors of future evaluations under normal 
conditions, with the weaker fits of ‘transition’ models illustrating how disruptive leadership 
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change is, at least in the short-term. Differences in model performance provide evidence that 
supports the hypothesis that new leadership causes an abrupt change to otherwise stable 
evaluation of leaders. 
  
Explaining Change in Leadership Evaluations Using a Multilevel Model 
 
While the two previous sections of this chapter highlighted differences between 
waves of the panel, the focus in this section is about integrating differences between waves 
and differences between individuals in the sample. The dependent variable for each of the 
models is the absolute change in leadership evaluations. Multilevel models (MLMs) allow for 
wave and individual level variables to be modelled neatly in one model. Using binary wave-
level variables, I examine whether new leadership and general election waves cause greater 
changes in leadership evaluations. This provides an opportunity to cross-validate the findings 
presented above. Voters with no party identification, ‘unsophisticated’ voters and voters that 
consume high levels of televised political coverage are all hypothesised to change their 
leadership evaluations more than other voters. A range of individual-level variables are 
included to capture these characteristics: party identification, political efficacy, consumption 
of televised political information and attention to politics. To investigate the role of party 
identification further I include interaction effects between party identification and strength 
of party identification. EU referendum vote intention/choice was included in the model 
because the issue of Britain’s membership of the European Union was especially salient 
during the time period of the panel. Standard demographic variables of age, gender, 
education, ethnicity and household income variables were included as control variables. 
Lastly, I test whether changes in leadership evaluations are made relatively by voters through 
including change in evaluations of rival party leaders. Note that not all variables of interest 
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were included in every wave of the study, therefore some variables were time invariant.7 This 
exposes a limitation within the data because some time constant variables will fluctuate in 
reality. For example, respondents’ understanding of political events could vary over different 
times in the panel, but for the variable to be included in the model the available data was 
aggregated into a time constant variable.  
 
Wave Level Fixed Effects 
The wave-level effects of leadership change and campaign waves are summarised in 
Figure 4.13. Leadership change has the strongest effect in the Conservative model (.31), with 
new leadership causing a notable level of change in individual evaluations, compared with 
previous waves in the panel. Strong effects for leadership change waves are also recorded in 
the Labour (.22) and Liberal Democrat (.26) models, representing a strong positive effect as 
voters adjust their evaluations after a new leader has taken office. Party leadership change in 
the Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Labour parties is the largest of any effect in the 
model, indicating that between-waves differences are larger than between-voter differences. 
The UKIP model shows no significant effect of party leadership change on leader evaluations. 
However, while the effect is insignificant, there is a positive, but noticeably smaller effect 
from Paul Nuttall’s new leadership. The exception provided by the UKIP model demonstrates 
that voters do not respond uniformly to leadership change. The UKIP exceptionalism could be 
the result of a difference between mainstream parties and single-issue parties or Paul 
Nuttall’s personal qualities as the new leader. Leadership change may therefore be 
meaningful in affecting feelings from voters in some parties but not others.  
 
7 This includes: Consumption of Televised Coverage, Political Attention, Political efficacy. For further 
information see Research Methods Appendix section 2.2 
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Figure 4.13: Wave Level Effects on Party Leader Evaluation Change 
 
To analyse whether these effects were a product of the time period (2014-2017) 
covered by the BESIP panel or whether these findings are applicable more generally, I 
constructed similar MLMs for data on the nine wave British Election Study panel for the period 
2005 – 2010. Again, this panel covered a time period where the Conservatives, Labour and 
Liberal Democrats changed their respective leaders. I do not go into the detail of each model 
here, but the model summaries are available in the Model Output Appendix Table 9. The 
results from leadership change waves are very similar to those found for the 2014-17 data. 
There is a substantial level of absolute change in leader evaluations and these effects are 
consistent across the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat models (data for UKIP were 
not available in this study). Such results provide further evidence, beyond the primary sample 
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Other wave level effects included within the analysis test whether there is any 
substantial effect from leadership change in rival political parties or from general election 
campaign waves. General election campaign waves were introduced together and separately 
to assess any effects from the 2015 and 2017 campaigns. There is, however, no evidence that 
any combination of campaign variables had a significant impact. This is an interesting finding, 
considering the intensity of modern campaigns and the focus on party leaders. In particular, 
it is interesting that the 2017 campaign had no significant effect given the universal 
recognition that Theresa May’s performance during the 2017 campaign was exceptionally 
poor, together with the strong performance of Jeremy Corbyn in the same campaign (Bale 
and Webb 2018; Cowley and Kavanagh 2018; Mellon et al. 2018). Additionally, there is no 
effect of rival leadership change stimulating change in evaluations of other leaders. Owing to 
the binary structure of these wave-level variables, this is not unexpected, given the strong 
effects found in the leadership change waves. The results of MLMs for the 2005-2010 data 
show similar results, with general election campaign waves exhibiting no significant effect in 
changes of leadership evaluations. This finding illustrates that while opinions of party leaders 
change often, the greatest changes in leadership evaluations over the panel do not happen 
during the ‘short campaign’. 
 
Individual Level Fixed Effects 
Table 4.4 contains the full model summaries for each leader, including wave level and 
individual-level effects. Firstly, I discuss the results of relative changes in evaluations with rival 
party leaders. Next, I examine the effect of variables related to hypotheses 3a-c and discuss 
potential effects on changes in leader evaluations. I discuss the effects of party identification, 
before turning to political sophistication and consumption of televised political coverage. 
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Lastly, I examine interaction effects between party identification and strength of 
identification. 
There is consistent evidence throughout each model to suggest that party leader 
evaluations are made relatively by respondents. Change in the evaluations of rival leaders all 
have a positive effect on change in the evaluations of the leader who is modelled as the 
dependent variable. The size of each effect depends on which leader is being modelled. For 
instance, in the Labour model there is a stronger link between changes in evaluations of 
Liberal Democrat and Labour leader evaluations, as opposed to Labour and UKIP leader 
evaluations. However, all effects are strong and significant, indicating the importance of rival 
leaders on how voters adjust their evaluations. Consistency in the results across the models 
provides strong evidence that voters do not adjust their evaluations of leaders in isolation but 
relative to the performance of the other incumbent leaders. Change in one leader is 
associated with change in all other leaders, demonstrating that voters are conscious of the 
available options for leading the country and judge each leader relative to their competitors.  
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Table 4.4 Full Multilevel Model for Absolute Change in Leadership Evaluation  
 Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat UKIP 
Wave Level Variables     
Conservative and UKIP Leadership Change 0.31*** (0.05) -0.05 (0.03) -0.005 (0.04) 0.10 (0.07) 
Campaign Wave -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.06) 
Labour and Lib Dem Leadership Change 0.02 (0.05) 0.22*** (0.03) 0.25*** (0.04) -0.03 (0.07) 
Individual Level Variables     
Age (Scaled) 0.02*** (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 
Education 0.01*** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) -0.001 (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) 
Gender - Female -0.02* (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 
Income (Household) 0.004 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) 
Ethnicity - Non-White British 0.04** (0.02) 0.001 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Labour Party Id 0.13*** (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) -0.001 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) 
Party Id Strength -0.04** (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
Conservative Party Id 0.14*** (0.05) -0.08 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05) 0.09* (0.05) 
Liberal Democrat Id 0.05 (0.06) -0.12* (0.06) -0.03 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 
UKIP Party Id -0.02 (0.06) 0.03 (0.07) -0.01 (0.06) 0.31*** (0.07) 
No Party Id 0.07 (0.05) -0.05 (0.05) -0.05 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05) 
EU Ref - Remain -0.02** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) -0.13
*** 
(0.01) 
Change in Labour Leader Evaluations 0.06*** (0.01)  0.13*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 
Change in Liberal Democrat Leader 
Evaluations 0.12
*** (0.01) 0.13*** (0.01)  0.07*** (0.01) 
Change in UKIP Leader Evaluations 0.10*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01)  
Change in Conservative Leader Evaluations  0.07*** (0.01) 0.13*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 






Political Attention (Self Described, scale 0-
10) 0.01
*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) -0.0004 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
Political Efficacy 0.02*** (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 0.001 (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 
TV for Political Information Scale (1-5) 0.01** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Interaction: Labour Id * Party Id Strength -0.03 (0.02) -0.04* (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 
Interaction: Conservative Id * Party Id 
Strength -0.01 (0.02) -0.06
** (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
Interaction: Lib Dem Id * Party Id Strength 0.04 (0.03) 0.06* (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
Interaction: UKIP Id * Party Id Strength 0.07** (0.03) -0.05* (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.10
*** 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.24*** (0.06) 0.46*** (0.06) 0.45*** (0.06) 0.26*** (0.07) 
N 27,022 27,022 27,022 27,022 
Log Likelihood -25,575.76 -27,069.33 -26,826.58 -27,308.00 
AIC 51,211.53 54,198.66 53,713.17 54,676.00 
BIC 51,457.66 54,444.79 53,959.30 54,922.13 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
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  Effects from the socio-demographic variables were relatively small, compared to other 
effects seen in the model. The effects were also fairly predictable. For instance, younger 
voters were more likely to change their evaluations of Labour leaders, while older voters were 
more likely to change their evaluation of Conservative leaders. None of the socio-
demographic variables had a significant effect in the Liberal Democrat model. Interestingly 
the strongest socio-demographic effect was that women were more likely to change their 
views of the UKIP leaders, while men had more fixed views.  
Identification with a political party has a clear and significant effect on changes in 
evaluations. Within the Conservative and UKIP models, voters who identify with a leader’s 
party are more likely to change their evaluation than those who do not identify with the party. 
This effect is particularly strong with UKIP identifiers and is the strongest effect in the entire 
UKIP model. Effects from party identification in these models indicate that partisans are most 
likely to change evaluations of their own leaders. Partisans may have closely followed the 
leadership elections of their party and already gathered information to make an assessment 
of the new leader. These results contrast with the rationale developed from the literature 
which suggested that those with partisan attachments would hold more stable evaluations of 
their leader because they are guided by their party identification to be supportive. The same 
effects were not found in the Labour and Liberal Democrat models, where results showed 
that their own party identifiers did not change leadership evaluations more than other 
partisans. There is no evidence from any of these models that voters with no identification, 
who were theorised to be the most susceptible to change, change their evaluations more 
than other respondents. These findings provide no support for the hypothesis that non-
identifiers are more likely to change their evaluations. Indeed, in some cases party identifiers 
are more likely to change their opinion of their own leader. 
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The interaction effects between party identification and strength of party 
identification, provide further insight into the effect of partisanship on changing evaluations 
of party leaders. These results suggest that stronger Liberal Democrat and UKIP identifiers 
changed their evaluations of the Conservative leader more than weaker identifiers. This may 
be due to an incumbency effect because the Conservative leader was also Prime Minister 
throughout the waves covered in the panel. Stronger Conservative identifiers also change 
their evaluations of UKIP leaders more than weaker Conservative identifiers. This is 
potentially due to some policy similarities, notably Britain’s membership of the European 
Union. There is some evidence in the Labour and UKIP models that the strongest identifiers 
hold the most consistent evaluations of their own leader, supporting the hypothesis outlined 
in Box 4.1, but the evidence is not consistent across each of the models. Distinctively, there 
are no significant interaction effects within the Liberal Democrat model. Interaction effects 
between party identification and strength of identification show no consistent effect across 
the models. 
 Effects from political efficacy and knowledge variables have varied success in 
explaining greater levels of change in leadership evaluations. Firstly, self-described political 
attention on a 0-10 scale has no significant effect, with the exception of the Conservative 
model, where those who claim a higher level of political attention are slightly more likely to 
change their views of the leader. It is important to note that political attention scores are 
skewed toward very positive values, with a mean score of 8.1 out of 10. This may be a 
consequence of panel attrition with more politically interested respondents remaining in the 
panel over multiple waves. Political knowledge measured by trivia questions produced similar 
results and only had a marginal effect in the Liberal Democrat and UKIP models. However, 
interest in politics and being confident about understanding political developments are not 
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mutually exclusive. Political efficacy, measured by asking respondents if they find it difficult 
to understand politics, has a more notable and uniform effect in each model. Those who agree 
more strongly with the statement are more likely to change their evaluations of each party 
leader (with the exception of the Liberal Democrat model). This finding provides some basis 
for ‘unsophisticated’ voter arguments, with those who find it difficult to understand politics 
being more likely to change their feelings toward leaders than those who profess to find it 
easier to understand political events. The effect is strongest in the UKIP model, suggesting 
that ‘unsophisticated’ voters adjust their leadership evaluations of UKIP leaders more than 
the conventional political parties. It is worth emphasising that only one of the three variables 
employed to measure whether voters are ‘sophisticated’ was successful in finding a clear 
result. Whether finding it difficult to understand political information constitutes being an 
‘unsophisticated’ voter is a wider point of debate, beyond the scope of this chapter, but as 
outlined in the literature review of this thesis, the classification of ‘unsophisticated’ voters 
does not have uniform understanding among researchers. 
Consistent evidence is found when modelling the effect of television consumption of 
political information. The effect is positive, suggesting that greater consumption of broadcast 
political news, which leaders dominate, influences greater changes in evaluations. Uniform 
effects are found across each model as greater exposure to televised political content is 
influential in changing the political opinions of leaders. Again, it is important to note that the 
effects are small relative to other effects discussed in this section. This finding fits with the 
hypothesised relationship, as these voters are likely to have significantly more information 
about party leaders and are able to update their feelings and re-evaluate leaders in the light 
of political events and performance. Therefore, the results suggest a link between 





Leadership change causes a substantial shift in otherwise stable feelings toward party 
leaders. If voters reacted automatically to new leaders using cues from the party they 
represent or from their predecessor, it would follow that little change in evaluations would 
be observed with new leadership. This means new leaders are offered an opportunity by 
voters to make a fresh impression and gain the support of potential voters. If voters’ 
evaluations of leaders remain stable in waves after leadership change, then party leaders may 
have a limited window to persuade most votes of their capabilities. All these findings apply 
to the well-established parties of the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats but do 
not extend to the less-established UKIP. The UKIP exception highlights that these findings are 
not generalisable to all political parties, with contextual effects of single-issue and catch all 
parties requiring a potential caveat to these results. I further considered whether voters 
changed their evaluation leader in isolation or comparatively. Strong evidence was found in 
each multilevel model to provide further support for existing suggestions that voters evaluate 
leaders relative to their rivals. These effects were consistent and further strengthened the 
argument of relative evaluations, providing an insight into which factors voters consider to 
be important when they construct their evaluations. 
Evidence was found to suggest that certain sub-sections of the electorate changed 
their evaluations of party leaders to a greater extent. Partisanship has a strong effect in the 
Conservative and UKIP cases but no significant effect in the Labour or Liberal Democrat 
models. In these cases, the results suggested that voters who identify with a party are more 
likely to change their opinion of their own leader than other voters. This finding ran contrary 
to the expectation that voters with no party identification would change their evaluations 
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more. Interaction effects were inconsistent when modelling the effect of party identification 
and strength of party identification. Crucially, there is no evidence that non-partisans change 
their evaluations of leaders more than partisans. Some evidence is found to suggest that 
‘unsophisticated’ voters are more likely to change their evaluations of party leaders, albeit 
that the results suggested these effects were not particularly strong. This provides some 
evidence that voters who find it difficult to understand politics have more fluid evaluations of 
leaders. Lastly, there was consistent evidence that consumption of televised political 
coverage had a small effect on changes to leadership evaluations. Findings presented here 
suggest some sub-groups within the electorate update their evaluations of leaders more 
frequently than others.  
 Analysis of leadership evaluations in a panel data setting has provided valuable 
insights into the dynamics of change. Scarcity of longitudinal data that captured regular leader 
evaluations had restricted observing individual level change over a substantial time period. 
Even more scarce is panel data that covers periods that include leadership change. The 
irregularity of fieldwork and inconsistencies in questions asked to respondents were 
limitations to navigate. However, the analysis demonstrates the opportunities provided by 
panel data. Movements towards multi-wave panel data in election studies in the UK and 
beyond means that future opportunities to examine leadership change with more consistent 
fieldwork times are likely. 
 Findings in this chapter suggested that change in evaluations during general election 
campaigns were not significantly greater than the change observed in other waves, providing 
no support for the relevant hypothesis in this chapter. This finding is important to consider 
when feeding forward into the next chapter that specifically examines changes to leadership 
evaluations during the campaign. Evidence found here suggested that leadership change was 
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most likely to cause absolute level changes in leadership evaluations. Despite results 
suggesting there was no extraordinary direction of change during the campaign wave, the 
next chapter investigates whether the level of change observed in evaluations is significant 





Chapter 5 : Party Leaders and Campaigns: Masters of Persuasion? 
 
 Modern election campaigning is distinctly focused around party leaders, particularly 
the Labour and Conservative leaders who are the only realistic contenders to become Prime 
Minister, barring an unprecedented realignment of political parties. Given their high profile, 
can leaders persuade and convince undecided and disaffected voters during campaigns? 
Similarly, if leaders perform poorly, could they discourage undecided voters from supporting 
their party? Greater opportunities exist in modern campaigns for parties to influence 
undecided electors to vote for their party but, for such effects to occur, voters must be open 
to persuasion. Previous research has found little evidence of campaigns having a net effect 
on vote choice, as most voters ultimately vote for the party they intended to before the 
campaign began (Clarke et al. 2004; Erickson and Wlezien 2012; Finkel 1993; Finkel and 
Schrott 1995; Kalla and Broockman 2018). Other researchers have gone as far to say that the 
campaign merely funnels vote choice in a predetermined direction (Finkel 1993; Harrop and 
Miller 1987; Wlezien and Erikson 2002). 
There is, however, good reason to think that greater effects could be present in 
contemporary British general election campaigns. A larger proportion of voters now decide 
their vote choice during the campaign and, compounded with weaker alignment to political 
parties, vote choice could be swayed by campaign events (Barisione 2009; Bittner 2014; 
Denver, Carman, and Johns 2012). Floating voters are desirable targets for political parties 
eager to maximise their vote. Ample opportunities exist for leaders to sell themselves to the 
electorate through televised debates and interviews which have become mainstays of 
modern campaigns (Deacon et al. 2017; Gaber 2013; Harrison 1992; Mellon 2016; Mughan 
and Aaldering 2018). Therefore, are leaders influential in persuading key sections of the 
electorate, including the much sought after floating voter, to vote for their party? 
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The following findings are presented in this chapter. Campaign effects were 
distinctively different for the 2015 and 2017 general elections. In 2015 few Labour or 
Conservative voters switched their party choice during the campaign, with most voters 
remaining with the same party they intended to vote for before the campaign started. Greater 
evidence of vote switching was observed in 2017 for Labour and was caused, to some extent, 
by changing evaluations of Jeremy Corbyn and Theresa May over the campaign. I illustrate 
that persuading voters who were sympathetic to Labour but held reservations at the 
beginning of the campaign about voting for the party, were critical to Labour exceeding 
expectations in 2017. In 2015 and 2017, most individuals in the sample were considered 
unlikely to switch during the campaign because their vote choice can be accurately predicted 
with relatively few pre-campaign variables. After isolating voters in the sample who are most 
likely affected by campaign events, I find that changes in leader evaluations had a significant 
effect on those voters who converted to Labour or the Conservatives in the 2017 General 
Election. Differences in the strength of leader effects on vote choice were noticeably larger in 
2017 for these Labour and Conservatives voters, relative to the size of the effects in 2015. 
Differences between the two elections suggest that leader effects can vary depending on 
election context, events of the campaign and who the leaders are. 
 
Previous Efforts to Examine Campaign Effects 
 
Studies of voter behaviour in the US and Britain suggested that election campaigns 
were unlikely to have a meaningful effect on voters (Butler and Stokes 1974; Campbell et al. 
1960; Lasarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Schmitt-Beck 2007; Tilley 2008). The 
professionalisation of election campaigning and the emergence of television as the primary 
medium of political information led to a reassessment of campaign effects in the US (Schmitt-
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Beck 2007; Sunshine Hillygus and Jackman 2003). An equivalent reassessment is particularly 
relevant to contemporary campaigns in Britain with the recent establishment of televised 
leadership debates and special televised political programs (Deacon et al. 2017; Gaber 2013; 
Harrison 1992; Mughan and Aaldering 2018). Leaders dominate these special campaign 
events. Moreover, the dominance of leaders in campaigns has occurred at a time where more 
British voters decide their vote during the campaign and a greater proportion change their 
vote choice from one election to the next (Fisher 2018; McAllister 2003; Mellon 2016). In 
addition, campaign effects are expected to be stronger if voters do not identify with a political 
party, are ideologically moderate or are relatively uninterested in politics (Barisione 2009; 
Denver, Carman, and Johns 2012). 
Studies that examine the influence of campaigns on vote choice can largely be divided 
into two categories. The first group of researchers have used daily cross-sectional surveys to 
isolate the effect of specific campaign events on voters (Blais et al. 2003; Erickson and Wlezien 
2012; Shaw and Roberts 2000). A second group uses panel data and seeks to measure 
individual-level changes in voters’ attitudes over the entire campaign (Clarke et al. 2004; 
Finkel 1993, 1995; Finkel and Schrott 1995). Examining changes across the entire campaign 
holds fewer assumptions about how specific events affect the views of the electorate. For 
example, researchers have to consider whether respondents in their sample were aware of 
the campaign event and were somewhat knowledgeable about the details. On the other 
hand, analysing the election as a whole enables comparisons of campaign effects between 
elections. This approach uses information gathered before the campaign has begun, during 
the campaign and after the campaign.  
These effects of reinforcement, activation and conversion have been used as the 
theoretical framework in a range of studies (Clarke et al. 2004, 2009a; Finkel 1993; Finkel and 
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Schrott 1995; García-Viñuela, Jurado, and Riera 2018). Reinforced voters begin the campaign 
with a clear vote choice preference and political information consumed during the campaign 
serves to reaffirm and strengthen their existing preference (Schmitt-Beck 2007). Some of 
these individuals may be considered the party’s ‘core’ voters who are highly unlikely to vote 
for another party, but it remains important that these voters are mobilised to turnout in an 
election. The second effect is activation. Campaigns provide candidates and political parties 
with an opportunity to activate the latent political predispositions of voters (Finkel 1993; 
Schmitt-Beck 2007). As an example, voters who (1) hold attitudes or belong to socio-
demographic groups that align favourably with the Conservative Party, (2) do not intend to 
vote Conservative at the beginning of the campaign but (3) ultimately vote for the 
Conservative Party are considered to be ‘activated’ by the campaign. The last effect is 
conversion, ‘the holy grail of campaign effects’ (Erickson and Wlezien 2012, 9). Convincing an 
elector to switch from one party (or from being undecided) to another over the course of the 
campaign is considered the most powerful effect, because it takes votes away from rival 
parties whilst adding to your own.  
Like preceding studies, I focus in particular on conversion. However, I also aim to go 
beyond previous studies, which have mostly concentrated on how many voters convert 
during the campaign, to investigate why voters converted. It is important to understand the 
reasons why voters convert as ‘converters’ are often viewed as integral to parties maximising 
their vote. Voters that switch during the campaign are sometimes referred to as ‘floating’ 
voters. Some studies reference floating voters without any further description or elaboration 
of the term beyond an understanding that they are a highly coveted group of voters (Russo 
2014). Others have been more precise, describing floating voters as weak partisans with no 
ideological leaning (Bearnot and Schier 2012). In other cases, floating voters are simply voters 
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who chose a different party in the current election than the previous election. Mellon (2016, 
3) argues that ‘If 40% of voters [in Britain] are changing parties every election, almost every 
voter is a potential swing voter’. While it is not necessarily the same voters who switch party 
choice between each general election, 40% constitutes a substantial amount of switching 
from voters. It raises the question of how many voters switch their vote choice during the 
campaign. Floating voters are unlikely to be one homogenous group within the electorate. 
For example, voters weighing up Labour or Green are likely to be different to those weighing 
up the Conservatives and UKIP. This approach points to an important acknowledgement; 
floating voters will have political opinions and evaluations before the campaign begins that 
will affect the likelihood of voting for specific parties. Therefore, pre-campaign feelings and 
opinions can help establish whether voters are likely to convert during the campaign. It is also 
useful to consider the circumstances in which campaigns are more persuasive to voters 
(Sunshine Hillygus 2010). Opportunities to persuade voters may be greater in some elections 
and less in others, for instance in a closely fought election between two parties of similar 
popularity (Erickson and Wlezien 2012). Similarly, the reasons for switching may vary in 
significance between elections, depending on the political actors involved and the salience of 
issues in the campaign.  
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Box 5.1 : Hypotheses for leader evaluations and campaign effects
 
 
Approach to Data Analysis  
 
The 2015 and 2017 UK general elections provide two excellent comparative case 
studies to analyse campaign effects. The campaigns happened during very different contexts 
(Cowley and Kavanagh 2016, 2018; Geddes and Tonge 2015; Tonge, Leston-Bandeira and 
Wilks-Heeg 2017). A crucial difference is that the 2015 election was projected to be a close 
and competitive race, with the two main parties exhibiting broadly equal popularity in opinion 
polls and relatively minor differences in policy. In 2017, by contrast, the Conservative Party 
was clearly more popular heading into the campaign and there were greater policy 
differences between Labour and the Conservatives, suggesting smaller leadership effects. UK 
general election campaigns are routinely covered in longstanding series that analyse general 
elections, but these are largely limited to the ‘expert’ interpretation of events, based on 
conversations with party strategists, media reaction to events of the campaign and aggregate 
polling data (Cowley and Kavanagh 2018, 2016; Geddes and Tonge 2015; Tonge, Leston-
Bandeira, and Wilks-Heeg 2017). Relatively few studies have researched these campaigns and 
possible effects based on a focused analysis of daily campaign survey data (Mellon et al. 
How voters feel before the campaign will largely predict their actual vote choice. 
Pre-campaign leadership evaluations have a strong effect on vote choice. 
Changes in leadership evaluations during the campaign improve predictions of 
vote choice. 
Most voters are unlikely to change vote choice, irrespective of changes in 
leadership evaluations seen over the campaign. 
The effect of leadership evaluations will differ across voters and elections 
Of the voters who do switch during the campaign, change in leadership evaluations 
explain this choice. 
Voters susceptible to converting during the campaign will have moderate pre-
campaign views. 
Change in leader evaluations during the campaign will be more moderate in 2015 
than 2017 and the effect of evaluations will reflect the level of change. 
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2018). To address this gap, I utilise the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP), using ‘pre-
campaign’ variables, ‘campaign’ variables and ‘post-election’ vote choice to create a three-
wave framework to predict vote intention and calculate campaign effects (Finkel 1993; Finkel 
and Schrott 1995). Additionally, I utilise the ‘rolling thunder’ design of the 2015 and 2017 
campaign waves, which provides survey responses for each day of the campaign.  
To make predictions about individual political choices at the 2015 and 2017 elections 
I adopt a machine learning approach. Predictive power is central to machine learning 
approaches, using information gathered from one dataset to make predictions about unseen 
data (Baćak and Kennedy 2019). I include Figure 5.1 as a reminder of the stages of a machine 
learning approach that was outlined in greater detail during the Chapter Three. A machine 
learning approach has notable advantages when making individual-level predictions and it  
draws upon advances in statistics and computing power (Lowndes, Marsh, and Stoker 2015). 
Advantages include greater reliability of findings through an extensive cross-validation 
process. In order to generate reliable findings, I produce 100 iterations of each model to check 
the level of variation after randomly selecting respondents. 
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Figure 5.1: Machine Learning Approach Flow Chart 
 
I use binomial LASSO regression to construct models using a subset of the overall BESIP 
sample, a random selection of 75% of respondents that is labelled the ‘training’ dataset. The 
remaining 25% of respondents form the unseen ‘test’ dataset and the model attempts to 
predict the vote choices of these respondents. LASSO regression estimates smaller effects 
from predictor variables than in conventional regression, with the objective of constructing a 
model generalisable beyond the data that informs it (Tibshirani 1996). This approach gives 
additional robustness to the findings of the model because results are compared against 
different iterations. For example, comparing the size of variable effects across iterations to 
assess the overall significance. Producing the models through this approach provides an 
accurate assessment of which voters are likely to switch.  
The dependent variable in each of the models is an individual’s reported vote choice 





















Conservative or Labour vote choice is placed at 1, with votes for any other party or not voting 
at all recorded as 0. One of the limitations of predicting individual vote intention through this 
framework is that these binomial models work best with a clear two-party system. As a result, 
model performance for vote choice for smaller parties was poor. This performance may be a 
consequence of supporters of smaller parties voting tactically in general elections. That said, 
Labour and Conservative supporters could still vote tactically, depending on the local election 
context in their constituency. I factor in respondents’ assessments of how likely parties are to 
win in their constituency in order to account for the possibility of tactical voting. Since Labour 
and Conservative leaders are also the only likely candidates to become Prime Minister, their 
effects during the campaign are expected to be greater than leaders of smaller parties. Three 
separate models are developed, each with an increasing number of predictor variables in an 
attempt to improve the accuracy of predictions. This is done by starting with some basic 
indicators and then adding variables relating to party leader evaluations and ‘campaign 
change’ variables to assess any improvements in accuracy with additional information 
included in the model. 
Predicted scores from the second LASSO model, which includes leadership evaluations 
and only contains pre-campaign variables, provide a baseline assessment of which voters are 
likely to be converted during campaigns. Existing research suggests the voters who are most 
susceptible to conversion could be influenced by changed evaluations of party leaders. I 
construct standard binomial regression models to explain why some of these key voters 
converted, whilst others did not. Variables that record changes to evaluations and feelings 
over the campaign are used to explain these decisions. In addition, I provide descriptive ‘flow 
of the vote’ figures to illustrate where votes were gained from and lost to.  
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An Overview of the 2015 and 2017 General Election Campaigns from ‘Rolling Thunder’ 
Data 
 
The 2015 and 2017 general election campaigns were distinctively different from the 
perspective of leadership evaluations. There are distinct trends in the overall movement of 
vote intention and leadership evaluations in the 2017 campaign. Evidence shows that Theresa 
May and the Conservatives become substantially less popular over the campaign, with Jeremy 
Corbyn and Labour becoming increasingly popular. The 2017 campaign trends are replicated 
with partisan supporters, illustrating that Labour and Corbyn gained substantial ground with 
Labour Party identifiers, while May and the Conservatives lost some ground with Conservative 
Party identifiers. However, strong evidence of campaign change found for party identifiers is 
not replicated for non-partisans in 2017. Evidence from the 2015 UK General Election shows 
no consistent individual or aggregate movement over the campaign. In 2015 Miliband gained  
some ground among Labour identifiers, but not the decisive shift seen from Corbyn two years 
later. Attempts to sway the opinions of non-partisan voters decisively in 2015 or 2017 were 
unsuccessful for both parties. In this section, leadership evaluations are represented by 
dashed trendlines, while vote intention is represented by solid trendlines. Smoothed linear 
trendlines are layered on the figures to provide greater clarity in the direction of change over 
time. Shaded areas around smoothed trend lines represent the standard error.  
Figure 5.2 provides daily vote intention and leader evaluations in 2015 and 2017 for 
the overall sample. The trendlines in 2015 are flat, indicating no trend in vote intention or 
leader evaluations during the campaign. When comparing where vote intention and 
leadership evaluations begin and where they end, there is little net difference in both values. 
For instance, average assessments of Cameron begin at 4.2 and at the end of the campaign 
have only risen marginally to 4.3. Small movements in evaluations were observed during the 
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campaign, but had all but evaporated by polling day. Results for the 2017 campaign are 
strikingly different. There are distinct linear relationships in vote intention and leadership 
assessments over the duration of the campaign. Labour vote intention begins at 27.1% at the 
start of the campaign and finishes slightly under 40%. This is a remarkable difference over 34 
days. Corbyn’s ratings increase gradually and, on average, he is more well liked than May by 
the end of the campaign. The inverse is true for May and the Conservatives, her ratings and 
Conservative vote intention both decrease steadily over the campaign. The trends in Figure 
5.2 suggests that leader evaluations are linked; evaluations of May decreased while 
evaluations of Corbyn increased. Findings presented in Chapter Four suggested evaluations 
were made relatively over a three-year period, and these initial results suggest the same 
relative relationship during the campaign. Furthermore, trends seen in the graph suggest a 
very strong relationship between leader evaluations and vote intention. 
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Figure 5.2: Campaign Vote Intention and Leadership Evaluations for Labour and the 
Conservatives  
 
Figure 5.3 presents the aggregate vote intention and leader evaluations for very 
strong party identifiers at each election. Beginning with 2015, the familiar horizontal trends 
for Miliband, Cameron and Conservative vote intention are visible. An important difference 
between Cameron and Miliband is that Cameron was notably more well-liked by his core 
supporters, relative to assessments of Miliband made by his own supporters. Furthermore, 
Labour vote intention drops steadily over the course of the campaign, with 80.5% of Labour 
identifiers intending to vote Labour at the beginning of the 2015 campaign, but only 70% 
doing so by the end. Conservative partisans’ vote intention for their party also drops, but only 
by approximately 2%. At the beginning of the 2017 campaign, May and the Conservatives 
have the support of over 90% of Conservative identifiers, compared to only 65% of Labour 























































































































































































Vote Intention for Labour and Conservatives and Average 
       Like/Dislike Evaluations of Party Leaders
Source: BESIP 'Rolling Thunder' Wave 5 & Wave 12
       Dashed Lines represent Like/Dislike Averages for party leaders. Solid Lines represent Vote Intention Percentages (0−10 scale)
       Smoothed Lines represent linear relationship over time (Stanard Error is shaded area)
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Labour identifiers, finishing 15 percentage points higher by the end of the campaign. 
Conservative vote intention among Conservative partisans decreases over the course of the 
campaign, finishing 7.5 percentage points lower. Similarly, core supporters’ evaluations of 
their respective leaders converge over the campaign until they hold nearly the same standing 
with their core supporters by the end. Corbyn began the campaign with the support of fewer 
core supporters than Miliband in 2015. However, Corbyn successfully galvanised these voters 
during the campaign, indicating that activation effects could be highly important to Labour’s 
performance in 2017. 
Figure 5.3: Campaign Vote Intention and Leadership Evaluations (Very Strong Party 
Identifiers Only) 
 
Turning to voters with no party identification in Figure 5.4, there are much weaker 
trends across both campaigns. Cameron overtakes Miliband in evaluations of non-partisans 























































































































































































Vote Intention and Average Like/Dislike 
       Evaluations Party Leaders (Conservative and Labour Partisans)
Source: BESIP 'Rolling Thunder' Wave 5 & Wave 12
       Dashed Lines represent Like/Dislike Averages for party leaders. Solid Lines represent Vote Intention Percentages (0−10 scale)
       Smoothed Lines represent linear relationship over time (Stanard Error is shaded area)
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variation in evaluations of Miliband over the campaign, but no net trend. Both parties 
increased their vote share among non-partisan voters by the end of the 2015 campaign but 
not significantly. Vote intention during the 2017 campaign follows a smoother trajectory. 
Labour vote intention increases slowly, as non-partisans are won over. However, the shift in 
support among non-partisans during the campaign (6 percentage points) is much smaller than 
that seen among partisans (15 percentage points). Fewer non-partisans switching to Labour 
may indicate that Labour’s gain in the 2017 campaign was predominantly driven by the 
activation of partisans, already sympathetic to Labour. Conservative vote intention among 
non-partisans holds steady after an initial increase during the early stages of the campaign. 
Though May was widely criticised during the campaign for performing poorly, assessments of 
her by  non-partisans changed relatively little. Such a trend implies that Conservative 
identifiers were driving high ratings of May when the campaign began, but this enthusiasm 
did not extend to non-partisans. Overall, the data presented here indicates a clearer 
relationship between the campaign and partisans in 2017, with little evidence that the views 
of non-partisans changed significantly.  
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Many of the previous findings are replicated in Figure 5.5, which examines change in 
leadership evaluations during the 2015 and 2017 campaigns. Change in evaluations is 
measured by subtracting respondents’ pre-campaign scores from the scores given when 
surveyed during the campaign. The graph is divided between three different groups: all voters 
in the sample, voters who identify with the party (which I label ‘core partisans’) and non-
partisans (voters with no party identification). Trendlines for the 2015 campaign are flat 
across each group. Average evaluations of Miliband and Cameron increased by a small 
amount during the campaign, by around 0.25 points, with little variation between the days of 
the campaign.  
In 2017 there is a clearer relationship between change in evaluations and the 































































































































































































Daily Vote Intention for Labour and Conservatives
       and Average Like/Dislike Evaluations of Leaders (Non−Partisan)
Source: BESIP 'Rolling Thunder' Wave 5 & Wave 12
       Dashed Lines represent Like/Dislike Averages for party leaders. Solid Lines represent Vote Intention Percentages (0−10 scale)
       Smoothed Lines represent linear relationship over time (Stanard Error is shaded area)
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campaign, suggesting they were not driven by individual campaign events. Moreover, there 
is a potential link between better evaluations of leaders and higher levels of vote intention. 
As the campaign progresses, more positive changes in evaluations of Corbyn are recorded 
alongside more negative changes in evaluations of May. A simple bivariate regression for all 
voters finds that each day of the campaign is associated with an average positive change in 
evaluations for Corbyn of .03. Labour partisans become steadily more impressed by Corbyn’s 
campaign performance, achieving peak average change in likability of 1.5 points on the 5th 
May 2017 compared to the pre-campaign baseline. Voters sampled later in the campaign 
were more convinced with Corbyn than those at the beginning of the campaign. Trends in 
Figure 5.5 suggest that those most impressed by Jeremy Corbyn during 2017 were Labour 
supporters, as the gradient of the trendline is notably steeper for Labour partisans than for 
non-partisans. Conservative partisans give May lower scores as the campaign progresses, but 
the decline is not any steeper than non-partisans. These trends would be consistent with 
activation effects, though more tests are needed to clarify this.  
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Figure 5.5: Change in Leadership Evaluations (2015 & 2017), Split by Partisan Groups 
 
 
Predicting Labour and Conservative Vote Choice at the 2015 and 2017 Elections 
 
The previous section suggested that whilst there was variation, there was no lasting 
or impactful change in vote intention or leadership evaluations during the 2015 campaign. 
Conversely, there was a clear trend over time for these same measures over the course of the 
2017 campaign. This section provides a greater test of these descriptive trends. I previously 
outlined approaches to examining campaign effects (reinforcement, activation, conversion) 
at the beginning of this chapter and these serve as the foundation for the approach taken 
here (Clarke et al. 2004; Finkel 1993; Finkel and Schrott 1995). The premise of the research 
design is simple. If vote intention cannot be accurately predicted from pre-campaign variables 
alone, then campaign variables should help explain vote choice. Predicted outcomes form the 
basis for calculating campaign effects, combining respondents’ actual vote in the election and 
All − 2017 Partisans − 2017 NonPartisans − 2017
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Leader Cameron Corbyn May Miliband
Daily Average Change in Leadership Evaluations
Source: BESIP 'Rolling Thunder' Wave 5 & 12
       Dashed lines represent Average change like/dislike for party leaders
       Solid lines represent linear relationships overtime
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their pre-campaign vote intention. With this information, the size of reinforcement, activation 
and conversion effects are calculated.  
I develop three separate predictive models. The variables for each model are 
summarised in Table 5.1, with additional variables included in each subsequent model to 
evaluate the added value of new variables. Due to the binary dependent variable in these 
models, I constructed a party identification variable on a seven-point scale that ranges from 
a very strong identifier (1) with another party to (7) a very strong Labour/Conservative 
identifier.8 Models 1 and 2 only use pre-campaign variables, with model 3 using additional 
campaign-change variables. Specific measures for each model are presented in Table 5.1.9 
Model performance is evaluated by cross validating the results across 100 iterations. These 
models test the first three hypotheses in Box 5.1 at the beginning of the chapter. Firstly, that 
evaluations of party leaders improve vote choice predictions. Secondly, that campaign-
change variables of leadership evaluations improve predictive accuracy. Thirdly, that because 
of the change in the 2017 campaign discussed in the previous section, campaign-change 
variables will deliver larger improvements in vote choice predictions in 2017 than 2015.  
Table 5.1: Variables used in each Lasso model in predicting vote intention 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Pre-campaign Variables: 
Partisanship, EU 
Referendum Vote Intention, 
Previous General Election 
Vote Choice, Age, 
Education, Gender, Income 
(household), Ethnicity and 
assessment of the party 
winning in the respondent’s 
constituency. 
All variables in Model 1 + 
Like-Dislike Evaluations of 
Conservative and Labour 
Leaders 
All variables in Model 2 + 
Campaign change variables: 
Change in Partisanship, 
Change in Leadership 
Evaluations, Change in EU 
Referendum Vote Intention, 
Change in assessment of 




8 See research methods appendix 2.2 for further information on calculating this variable. 
9 For further information on calculating changes see Research Methods Appendix 2.3 
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 Constructing a confusion matrix of actual and predicted outcomes for respondents 
allows several measures to be calculated for evaluating model performance. In particular, I 
focus on the measures of accuracy and recall. Figure 5.6 displays a full confusion matrix and 
demonstrates how measures of performance is calculated. Figures 5.7 & 5.8 plot the accuracy 
and recall of predicted vote choice from respondents. 
Figure 5.6: Example Confusion Matrix and Model Performance Measures 
 
The accuracy of the model is plotted on the Y-axis of each plot. Accuracy gives an 
indication of the overall performance of the model, providing the percentage of correct 
predictions in voting Conservative/Labour and voting for a different party or not voting. 
However, as the majority of the sample do not vote for either Labour or the Conservatives, 
the accuracy measurement may inflate the success of the model. Recall measures the number 
of correctly classified Labour/Conservative voters relative to the number of actual Labour or 
Conservative voters in the sample. Recall is plotted on the X-axis to compare between the 
two measures. Calculating this measure is necessary to understand if additional variables 
improve both overall accuracy and accuracy specific to voting Conservative or Labour. In 
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 each model has a different colour and each party has a different shape. 
As the models incorporate additional variables, their predictive value should improve. The 
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calculated and plotted. These are the larger and shaded points and provide an overall 
assessment of each model. Each graph is split between results for Labour and the 
Conservatives.  
Predictions for 2017 improve as the model develops in complexity from the baseline 
in model 1 to model 2, but only a slight improvement is observed in model 3. There is a steady 
improvement between models 1-3 for 2015, suggesting that campaign change variables 
improved the accuracy of predictions in this election. This can be seen in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 
as data points shift towards the top right of the graph. Accuracy for each baseline model is at 
least 85% or higher, signalling that the overall predictive performance of the model is very 










Figure 5.7: Percentage of Correctly Classified Vote Choice (2015) 
 
Figure 5.8: Percentage of Correctly Classified Vote Choice (2017)  
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The baseline model (1) is more inaccurate than the more sophisticated models and 
especially so for the Labour models. That said, there is certainly room for improvement as 
none of the baseline models exceed 80% party-specific accuracy, with this result consistent 
across elections and parties. These models are more successful in predicting who will not vote 
Labour or Conservative, with higher figures visible along the Y-axis. Interestingly, relative to 
the Conservative vote, Labour vote choice is more difficult to predict in both elections. With 
regard to the reliability of the results found across the models, results from the hundred 
iterations of each model are clearly clustered in 2017. There is little variation in accuracy 
across iterations, confirming that the model works beyond the sample it is trained on. There 
is, however, greater overlap between each model in 2015 but the averages for each model 
show a significant difference. 
 Introducing party leader evaluations to complete model 2 increases the predictive 
power of the model in both years. Evaluations of leaders provide an average increase in 
correct party specific predictions of 5.8 percentage points for Labour and 7.8 percentage 
points for the Conservatives in 2017. Smaller increases of 1.1 percentage points for Labour 
and 3.4 percentage points for the Conservatives were observed in 2015. Change in the 
accuracy of predictions is noticeably larger in 2017 than in 2015, suggesting that feelings 
about the two main party leaders were more important to vote choice in 2017. The findings 
demonstrate that the inclusion of leadership evaluations has a positive effect on party-
specific predictions, in addition to leaders having a clear net effect on overall predictions.  
 The effect of introducing campaign-change variables is inconsistent. While there is 
always some increase in accuracy, the margin of improvement can be fairly insignificant. 
Minor improvement in accuracy is seen in 2017 for the Conservatives, where accuracy 
averages 90.8% in model 3, representing an increase of only 0.7 percentage points compared 
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to model 2. The inclusion of campaign variables improved the overall accuracy of Labour 
predictions by 0.7 percentage points too. More importantly, in Figure 5.8, some iterations of 
the second model outperform the third model, meaning that we cannot definitively conclude 
that campaign variables improve the accuracy of predictions. The differences between model 
2 and 3 are clearer in 2015, especially for the Labour Party, where overall accuracy improves 
by 1.8 percentage points and party specific accuracy improves 3.6 points. The finding that 
campaign variables improve the accuracy of predictions in 2015, but not in 2017, is contrary 
to the hypothesised relationship. The previous section outlined the stark differences between 
the two campaigns, showing only a moderate level of change in 2015. In contrast, results for 
2017, showed that there was a significant shift in opinions during the campaign but that 
recorded changes had little impact on the accuracy of predictions. 
Results presented in Figures 5.7 & 5.8 demonstrate that campaign variables do 
increase the accuracy of predictions but that the increase is relatively small. Findings 
demonstrate that the models can accurately predict whether a respondent will vote 
Conservative or Labour based on their pre-campaign attitudes and choices. Based entirely on 
pre-campaign variables, 80-85% of Conservative and Labour voters can be predicted before 
the campaign takes place. While improvements from campaign variables were more visible 
in 2015, these variables did not decisively improve the predictive accuracy. This result 
suggests that campaign change variables do not have a decisive effect to improve model 
accuracy. In the next section I give an overview of the coefficients that inform predictions 








The following tables present estimated coefficients for voting Labour or Conservative 
at the 2015 and 2017 elections. It is important to investigate which variables explain the data 
and provide the basis of the predictions presented previously. These models are conducted 
using LASSO regression. Because estimates are calculated differently to ‘standard’ regression 
models, such as OLS, there are no p-values for each coefficient. Variables that would be 
deemed ‘statistically insignificant’ under traditional models are shrunk to zero in this model.10 
Instead, variables with a non-zero coefficient can be deemed ‘statistically significant’ in LASSO 
models. Continuous variables in the model are standardized. As each model was run a 
hundred times, tables present averages across the iterations. 
Results from the 2015 model demonstrate that past vote choice, partisanship and 
leadership evaluations all have strong effects on vote choice. Voters’ perceptions of whether 
the party is likely to win in the constituency have a strong effect in the Labour model and a 
moderate effect in the Conservative model too. In both the Labour and Conservative 2015 
models, the effect of partisanship is greater than found in the 2017 models. However, 
leadership evaluations continue to have strong effects, particularly the effect of evaluations 
of Cameron in the Conservative model. The effect of partisanship is particularly significant in 
the 2015 Labour model, where it has the largest effect. There is a notable difference between 
the Conservative and Labour models when examining rival leader effects. In the Conservative 
model, where more positive evaluations of Miliband have a relatively small negative effect on 
Conservative vote choice, whereas more positive evaluations of Cameron have a larger 
negative effect in the Labour model. Lastly, there is little evidence that wanting to leave the 
 
10 See Research Methods Appendix section 1.6 for more details on LASSO regression. 
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European Union predicts Conservative vote intention in 2015. Although a majority of 
Conservative voters in the sample supported leaving the EU (58% in favour of Leave), this 
preference did not have a significant effect when predicting Conservative vote choice. There 
is a negative effect from wanting to leave the EU and voting for Labour in 2015, where Labour 
voters were more decisively in favour of ‘remain’ (73% of Labour voters). However, the effect 
of the socio-demographic variables that were significant was negligible relative to other 
effects in the model. 
Table 5.2: Labour Vote Choice (2015) - LASSO Model Coefficients 




Gender - Female .0139 
Household Income 0 
Ethnicity – Non-White British .0005 
Vote Leave W4 -.250 
Labour Partisanship (0-7) 1.03 
Like Miliband (0-10) .799 
Like Cameron (0-10) -.519 
Vote 2010 Labour .594 





Table 5.3: Conservative Vote Choice (2015) - LASSO Model Coefficients 




Gender - Female .0023 
Household Income .0037 
Ethnicity – Non-White British .001 
Vote Leave W4 0 
Conservative Partisanship (0-7) .899 
Like Miliband (0-10) -.321 
Like Cameron (0-10) 1.15 
Vote 2010 Conservative .705 




Models for Labour and Conservative vote choice in 2017 have several consistent 
features. Firstly, voting Labour or Conservative at the previous election has a substantial 
effect in each model. This finding is unsurprising, with most voters who voted Labour or 
Conservative in 2015 doing so again in 2017 and the effect is stronger than previous vote 
choice for the 2010 General Election in the 2015 models. Leadership evaluations also have 
notable effects in explaining Labour or Conservative vote choice and there is stronger 
evidence of relative effects in both 2017 models. In this instance, more positive feelings about 
Corbyn have a negative effect on voting Conservative, while more positive feelings of May 
have a negative effect on voting Labour. Effects of leadership evaluations are stronger in the 
Conservative model than in the Labour model. Partisanship has a strong effect in both models, 
but this effect is weaker than leadership evaluations in both models. Results across both 
models in 2017 show that age has only a minor effect, suggesting that age is mediated by the 
different variables included in the model. One noticeable difference between the two models 
in 2017, is the effect of ‘Leave’ vote intention in an EU referendum. Using respondents’ actual 
EU referendum vote choice would, of course, not be possible in 2015 and keeps the variables 
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used consistent across each model.11 There is a clear ‘Leave’ effect in voting Conservative but 
in the Labour model there is no observable ‘remain’ effect on vote choice. Another noticeable 
difference is respondents’ assessment of whether the party is likely to win in their 
constituency. There is a stronger effect in the Labour model: if voters think Labour has a 
better chance of winning in their constituency, they are more likely to vote for the party. 
Similar to the effects in 2015, socio-demographic variables had very minor or insignificant 
effects in 2017. 
Table 5.4: Labour Vote Choice (2017) - LASSO Model Coefficients 





Household Income 0 
Ethnicity – Non-White British .0007 
Vote Leave W11 -.026 
Labour Partisanship (0-7) .670 
Like Corbyn .769 
Like May -.542 
Vote 2015 Labour 1.49 









11 Additionally, this variable describes how respondents felt about the issue on the eve of the campaign, 
allowing changes that occurred during the campaign to be recorded. 
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Table 5.5: Conservative Vote Choice (2017) - LASSO Model Coefficients 





Household Income 0 
Ethnicity – Non-White British 0 
Vote Leave W11 .954 
Conservative Partisanship (0-7) .693 
Like Corbyn -.681 
Like May 1.2 
Vote 2015 Conservative 1.36 




Estimating the size of campaign effects: Reinforcement, Activation and Conversion 
By using the predicted vote choice from the second model, which uses pre-campaign 
variables and knowing the actual vote choice of the sample, voters can be separated into the 
effects of conversion, activation and reinforcement. Finkel (1993) outlines a clear approach 
for prescribing campaign effects to voters. Pre-campaign vote intention, model prediction and 
actual vote choice are used to produce a matrix of campaign effects. If a voter intends to vote 
Labour at the beginning of the campaign, is predicted to do so by the model, and does so in 
the election this is classified as an instance of reinforcement. Where the model is incorrect in 
its prediction, but voters are consistent in their vote choice, they are prescribed a 
reinforcement effect because these individuals were consistent in their vote intention before 
the campaign and voted for the same party in the election. If the model predicts an individual 
will vote Labour and they report voting Labour in the post-election wave, but their pre-
campaign vote is undecided or for a different party, these voters are considered to be 
“activated” by the campaign. Lastly, conversion is when voters express an intention to vote 
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for a different party pre-campaign, are not predicted to vote for a party based on the pre-
campaign model but end up supporting that party.  
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In this section I first describe the results of the 2015 election before turning to the 
2017 election. Campaign effects in the 2015 election are fairly uniform across Conservative 
and Labour voters. The overwhelming majority of voters were reinforced or unaffected by the 
2015 campaign. This totals 85.7% of Labour voters and 82.8% of Conservative voters, 
illustrating that most voters had already decided which party they would vote for prior to the 
campaign. Activation only accounted for a small proportion (4.4%) of eventual Labour voters. 
Labour was more successful in persuading voters to convert to their cause over the campaign 
which constituted 10% of their final vote. While Labour persuaded voters during the 2015 
election, the Conservatives converted a similar percentage, accounting for 10.9% of their final 
vote. Conversion did take place during the 2015 campaign, but with similar gains made by 
both parties, gains were likely cancelled out by the rival party. This supports the narrative 
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that, even though there was evidence of conversion and activation, ultimately there was no 
net effect from the 2015 campaign.  
The voting profiles of Labour and Conservative converters and activators were 
understandably different in 2015. Of all Conservative activators, 61% intended to vote UKIP 
before the campaign began, with only 17.9% being undecided before the campaign. This 
potentially illustrates the attraction of the Conservative Party’s promise of an in/out 
referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU if it won a parliamentary majority in 2015. 
Conservative converters mostly intended to vote Labour (27.3%), UKIP (21.1%), Liberal 
Democrat (18.7%) or were undecided (22.1%) in the pre-campaign wave, with these groups 
making up 89.2% of Conservative converters. The remainder of converters came from smaller 
parties or those not intending to vote at the beginning of the campaign. Figures for Labour 
converters were slightly less concentrated than the Conservative figures, with Labour 
converting voters from the Conservatives (13.4%), Liberal Democrats (16.4%), UKIP (16.6%), 
Green (18.6%) and undecided (25.3%). Of the small proportion (4.4%) of Labour voters that 
were activated during the campaign, 20.6% were undecided, 26.8% intended to vote UKIP, 
and a further 20.7% to vote for the Green Party. 
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Campaign effects vary noticeably between the two parties at the 2017 election, 
reflecting the substantial changes in vote intention and leader evaluations seen over the 
campaign and presented earlier in this chapter. The Conservative vote in 2017 is heavily 
concentrated in reinforcement. A total of 88.7% of Conservative voters intended to vote 
Conservative before the campaign, meaning that the party activated or converted 11.3% of 
their final vote during the campaign. Conservative vote intention was high before the 
campaign, with over 40% of the sample intended to vote for the party, illustrating how the 
overwhelming majority of Conservative voters stuck with the party from the beginning of the 
campaign. This is reinforced by the aggregate data, which showed that 40.6% of the sample 
intended to vote Conservative prior to the campaign and 40% indicated they had done so in 
the post-election wave. Using pre-campaign vote intention data, we can examine where 
activated and converted voters were gained from in 2017. Conservative converts mainly 
intended to vote UKIP (41.1%) or Liberal Democrat (18.1%) before the campaign or were 
undecided (24.9%). Conservative activators were primarily gained from similar sources as 
their converters, with 38.8% coming from UKIP, 36.2% undecided and 11.7% from Liberal 
Democrats. 
Results show the majority of Labour’s voters were reinforced during the campaign 
(67.7% of their total vote), but this was much lower than the Conservatives in 2017 and both 
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parties in 2015. In turn, Labour activated and converted a significant percentage of its 
eventual voters; a remarkable 32.3% of the Labour vote was gained during the campaign. A 
total of 14.2% of the sample were ‘activated’ by the events of the campaign and this 
corresponds with accounts in the literature that Labour’s campaign strategy focussed on 
recapturing former voters who were disillusioned with the party prior to the campaign (Goes 
2018). Based on their pre-campaign attitudes, the model predicted these respondents would 
be Labour voters, indicating that Labour was successful in activating their pre-dispositions 
during the campaign. Labour activators were predominantly undecided (30.4%) or intending 
to vote Liberal Democrat (30.3%) before the campaign, with smaller numbers gained from 
the Conservatives (17.6%) and the Green Party (10.2%). Ultimately, the Labour campaign 
reassured voters with sympathetic views to return to the party. A further 18% of Labour 
voters were classified as being converted by Labour’s campaign because they were not 
considered likely Labour voters. Labour converted voters from a range of parties, but most 
commonly from the Conservative Party (31.4% of Labour converters). Taking votes directly 
away from the Conservatives in this way during the campaign was highly effective as, in 
addition to increasing the Labour total, it took votes away from their main rival. This may have 
been especially important as Labour gained 28 seats from the Conservatives in the 2017 
General Election. The notable proportion of voters who were converted illustrated how 
pivotal the campaign was to Labour’s performance in 2017. The other pre-campaign vote 
intentions of Labour converters were Liberal Democrat (27.7%), undecided (19.4%) and UKIP 
(8.5%). The success of the Labour campaign in 2017 is evident when examining the number 
of voters persuaded. Critically, this effect is observed in conjunction with activating natural 
Labour supporters. The combination of these campaign effects led to the better than 
expected election results in 2017. 
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Isolating Persuadable Voters 
 
There are several limitations associated with producing categorical matrixes, like 
those above, when understanding campaign effects. Firstly, the results above can only assign 
possible campaign effects to voters and make an assessment about the size of effects. While 
this exercise provides an informative overview, it cannot explain why voters converted, nor 
does it provide an understanding about whether voters’ attitudes actually changed during the 
campaign. Examining the variables that capture campaign change would lead to a better 
understanding of how likely voters are to convert or activate during the campaign. Instead, 
the approach assumes that changes have occurred and also the reasons why voters who were 
converted and activated changed their vote choice. Without additional tests there would be 
no certainty that changed opinions affected vote choice. 
More robust testing is conducted in this section to examine whether persuadable 
voters changed their views during the campaign and led to strong effects on voting 
Conservative or Labour. Due to sample size constraints and research design limitations, such 
analysis would not have yielded any useful results in previous research because these voters 
formed only a small sub-section of the samples (Clarke et al. 2004; Finkel 1993; Finkel and 
Schrott 1995). As such, the larger and richer sample from the 2014-17 BES Internet Panel 
study provided an opportunity to examine predicted values in greater detail. I explore the 
spread of predicted values produced by model 2, using these values to identify voters who 
are most likely to be influenced during the campaign, before analysing the effect of variables 
in the following section. Subsequent to this analysis, I investigate the ‘flow of the vote’ for 
persuadable voters from their pre-campaign vote intention to their post-campaign vote 
choice, to understand where votes were won from and lost to. 
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Figure 5.9: Range of Predicted Values in Voting Conservative at the 2017 General Election 
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Figures 5.9-5.12 illustrate the distribution of predicted values for each respondent 
before they are turned into a binary outcome. The fill of columns indicates respondents’ 
actual vote in the election. As 100 iterations of the analysis were run, the figures displayed 
are the iteration that was closest to the average. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 provide the values for 
predicting Labour and Conservative vote choice at the 2017 General Election. In terms of 
predictive accuracy, the pattern of each graph is clear. Accuracy is noticeably higher at either 
end of the spectrum than for voters with moderate predicted scores positioned towards the 
centre. For voters with predicted values greater than .75 or lower than .25, model predictions 
are correct in 93.5% of cases (percentage from Figure 5.10). When examining voters between 
.25 and .75 the model is significantly less successful as only 65.9% of predictions are correct, 
demonstrating that this group is more difficult to classify based on pre-campaign variables. 
Therefore, the centre ground of the graph is where persuadable voters are likely to be 
positioned. Results for the 2015 election are very similar to 2017. Again, in 2015, more 
extreme values are easier to predict correctly than values closer to the centre. Fewer voters 
overall voted for the two main parties in the 2015 general election and, as a result, fewer 
voters are positioned on the right side of the Figures 5.11 and 5.12.  
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Figure 5.11: Predicted Values of Voting Conservative at the 2015 General Election 
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 Examining Leader Effects on ‘Goldilocks’ Voters 
 
I now examine individuals with a pre-campaign predicted score of between .25 and 
.75 in further detail to investigate the effect of changed leadership evaluations during the 
campaign. It is reasonable to assume that these voters could be convinced during the 
campaign to vote for a different political party. For this reason, I label them ‘goldilocks’ voters, 
as their predicted values are not too extreme in either direction, meaning there should be 
some uncertainty whether these individuals will back either the Conservatives of Labour in 
their respective models. This section investigates changes in attitudes during the campaign 
variables can explain why some goldilocks voters either vote Labour or Conservative and why 
the remainder of goldilocks voters do not. 
I construct standard binomial regression models to explain general election vote 
choice in 2015 and 2017 for these specific voters. The model uses a binary vote choice variable 
as the dependent variable. To explain vote choice, the model uses campaign variables which 
measure the change in opinions or evaluations. Here the focus is on measuring the impact of 
change during the campaign. Variables included are: change in leadership evaluations, change 
in strength of partisanship, change in EU vote intention and change in perception of which 
party is likely to win the respondent’s constituency. Pre-campaign variables of these 
measures are included to control prior attitudes. I decided not to expand the list of 
explanatory variables at risk of overfitting the model. While the number of goldilocks voters 
available to examine here is larger than previous studies, it is still not extensive.12 I present 
summary statistics from each model. Again, as the model was run with multiple iterations, 
the coefficients, standard error and p-values presented are averaged.  
 
12 The number of ‘goldilocks’ voters the model is tested on varies between parties. Conservative iterations 
typically featured 300-450 respondents, while Labour iterations featured 600-750.  
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There are three substantial insights relating to goldilocks voters from the results of 
these models. Firstly, changing perceptions of party leaders over the course of both 
campaigns is highly influential in explaining who will eventually vote for the party. Secondly, 
there are noticeable differences between the 2015 and 2017 models, indicating that effects 
are inconsistent across elections. In particular, changes in partisanship are less important in 
2017 than in 2015. Lastly, the remaining variables that capture campaign change have no 
consistent effect on voters in any model.  
 There are clear effects from changes in leader evaluations in explaining differences 
between voters who ultimately vote for either the Conservatives or Labour. However, there 
are differences between the strength of these effects in 2015 and 2017. Critically, in 2015, 
increases in the strength of partisanship over the campaign are stronger in explaining the 
difference in vote choice for goldilocks voters than change in leadership evaluations. For 
example, becoming a stronger Conservative party identifier during the election has a very 
strong effect on voting Conservative in 2015. The same effects can be seen in the Labour 
model. Voters who identified more with either of these parties during the campaign were 
then more likely to vote for that party in the election. Changes in leadership evaluations 
remain important in both 2015 models. More positive evaluations of Cameron have a strong 
effect on Conservative vote choice. However, there is no evidence of a negative effect from 
better evaluations of Miliband on voting Conservative. In the Labour model there is a positive 
effect from more positive evaluations of Miliband but no negative effect from more positive 
evaluations of Cameron.13 The size of the effect from changes in evaluations of Miliband is 
noticeably smaller than the effect of Cameron in the Conservative model. There is little 
 
13 This effect is slightly above the .05 threshold for statistical significance.  
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evidence of any other variable explaining the differences between goldilocks voters, with the 
exception of change in respondents’ assessments that Labour will win in their constituency in 
the Labour model. The smaller sample size after isolating this particular subset of voters could 
have factored into higher p-values for these effects. Voters who grew more confident that 
Labour would win were more likely to vote for the party. Pre-campaign variables in the 
Conservative model have strong and expected effects from partisanship and evaluations of 
Cameron. Labour partisanship, leadership evaluations, EU referendum (Leave) vote and 
Labour vote in the 2010 General Election all have strong effects on Labour vote choice. 
Changes in partisanship and leadership evaluations are statistically significant here, providing 
an understanding of why goldilocks voters supported either Labour or the Conservatives in 
the 2015 General Election. 
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Table 5.10: 'Goldilocks' Voters - Conservative Model 2015 
 Variable Est. Standard Error p-value 
 
1 (Intercept) 0.02 0.23 0.41 
2 Change in EU Referendum Vote  -0.14 0.13 0.35 
3 EU Referendum Vote - Leave -0.33 0.25 0.29 
4 Age -0.01 0.12 0.46 
5 Education  -0.02 0.12 0.49 
6 Income - Household 0.12 0.12 0.36 
7 Gender 0.4 0.23 0.18 
8 Ethnicity – Non-White British -0.17 0.42 0.47 
9 Conservative Partisanship 0.86 0.14 0 
10 Change in Conservative Partisanship 0.75 0.14 0 
11 Cameron Evaluation 0.76 0.16 0 
12 Miliband Evaluation -0.31 0.13 0.08 
13 Change in Cameron Evaluation 0.53 0.14 0.01 
14 Change in Miliband Evaluation -0.21 0.12 0.19 
15 Respondent’s Assessment Conservatives Will Win Constituency 0.3 0.13 0.08 
16 Change in Respondent’s Assessment Conservatives Will Win Constituency 0.16 0.12 0.3 




Table 5.11: 'Goldilocks' Voters - Labour Model 2015 
 Variable Est. Standard Error p-value 
 
1 (Intercept) -0.05 0.19 0.44 
2 Change in EU Referendum Vote  -0.01 0.11 0.42 
3 EU Referendum Vote - Leave -0.68 0.25 0.05 
4 Age 0.02 0.11 0.47 
5 Education  0.07 0.12 0.44 
6 Income - Household 0.07 0.12 0.45 
7 Gender 0.36 0.21 0.19 
8 Ethnicity – Non-White British 0.19 0.35 0.5 
9 Labour Partisanship 1.06 0.14 0 
10 Change in Labour Partisanship 0.83 0.12 0 
11 Cameron Evaluation -0.47 0.12 0.01 
12 Miliband Evaluation 0.7 0.13 0 
13 Change in Cameron Evaluation -0.25 0.11 0.12 
14 Change in Miliband Evaluation 0.38 0.12 0.06 
15 Respondent’s Assessment Labour Will Win Constituency 0.51 0.12 0 
16 Change in Respondent’s Assessment Labour Will Win Constituency 0.32 0.11 0.04 
17 2010 GE Vote - Labour 0.5 0.22 0.11 
 
 
 Results from the 2017 model show stronger effects from changed evaluations of party 
leaders in explaining the vote choice of goldilocks voters. Changing leadership evaluations of 
May and Corbyn in 2017 had a clear effect on whether voters decided to vote Conservative 
or Labour. Positive changes in evaluations of May had a strong effect on voting Conservative. 
However, her personal ratings declined during the campaign, likely costing the Conservatives 
support from goldilocks voters. Similarly, increasingly negative opinions of Corbyn during the 
campaign indicates respondents were more likely to vote Conservative. While more positive 
changes in evaluations of Corbyn led to greater support for Labour, there is no significant 
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effect from changing evaluations of May. Whilst the effect of party leaders is stronger in 2017, 
the effect of changing partisanship is weaker. Change in partisanship is not statistically 
significant in either the Labour or Conservative models, representing a distinct difference 
from the 2015 results. Pre-campaign variables of partisanship, leadership evaluations and 
previous general election vote all have powerful effects on vote choice in both models. 
Evidence from both 2017 models suggests that goldilocks voters’ party choice was more likely 
due to changes in evaluations of leaders, rather than changes in partisanship.  
Stronger leaders’ effects in 2017 were found during a campaign where evaluations of 
the leaders evaluations of the two main parties changed rapidly, and in opposite directions 
for rival leaders, over the course of a few weeks. While voters reacted to the unfolding events 
of the campaign in 2017, and adjusted their evaluations of leaders as a result, changes in party 
identification did not explain vote choice. But if, as was the case in 2015, changes in leader 
evaluations are moderate and do not represent a reversal in fortunes from the pre-campaign 
environment, leader effects may be smaller. Effects from leaders are still visible in 2015, 
suggesting they continued to be impactful on goldilocks voters, but they did not feature a 
relative effect from changing evaluations of the rival leader. While all modern campaigns 
focus somewhat on party leaders, the unexpected reversal of fortunes for the leaders in 2017 
may have contributed to a larger effect in this election. 
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Table 5.12: 'Goldilocks' Voters - Conservative Model 2017 
 Variable Est Standard Error p-value 
 
1 (Intercept) -1.02 0.41 0.05 
2 Change in EU Referendum Vote 0.04 0.94 0.47 
3 EU Referendum Vote - Leave 1.21 0.38 0.01 
4 Age -0.1 0.13 0.43 
5 Education -0.05 0.14 0.46 
6 Income - Household -0.04 0.14 0.54 
7 Gender -0.12 0.25 0.42 
8 Ethnicity – Not ‘White British’ 0.9 0.55 0.21 
9 Conservative Partisanship 0.73 0.17 0 
10 Change in Conservative Partisanship 0.32 0.14 0.11 
11 Corbyn Evaluation -0.68 0.15 0 
12 May Evaluation 1.06 0.17 0 
13 Change in Corbyn Evaluation -0.47 0.14 0.02 
14 Change in May Evaluation 0.72 0.15 0 
15 Respondent’s Assessment Conservatives Will Win Constituency 0.18 0.15 0.33 
16 Change in Respondent’s Assessment Conservatives Will Win Constituency 0.16 0.14 0.33 




Table 5.13: 'Goldilocks' Voters - Labour Model 2017 
 Variable Est Standard Error p-value 
 
1 (Intercept) -0.53 0.23 0.1 
2 Change in EU Referendum Vote 0.08 0.11 0.37 
3 EU Referendum Vote - Leave -0.12 0.29 0.48 
4 Age -0.2 0.12 0.2 
5 Education -0.08 0.13 0.52 
6 Income - Household 0.05 0.12 0.5 
7 Gender -0.01 0.23 0.52 
8 Ethnicity – Not ‘White British’ 0.13 0.43 0.44 
9 Labour Partisanship 0.93 0.16 0 
10 Change in Labour Partisanship 0.2 0.13 0.21 
11 Corbyn Evaluation 0.97 0.18 0 
12 May Evaluation -0.63 0.16 0 
13 Change in Corbyn Evaluation 0.48 0.13 0.01 
14 Change in May Evaluation -0.33 0.12 0.03 
15 Respondent’s Assessment Labour Will Win Constituency 0.47 0.14 0.01 
16 Change in Respondent’s Assessment Labour Will Win Constituency 0.08 0.13 0.46 
17 2015 GE Vote - Labour 1.61 0.33 0 
 
 
One further consideration is whether the persuadable Conservative and Labour 
goldilocks voters are in fact the same respondents. The expectation would be that goldilocks 
voters are specific to each party because they are identified by their pre-campaign attitudes. 
I identify the number of respondents, based on their predicted scores, classified as both a 
Labour and Conservative goldilocks voter. Once again, the cross-validation approach with 100 
iterations facilitates the calculation of a reliable figure. Results from 2017 show that only a 
minority of individuals are found in both the Conservative and Labour goldilocks voter groups, 
with most respondents falling exclusively in one group. Results indicate that 26% of Labour 
goldilocks voters were also found to be in the Conservative goldilocks range. Figures for the 
Conservative goldilocks voters are slightly higher with 30.8% of these voters also found in the 
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Labour goldilocks range. There are noticeably lower levels of overlap in 2015, with 9.3% of 
Labour goldilocks voters overlapping with Conservatives, while only 12.4% of Conservative 
goldilocks voters overlap with their Labour counterparts. Therefore, the results show there is 
limited overlap between Conservative and Labour goldilocks voters. 
 
General Election Vote Choice 
It is worthwhile exploring which party goldilocks voters eventually voted for in the 
general election and who they intended to vote for before the campaign began. This provides 
further insights into where voters came from and were lost to. In 2015, the Conservatives  
picked up a notable share of goldilocks voters, in contrast to Labour who struggled with this 
key group of voters. In 2017, the Conservatives still attracted some goldilocks voters, but 
Labour gained a substantial amount of these voters during the campaign, albeit from a poor 
position at the beginning of the campaign. 
In the 2015 election, Figure 5.13 shows that the Conservatives effectively picked up 
goldilocks votes from other parties, while predominantly maintaining the vote it already had. 
Mostly, the Conservatives gained from voters who were undecided or intending to vote UKIP. 
Just under half (49.7%) of goldilocks voters intended to vote Conservative before the 
campaign had started, increasing to 57.2% voting Conservative on polling day. Figure 5.13 
shows how the Conservatives lost some goldilocks voters to other parties but nevertheless 
finished with a net 7.5 percentage point increase. This trend suggests that the Conservatives 
were effective during the campaign in convincing voters who were undecided about its 
positions and policies. In contrast, Labour stagnated with a 0.3 percentage point decrease, as 
Labour began with 53.4% of goldilocks voters and finished with 53.1%. Labour gained mostly 
from undecided voters, but also small sections of voters who intended to vote Green, UKIP 
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and Liberal Democrat at the beginning of the campaign. However, Labour’s gains were 
cancelled out as it lost support to the Liberal Democrats, Conservatives and Greens during 
the campaign. Labour’s campaign was unsuccessful in convincing enough floating voters in 
the same proportion as the Conservatives. 
Figure 5.13: Flow of the ‘Goldilocks’ Vote (2015), Pre-Campaign Vote Intention to Actual 
General Election Vote Choice 
 
As with the earlier analysis conducted in this chapter, Labour in the 2017 election 
represents a noticeable deviation from the pattern established in 2015. Figure 5.14 presents 
a compelling overview of the movement toward Labour in 2017 among goldilocks voters. At 
the beginning of the campaign only 24.5% of Labour goldilocks voters intended to vote Labour 
at the upcoming general election, with 21.2% intending to vote Liberal Democrat, 18.7% 
Conservative and a further 13.6% undecided. Labour were failing to win over many of the 
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end of the campaign 50.9% of goldilocks voters opted for Labour in the 2017 election, more 
than double the proportion of voters who indicated they would vote for the party before the 
campaign. Labour primarily gained from voters who were undecided or intended to vote 
Conservative or Liberal Democrat at the beginning of the campaign. The change in vote 
choices from these voters is stark and no doubt contributed to Labour’s electoral 
performance in 2017. It demonstrates the success of Labour’s 2017 campaign. However, it is 
important to be clear about what ‘success’ meant for Labour in 2017. The party made up 
substantial ground among goldilocks voters, largely undoing the damage of entering the 
campaign on such a poor standing, but ultimately not taking the party beyond the percentage 
of goldilocks voters gained in 2015. In most regards, the flow of the Conservative vote in the 
2017 election is familiar to 2015 but differs in some key respects. It is similar because the 
Conservatives still gained amongst these voters, with a net increase of 3.8% over the 
campaign. This remains a significant increase. In the context of a poor campaign, voters were 
gained from familiar sources of undecided and UKIP voters. A noticeable difference is the 
growth in Labour voters amongst Conservative goldilocks voters. The Conservative party 
gained some goldilocks voters, but Labour did disproportionately better in gaining these 
voters during the campaign.  
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Figure 5.14: Flow of the ‘Goldilocks’ Vote (2017), Pre-Campaign Vote Intention to Actual 




This chapter has outlined the importance of party leader evaluations in predicting 
voter behaviour at the 2015 and 2017 elections. The movements in leadership ratings during 
the campaign in these elections were highly distinctive, leading to an expectation that 
campaign effects would be stronger in 2017. I detailed how the majority of voters’ party 
choices could be predicted from attitudes and responses measured before the campaign had 
begun. Results illustrate that campaigns are unlikely to change the long-held political views 
of most voters. This includes voters’ evaluations of party leaders. Using a combination of pre-
campaign vote intention, predicted vote choice and actual vote choice provided, an 
estimation of the size of three different campaign effects: reinforcement, activation and 
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this effect was less prominent for Labour in 2017, while activation and conversion effects 
were more important.  
To provide greater clarity on why voters convert, or are activated during the campaign, 
I identified a subsection of the electorate that were more likely to be persuaded by the 
election campaign using models that captured pre-campaign attitudes. This was an important 
step of the analysis because most studies argue that only certain voters are likely to be 
impacted by the campaign and little detail is provided about what causes these voters to 
switch. Goldilocks voters are realistic targets for political parties to win over during the 
campaign. Results found here illustrate that changing evaluations of party leaders were 
crucial to understanding the vote choice of this sub-group in 2015 and 2017. These results 
have significant implications for leader effects because they demonstrate a clear link between 
changed evaluations during the campaign and vote choice. Changing levels of partisanship 
had a strong effect on these voters in 2015, but were absent from the 2017 models, with 
changes in leadership evaluations the only statistically significant effect in 2017. Stronger 
leadership effects illustrate the significance of leadership performance during election 
campaigns as a method to convince persuadable voters. Parties can gain a large proportion 
of voters based on the performance of their leaders during the campaign. Better evaluations 
of leaders can be effective for parties either lagging behind in opinion polls going into the 
campaign or looking to maintain their lead. Pre-campaign leader evaluations were also central 
to improving the accuracy of vote choice predictions. Party leader evaluations were crucial to 
understanding the effects of the 2015 and 2017 election campaigns.  
 The chapter presents a series of wider findings in explaining the outcomes of the 2015 
and 2017 elections. It details how Labour lost support among core partisans in 2015, losing 
10% of Labour identifiers over the campaign. Labour also failed to convince goldilocks voters 
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during the 2015 campaign, actually losing a small number of these crucial voters over the 
campaign, in comparison to the Conservatives adding a significant amount. While the 
Conservatives and Labour had similar levels of popularity going into the campaign, these gains 
were likely to be impactful on the Conservative victory. In the case of 2017, the campaign 
fundamentally changed the overall outcome. Corbyn’s rating increased across the entire 
sample of voters, particularly amongst Labour Party identifiers, bringing back natural Labour 
supporters into the fold was crucial to the votes gained in 2017. Similarly, the Conservative’s 
struggle during the 2017 campaign, as demonstrated through the party largely defending the 
base voter base it had already accumulated but failing to add to it.  
Studies that analyse campaign effects are often focused on understanding how many 
voters changed their minds during the election and whether this affected the outcome of the 
election. These studies may find that the campaign had little effect on most voters and too 
readily conclude that campaigns are unlikely to change the overall outcome of elections. 
When examining conversion effects, it is crucial to provide a baseline of how likely voters are 
to switch before investigating the reasons behind the switching. Isolating these voters first, 
based on their pre-campaign attitudes, before analysing the reasons behind switching 
enables a more convincing analysis of the vote choices made by this crucial section of the 
electorate. This goes beyond analysing the size of different effects and elections and provides 
a greater insight on ‘floating’ voters. 
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Chapter 6 : From Footnotes to Headliners: UK Party Leaders on 
Election Night 
 
The outcome of UK general elections unfolds in the late hours of polling day and the 
early hours of the following day. Election night television broadcasts, which follow and 
analyse the declared results, offer the first opportunity to analyse the results after weeks of 
speculation about the outcome. How influential are party leaders understood to be within 
these immediate narratives explaining the election outcome? Previous discussion in the 
literature review chapter highlighted how party leaders have become the dominant focus of 
media coverage during general election campaigns (Deacon et al. 2017; Hayes 2009; Mughan 
and Aaldering 2018). The activities of party leaders are followed closely throughout the 
campaign, and once the election outcome begins to unfold, commentators can 
retrospectively examine the effect of campaign activities. In the light of election results, do 
individuals change their assessment of the qualities and performance of leaders (see Ross & 
Joslyn 1988). The intense focus on party leaders during the campaign, combined with 
supporting academic evidence that leaders have an influential impact on vote choice 
(Barisione 2009; Bittner 2011; Mughan 2015), leads to the expectation that leaders will be 
key figures of discussion on election night. The first analysis of party leaders’ impact on the 
election results occurs during this ritual programming.  
The importance of narratives constructed on election night lies in the way they are 
used to frame election victories and failures for parties and their leaders. With the purpose 
of advancing the scope of previous studies, which have been confined to examining one or 
two elections (Cathcart 1997; Lauerbach 2013; Marriott 2000; Schieß 2007), this chapter 
illustrates the potential of findings in analysing election night trends over a long time period. 
The construction of a multi-election data set enables an examination of general trends over 
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time, whilst maintaining the detail relating to specific elections. Of course, after polling 
stations have closed, leaders can no longer have an effect on the outcome, but their specific 
role in influencing public understanding of the outcome deserves closer attention. Detailed 
quantitative analysis, such as in the previous chapter, is not readily available to help 
commentators explain the election results. Constructing statistical models about voter 
behaviour occurs in the months that follow the election, but explanations of election 
outcomes begin during televised results programmes. Immediate assessments of party 
leaders’ performance and abilities are likely to be discussed during election night broadcasts. 
Therefore, which leadership qualities are identified during the broadcast as responsible for 
persuading voters to choose the leader’s party? Poor election results often impact directly 
upon whether incumbents can continue to lead political parties (Curtice and Blais 2001; So 
2018). It prompts questions about how responsible leaders are for their party’s performance 
and whether they can continue as leader. This chapter constitutes an ambitious study into 
the effects prescribed to party leaders in order to understand election results. 
I begin by providing an overview of election night broadcasts where they relate to 
party leaders, detailing how attention to party leaders has steadily increased over the time 
series. Leaders are frequently mentioned in post-1979 broadcasts and become a common 
subject of discussion. I advance the argument that this is likely to be linked to broadcasters 
producing election outcome forecasts from exit polls. In recent election broadcasts, party 
leaders are immediately presented to viewers as key players. Next, I present four themes 
where discussion of party leaders is prominent. First, I demonstrate that talk of potential 
resignations from leaders has become a common feature of modern broadcasts. Broadcast 
journalists become particularly focused on whether leaders will have to resign on the basis of 
the election result and who may replace defeated leaders. Second, the performance of party 
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leaders during election campaigns is perceived by broadcasts to be highly important. Chapter 
Five outlined that the effect of changes in evaluations of party leaders was inconsistent 
between elections. However, discussion during broadcasts the campaign performance of 
leaders is considered to be particularly significant to the election result. Third, I present the 
range of leadership characteristics identified within the broadcasts that are considered to 
have contributed to the election outcome. Earlier analyses, in Chapters Four and Chapter Five, 
were constrained to analysing general like-dislike summaries; here I analyse both competency 
and personality traits. Finally, I explain where leaders are blamed or praised for good or bad 
election outcomes. Blame for party leaders is dependent upon the perceived closeness of the 
result and whether leaders have produced surprising results but, it is increasingly common 
for the victor to receive praise from their party colleagues interviewed during the broadcast.  
 
Leaders and the Explanation of Election Results  
 
The purpose of election night broadcasts are to describe and interpret the election 
results to viewers, as votes are counted and constituency results announced (Lauerbach 2013; 
Orr 2015; Ross and Joslyn 1988). Presentation of the results themselves, and in later 
broadcasts of exit poll predictions, provide answers to the fundamental question of election 
night, ‘which party won?’ (Orr 2015). Results or exit polls by themselves, however, are unable 
to explain why voters produced the reported outcome. During broadcasts, a variety of 
personnel including broadcast journalists, politicians, academics, political correspondents 
and occasionally members of the public, offer their own thoughts in explaining the outcome. 
Crucially, explanations of election outcomes are sought before any detailed or statistical 
analysis can be undertaken. Participants on election night must respond to the results in real 
time creating a unique scenario where explanations of the outcome are developed 
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throughout the night. Specifically, politicians must assess the performance of their party and 
evaluate the contribution of their leader while results are still being declared (Lauerbach 
2007; Marriott 2000). Narratives constructed following election night coverage can frame 
subsequent understandings of the election and alter the immediate priorities of governments 
(Cathcart 1997; Hale 1993; Mendelsohn 1998). Furthermore, studies have demonstrated 
party leader effects on voter behaviour (Barisione 2009; Bittner 2011; Mughan 2015). 
Investigating how party leaders are used to develop the understanding of the outcome of 
elections warrants additional examination.  
 Forecasts in the form of exit polls or proto-exit polls have commanded the majority of 
scholarly attention of election night coverage (Brown, Firth, and Payne 1999; Brown and 
Payne 1984, 1975; Curtice et al. 2017; Curtice, Fisher, and Kuha 2011; Fisher, Kuha, and Payne 
2010). However, analysis of the effect the exit poll has on broader election coverage is rare 
(Brown, Firth, and Payne 1999; Butler and Kavanagh 1992). Exit poll forecasts are 
commissioned by British broadcasters to shape the initial discussion of the election, filling 
time in the broadcast between the polls closing and the first results. The development and 
proliferation of exit polls occurs during the time period covered in this chapter and has 
potential implications for the findings.  
 A wealth of research has investigated the characteristics and traits considered 
important to voters (Bean and Mughan 1989; Bittner 2011; Clarke et al. 2004, 2009a; Costa 
and Ferreira da Silva 2015). Importantly, distinctions are often made between leaders’ 
competency and personality traits. References to specific leadership qualities may offer an 
insight into which qualities are considered most important to influence voters. The salience 
of individual traits can range between elections, through analysing traits over a range of 
elections, I examine whether specific traits are highlighted in individual elections (Evans and 
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Andersen 2005; Stevens and Karp 2012). Examination of leadership traits during election 
night has been explored to some extent in the US academic literature. For example, Ross and 
Joslyn (1988) describe how Walter Mondale’s personal qualities were criticised during the 
campaign but, on election night, he was praised as dignified and honourable because 
commentators had concluded no candidate could stop Ronald Reagan’s landslide in 1984. 
Additionally, as election night broadcasts are the culmination of election campaigns, coverage 
may place a strong emphasis in the preceding campaign. With leaders placed at the centre of 
the campaign, their performance is likely to receive particular scrutiny (Bean and Mughan 
1989; Deacon et al. 2017; Gaber 2013). This scrutiny is likely to have increased in elections 
since 2010, as campaigns have become more focussed around televised debates between 
party leaders (Deacon et al. 2017; Gaber 2013; Harrison 1992; Mellon 2016).  
 Once election data becomes available and can be subsequently analysed by 
researchers, more detailed and reliable reasons for the election outcome and voter behaviour 
are established. The effect of party leaders on the election outcome is commonly assessed 
during these studies. For instance, whether John Major was a vote winner for the 
Conservatives in 1992, or whether Theresa May was a vote loser for the Conservatives in 
2017, the effect of leaders is often considered in post-election analyses by scholars (Bale and 
Webb 2018; Clarke, Ho, and Stewart 2000; Heath and Goodwin 2017; Sanders 1992). With 
detailed analysis unavailable during election night coverage, responsibility for the outcome 
may be attributed to leaders, but with little evidence to support these claims. Leaders are 
likely to be at the forefront of this discussion if their party’s campaign strategy has been 
structured around their characteristics and personality (Cowley and Kavanagh 2018; 
Seawright 2013). Therefore, attributing the outcome of elections to leaders during election 
broadcasts would highlight their perceived importance from broadcasters and politicians. 
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 After considering the contributions made by these and previous studies, the following 
hypotheses were presented in the methodology chapter of this thesis and the hypotheses 
relevant to this chapter are restated in Box 6.1.  
Box 6.1: Hypotheses and sub-hypotheses for party leaders and election night broadcasts
 
Data Analysis & Approach 
 
The results in this chapter are presented using a variety of graphs, tables and excerpts 
taken from transcripts. These combine to provide an overview of trends across the elections 
that is supported by visualisations and detailed text. The first hour of each transcript is a 
verbatim copy of the broadcast, enabling quantitative analysis of the data and comparison 
across the seventeen elections in the dataset. Quotes are taken directly from transcripts of 
BBC coverage and I identify the election that the excerpt is taken from. In order to preserve 
the level of detail in the transcripts, text was coded simultaneously, meaning that several 
codes could apply to one section of text within the range of codes that were developed 
(Saldana 2012). By coding the text using this method, maximum information could be 
retained whilst preserving the richness of the dataset (Bryman 2016). After coding each of 
the seventeen transcripts, themes were developed in relation to the hypotheses outlined, to 
provide a detailed understanding of the data and generate a structured presentation for the 
findings. 
Discussion and focus of party leaders increase over time. 
Party leaders are central to the immediate understandings presented by 
broadcasters in explaining results. 
Greater focus is given to leadership succession, performance and characteristics 
of leaders during modern coverage. 
Modern election night broadcasts examine the performance and characteristics 
of leaders during the preceding campaign. 
Actions of leaders are blamed and praised by participants when explaining the 
outcome of elections. 
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There were challenges in gathering and processing the substantial amount of text 
from these transcripts. The process of cleaning and managing the data was outlined in 
Chapter Three. It is important to outline that the analysis in this chapter focuses strictly on 
the audio section of broadcasts. Other researchers have chosen to focus on the visual aspect 
of election coverage (Marriott 2000; Schieß 2007) but the focus here is on the spoken 
discussion about party leaders. There is of course some overlap between the two mediums, 
as televised pictures or graphics can be the focus of conversation or require lengthy 
explanations from broadcast journalists or academics. My decision to focus on spoken 
discussion allows for a thorough examination of how much attention is given to party leaders 
in the broadcast, the context in which they are discussed and how they are understood to 
have contributed to the election outcome. 
 
From Footnotes to Headliners: Tracking the coverage and interest in party Leaders 
from 1955-2017 
 
This section details the substantial rise in discussion, comments and questions relating 
to leaders of political parties in BBC election night broadcasts from 1955 to 2017. It explains 
how modern election broadcasts dedicate a growing proportion of coverage to party leaders 
and have become ‘headliners’ in modern election coverage. Despite leaders participating in 
some early broadcasts, the focus shifts disproportionally to leaders in later broadcasts. 
Table 6.1 displays the length of time between the first spoken word in each broadcast 
and the first explicit mention of a party leader. With the exception of 1970, no leader is 
mentioned in the opening ten minutes of a broadcast from 1955 to February 1974. Results 
for the 1950s show an even greater difference, with leaders not mentioned in the first 20 
minutes. There is then an abrupt shift, first seen in 1970, but continuously from October 1974, 
with leaders consistently mentioned within the first five minutes of the broadcast. At this 
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stage, leaders are now being billed as major figures at the top of the broadcast. In five of the 
six most recent elections analysed, leaders are name-checked within the first minute of 
coverage, with the quickest time recorded in 2010, just 16 seconds into the broadcast. In 
these elections, leaders play an important part in framing the broadcast before the BBC 
releases its exit poll figures. For instance, in 2010, when a hung parliament was widely 
expected, the leaders were introduced in relation to their possible role in this situation. As a 
result, David Cameron, Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg are each mentioned individually at the 
beginning of the programme. Moments into the 2015 broadcast, the narrative for the election 
was also set in relation to the party leaders: 
David Dimbleby: “All the results will come in here to be analysed, and they will reveal 
whether David Cameron will return triumphant, or [will] Ed Miliband succeed in driving 
him from Number Ten”. 
– 2015 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
Speculation about which leader will reside in number 10 is at the forefront of David 
Dimbleby’s introduction to the program even before the exit poll results are revealed. These 
introductory remarks demonstrate the importance that broadcasters give to leaders, as a 
narrative for the programme, and the election outcome is framed around which leader will 
occupy No. 10 Downing Street rather than which party will form the next government. Similar 
framing takes place in the 2010 and 2017 elections. Introductory remarks for the 2010, 2015 
and 2017 BBC election night broadcasts introduce leaders as the main characters in the drama 
of election night. This framing stands in stark contrast to the 1955 programme where party 
leaders are not mentioned or referenced once by Richard Dimbleby as he explains the format 
of the broadcast and the important events of the night. The overall trend from Table 6.1 is 
clear, leaders are increasingly pushed to the forefront of election night coverage. 
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Table 6.1: Time Between Election Broadcast Starting and the First Mention of a Party Leader 
Election Elapsed Time of First Mention 
1955 25 minutes, 17 seconds 
1959 21 minutes, 37 seconds 
1964 18 minutes, 36 seconds 
1966 18 minutes, 2 seconds 
1970 1 minute, 3 seconds 
1974 February 11 minutes, 5 seconds 
1974 October 2 minutes, 19 seconds 
1979 4 minutes, 8 seconds 
1983 1 minutes, 48 seconds 
1987 1 minutes, 16 seconds 
1992 1 minute, 40 seconds 
1997 23 seconds 
2001 56 seconds 
2005 2 minutes, 24 seconds 
2010 16 seconds 
2015 26 seconds 
2017 24 seconds 
 
Figure 6.1 presents the percentage of coverage that relates to party leaders within the 
first hour of broadcasts. It shows how coverage relating to leaders, apart from a couple of 
exceptions, steadily increased from 1955-2001. The coverage of leaders then dropped by over 
ten percentage points after 2001 but remained steady between 2005-2017. The period from 
1970-1987 is distinctively different to the earliest broadcasts in the 1950s and 1960s and 
reflects a notable change in the first hour of election broadcasts. The 1970 General Election 
represents the first election where the broadcast incorporates some kind of forecasting in the 
coverage in the form of the ‘Gravesend’ exit poll. With each subsequent broadcast the 
sophistication of the exit poll increases, generating increased discussion of its findings, with 
the focus on leaders increasing also. The 2001 election broadcast represents the peak of 
coverage relating to party leaders, as over a quarter of spoken discussion in the opening hour 
relates to party leaders. This high point of leaders in 2001 was likely intensified by contextual 
factors surrounding Labour’s ‘silent landslide’. With the exit poll confirming prior expectations 
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of an easy Labour victory, substantial coverage was therefore devoted to the consequences 
the result would have for William Hague as Conservative leader. 
Figure 6.1: Percentage of Spoken Words of Overall Coverage about Party Leaders (First Hour 
of Coverage) 
 
Figure 6.2 provides greater detail relating to the trend discussed above, presenting 
the percentage of coverage that is either dedicated to direct interviews with the party leaders 
or to ‘step-by-step’ reporting of leaders’ whereabouts during the first hour of broadcast. In 
pre-1979 election broadcasts, party leaders often dutifully participated in, sometimes 
lengthy, television interviews during the first hour of the broadcast. At least one leader is 
directly interviewed in nine of the seventeen broadcasts in the data set, but no leader has 
been interviewed in the first hour of the broadcast since 2001.14 This development is one of 
the contributing factors in the decline seen in the graph for the most recent elections. Some 
 






























Percentage of coverage relating to party leaders in first hour of broadcast
Note: Smoothed blue line provides moving average using the loess method
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interviews were pre-recorded prior to the broadcasts, so leaders are not necessarily reacting 
to early projections and are instead making more general comments about the campaign and 
their expectations of the result. The interviews vary in form and quality, some are pre-
arranged and lengthy, whilst others are hastily conducted as leaders travel to the count in 
their constituency. 
Figure 6.2: Percentage of Spoken Words Relating to Party Leader Interviews or Describing 
the Whereabouts of Leaders (First Hour of Coverage) 
 
Of course, interviews with party leaders can occur later in the broadcast and these are 
often more detailed as leaders have had the opportunity to reflect on the results. This is best 
exemplified by Harold Macmillan and Hugh Gaitskell having a lengthy discussion of the 1959 
outcome toward the end of the broadcast. Direct interviews with Conservative and Labour 
leaders during election broadcasts were a regular feature in BBC election night coverage from 































Percentage of coverage relating to party leaders Interviews or 
       'step−by−step' reporting of their movements in first hour of broadcast
Note: Smoothed blue line provides moving average using the loess method
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broadcasters an opportunity to question leaders about their performance in relation to the 
unfolding election outcome. Moreover, broadcasters have the opportunity to ask directly 
about the role the leader played in the campaign and the impact this may have had on voter 
behaviour. This is illustrated by the following exchange between Edward Heath and a reporter 
on the night of the 1966 General Election. 
Reporter: “Mr Heath you took the major burden of the actual campaigning, 
particularly the television campaigning at your own hands. Do you feel that you were 
perhaps mistaken to do this?” 
 
Edward Heath: “No, I don't think so, I have no regrets about the campaign at all but of 
course my colleagues were also playing (an) enormous part in the country. I think the 
way in which the campaign was covered on television and in the press made it appear 
that the emphasis was perhaps on the leaders of the parties…” 
– 1966 BBC Election Night Transcript 
 
The excerpt from this interview demonstrates the direct interaction of party leaders 
during earlier broadcasts, providing the reporter with an opportunity to question Heath on 
his role in the Conservative campaign and the perceived negative effect this had on 
Conservative fortunes. Heath was interviewed at a point when it was clear Labour was on 
track to achieve a healthy parliamentary majority. Interviews during the election broadcast 
hold potential risks for leaders, who may make premature and inaccurate comments about 
the results, particularly in elections where the result is close. Perhaps for this reason, Labour 
and Conservative leaders no longer participated in election night interviews from 1992 
onwards.15 Liberal Democrat leaders continued to participate in interviews on election night 
for longer with Paddy Ashdown, in particular, choosing to speak to the media up to the 1997 
broadcast. While commentary, questions and discussion about party leaders have all 
increased, leaders no longer play an active role in contemporary broadcasts but continue to 
 
15 A camera is positioned inside the building where Kinnock is watching the election coverage, in anticipation 
of some reaction to the exit poll, but he does not make a comment once the exit poll results are released. 
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be a central focus of election night. However, leaders’ speeches at their constituency continue 
to be closely covered in broadcasts, with leaders aware of the attention their broadcast 
attracts and deliver speeches aimed at the nation as a whole. 
In addition to interviews with leaders, broadcasts often present ‘step-by-step’ 
coverage of leaders, detailing their movements throughout polling day, what time they will 
attend their constituency count, and ‘gauging the mood’ from their inner circle. While 
leaders’ movements are a key focus for broadcasters, the journalists positioned to track the 
movements add little to the meaning or political consequences of the election outcome. For 
instance, BBC reporter Brian Hanrahan stationed at Michael Foot’s constituency talked 
through his schedule for the following hours: 
Brian Hanrahan (Blaenau Gwent) : “He's spending the evening at his agent’s cottage 
which isn't terribly far from here. His own cottage which you saw him leaving a few 
minutes ago doesn't have television so he'd gone off somewhere to get a better view 
of what's going on. The result, well, we expect that sometime between 1:30 and 2:00 
o'clock and we hope as you heard Mr. Foot say that we'll be get a chance to talk to 
him properly then” 
–  1983 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
 Positioning hundreds of camera crews and reporters across constituencies is a feature 
of modern election broadcast enabled by improvements in communications technology. The 
decision to station reporters in the constituencies of party leaders begins from the 1966 
broadcast. Limitations of broadcasting technology in 1966 restricted the BBC to only visiting 
nineteen locations outside the studio, a small but not insignificant number. Therefore, it is 
significant that producers chose to send reporters to the constituencies of party leaders. 
Advances in technology for mobile camera crews meant that, by 1987, reporters and camera 
teams were tasked with following one party leader throughout the night, following leaders 
from their houses, then to their constituency count and finally to the party headquarters. If 
party leaders continued to engage with broadcast journalists on election night, then this could 
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provide their reactions to results. However, in more recent elections with no engagement 
from party leaders, broadcasters simply commentate over footage of leaders arriving at 
counts and party headquarters. Host David Dimbleby explains during the 1997 broadcast that 
following the leaders is a primary objective during the night. 
David Dimbleby: “…we are already at all the places that matter, the count at Sedgefield 
for Tony Blair [at] his Labour club, with the Tories in Huntington, with the Liberal 
Democrats in Yeovil we'll be following the party leaders and will be at the party 
headquarters.”  
– 1997 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
Commentary on the whereabouts of party leaders increased further when the BBC 
started to use a helicopter to track the movement of leaders. Commentary over helicopter 
shots are used particularly in 1997 as the BBC track Blair triumphantly travelling down the 
motorway to Labour’s victory celebrations. Up to the minute coverage of the whereabouts of 
party leaders offers very little substance into explaining the results. However, the decision to 
commentate over helicopter pictures of Blair is representative of the ‘top billing’ given to 
party leaders in election night coverage.  
Figure 6.3 provides the percentage of coverage relating to party leaders over the first 
hour of the broadcast, after removing the ‘step-by-step’ reporting and interviews with 
leaders. As such, this graph predominantly captures discussion in the broadcast related to 
leaders. For example, examining the leaders campaign performance in retrospect. Discussion 
may not be directly related to early explanations of the election, particularly in the pre-exit 
poll era. Figure 6.3 displays a fairly clear trajectory of increases over time, albeit with notable 
variation between 1997-2017. Fluctuation in the coverage after 1997 may relate to 
uncertainty about the accuracy of exit polls caused by imprecise projections in previous 
elections. At two low points, 1997 and 2015, there is more caution about drawing too many 
conclusions about the overall result. The lasting memory of inaccuracy from the 1992 exit poll 
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prediction of a hung parliament likely had an effect on how the 1997 projection was 
interpreted. In the case of 2015, the exit poll was treated with greater caution after it 
conflicted with regular opinion polling conducted during the campaign. In contrast to Figure 
6.1, the 2017 election now represents the high point of coverage, with 17.16% of the 
transcript related to the discussion of leaders. There is little reporting dedicated to the 
whereabouts and movements of leaders in the first hour of the 2017 broadcast, which may 
be a reflection of these ‘step-by-step’ reports offering little information to viewers. Instead, 
the focus of this coverage is primarily on the political consequences of the predicted outcome 
for Theresa May, and to a lesser extent, Jeremy Corbyn. In early broadcasts there is nearly no 
coverage dedicated to leaders beyond describing their whereabouts or interviewing them 
directly.  
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Figure 6.3: Percentage of Spoken Words Discussing Party Leaders (First Hour of Coverage) 
 
Post 1983, broadcasters began to ask questions in the first hour of the broadcast that 
link party leaders to the projected outcome of the election. In 2005 broadcasters asked 
several Labour politicians if Labour’s results would have been better without Blair as leader 
of the party. Similarly, in 1987, Robin Day questioned deputy Labour leader Roy Hattersley on 
why the ‘dream team’ leadership of Hattersley and Kinnock had not produced a better result 
for his party. Broadcasts also discuss whether leaders may have had a positive effect, for 
example conversation about whether Nick Clegg’s surge during the 2010 campaign would be 
likely to help the Liberal Democrats keep marginal seats. With Conservative and Labour party 
leaders no longer talking to broadcasters during more recent election nights, broadcasters 
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Note: Smoothed blue line provides moving average using the loess method
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It is important to distinguish between descriptive comments from journalists 
positioned outside the houses of party leaders, relatively bland (and often pre-recorded) 
interviews with leaders who often make no substantial comment during the program, and 
discussions of the possible explanations of election outcomes that centre on the role of 
leaders. The presence of all of these types of coverage indicate the importance of party 
leaders to the programme makers but content centred on explaining election outcomes and 
leaders’ role in relation to them serves as a greater interest here, because of the role they 
play in helping to shape the unfolding narrative. The following sections examine different 
types of discussion about party leaders throughout the entirety of the broadcasts. 
 
Leader performance, potential resignations and personal characteristics during 
election broadcasts 
 
This section of the chapter focuses in greater detail on how election outcomes across the 
broadcasts are explained using different aspects relating to party leaders. In contrast to the 
‘step-by-step’ descriptive coverage that was analysed above, this section focuses on the 
subjects of discussion that are related to party leaders in greater detail. In turn I present 
findings about leaders’ campaign performance during the campaign, possible leadership 
succession and leader characteristics highlighted during the coverage. Overall the findings 
present a generally consistent pattern: modern election coverage has focused increasingly on 
campaign performance, leadership succession and analysis of personal qualities. 
 
Party Leaders’ Campaign Performance 
 
The emphasis on party leaders’ campaign performance from broadcast journalists and 
politicians alike has grown notably over the elections analysed. Of course, participants that 
feature in the broadcast have also followed the events of the campaign in detail, possibly 
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drawing on their own experience of the campaign. With leaders receiving significant media 
coverage during recent campaigns (Deacon et al. 2017; Denver, Carman, and Johns 2012; 
Gaber 2013), there is a marked increase in questions that relate to party leaders in modern 
elections. Evidence suggests the 1987 election represents a shift in coverage with a larger 
section dedicated to commenting on the performance of party leaders.  
Figure 6.4 plots the frequency of the word ‘campaign’ against my manual codes that 
relate to leaders’ campaign performance. In post-1987 elections party leaders’ campaign 
performance is discussed more often in elections when the expected result is close. Close 
election results in 1992, 2015, and most notably in 2017, see a greater reflection during the 
coverage on the campaign performance of party leaders. This relationship suggests that 
broadcasters are aware that leaders matter more when the result is expected to be close. 
Anticipated landslide victories generally result in fewer questions on the performance of party 
leaders during the campaign. While the 1987 election did result in a landslide Conservative 
victory, the BBC’s projection suggested a much smaller majority of 26, and Neil Kinnock was 
widely praised for his campaign performance in the broadcast coverage of this election. 
Analysis of William Hague’s campaign performance in 2001 does provide an exception to the 
relationship between landslide victories and focus on leaders’ campaign performance. Most 
Conservative politicians praised Hague’s campaign efforts even after the Conservatives 
improved their seat total by one and Labour’s landslide majority remained. Similarly, Liberal 
Democrat politicians were highly positive about the campaign performance of Charles 
Kennedy in the same election, seeking to portray him as the true star of the campaign. 
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Figure 6.4: Comments and Questions related to Campaign performance 1955-2017  
 
 
The Conservative Party’s leader-centric campaign in 2017 naturally led to evaluations 
of May’s performance throughout election night. May’s lacklustre performance compared to 
an invigorated Corbyn, naturally drew comparisons during the coverage. In turn, the 
campaign performance of Nicola Sturgeon in 2015, stemming from her strong performance 
in the televised debates received substantial attention from commentators. Meanwhile 
Labour MPs were broadly defensive of Ed Miliband’s campaign performance when 
interviewed at different stages of the night. Coverage in 2010 is not distinctly focused on the 
campaign nor the performance of leaders, but noticeable attention was given to the new 
party leader debates. These debates received widespread media and public attention, 
resulting in a period of ‘Cleggmania’ when the Liberal Democrats and Nick Clegg were 
performing well in the polls. On election night, many participants in the broadcast coverage 
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first to feature televised debates, there was certainly an expectation from some 
commentators that Nick Clegg’s campaign performance would result in better results for the 
Liberal Democrats. Jeremy Vine explains that the campaign looked unlikely to have a strong 
observable effect based on the exit poll results: 
Jeremy Vine: “…of course part of the story of the campaign was the surge, the so-called 
surge, for (the) Lib Dems that happened after the television debate and then the 
question about whether Nick Clegg might fight off the Conservatives successfully in 
lots of seats, well that surge, has ended up like this according to our exit poll: Lib Dem-
Conservative battles, just a small swing to the Conservatives of two percent.”  
– 2010 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
Given exit poll predictions in 2010 and 1987, broadcasters disproportionately focus their 
attention on the various configurations of possible governments, explanations of what a hung 
parliament means, and in 2010, protocols laid out in the Cabinet Manual. While the outcome 
remains unclear, broadcasters limit the time for retrospective analysis of the campaign. 
Therefore, contextual factors are likely to be influential in how much examination is given to 
the role of leaders in the campaign, as broadcast journalists first focus on possible outcomes 
before trying to explain the results. While the broadcasters’ focus on leaders’ campaign 
performances depends on the closeness of the election, the post-1987 elections discuss 
campaign performance more frequently on average than those which precede it, regardless 
of the perceived uncertainty of the outcome. In the pre-exit poll era, every election outcome 
was more uncertain, for a longer period of the broadcast, than is presently the case in modern 
elections.  
 
Leadership Skills and Personality traits 
 
Assessments of party leaders’ leadership abilities and personality traits are a key 
feature of broadcasters’ efforts to explain the results of elections. Comments relating to 
leadership abilities incorporated a wide variety of terms, such as, ‘experienced’, ‘decisive’, 
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‘Prime Ministerial’ and ‘authoritative’. Remarks about leaders’ personalities incorporated 
terms such as, ‘honourable’, ‘trustworthy’ and ‘caring’ (see section 3.5 in the Research 
Methods Appendix for the full codebook). Evaluations of party leaders’ personality are 
treated as distinct from their leadership qualities. Of course, traits can be attributed to leaders 
positively and negatively. Therefore, it is important to be aware of the context in which the 
trait is used, and not just the trait itself.  
Figure 6.5 summarises negative and positive assessments of party leaders across the 
dataset. References to leadership abilities are more finely balanced with positive and negative 
comments split fairly equally. Naturally, the partisanship of the contributor affects whether 
positive or negative comments are made about a leader. Positive comments regarding party 
leaders’ personality are more common from individuals who are defending their leader in the 
context of an election defeat.  
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John Major receives a sizeable amount of positive references to his personality despite 
his party’s catastrophic loss in 1997. Throughout the broadcast Conservative politicians 
describe Major as ‘dignified’, ‘honourable’ and ‘decent’. Ross and Joselyn (1988) found similar 
positive phrases were used to describe Walter Mondale during the US Presidential Election 
coverage in 1984, as he like Major, was defeated by a landslide margin. Positive remarks 
about Major’s personality are forthcoming throughout the coverage, even when it becomes 
clear that Labour has achieved a decisive victory. Such comments give the impression that 
defeat for the Conservatives was somewhat inevitable and portray Major as an honourable 
captain solemnly going down with the sinking Conservative ship. These comments have the 
indirect effect of absolving Major of responsibility for the Conservative defeat. Michael Foot 
















Negative and Positive Assessments of Leadership Traits
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Labour to a historic defeat. Assessments of leadership skills are more finely balanced as their 
absence or presence is identified as contributing to the failure or success of a party. For 
instance, Tony Blair’s credibility is criticised during the 2005 election broadcast over the 
unfolding events since the 2003 Iraq War, and this is used to explain why Labour lost votes. 
Leadership skills are more frequently used in conjunction with interpreting the election 
outcome and to provide an early explanation of voter behaviour, whereas comments about 
a leader’s personality are used to pay tribute to the efforts of leaders without being linked to 
the outcome. I provide a comparison of two comments about Tony Blair and John Major in 
1997: 
Robin Cook MP: “I think what happened tonight is a reflection of three things first of 
all the tremendous leadership of Tony Blair who has shown the world that he can lead 
the Labour Party and Britain now wants that leadership in charge of number 10” 
– 1997 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
Katie Adie: “I think whatever is going to happen, and from his character and from the 
way that things are conducted, it would be dignified facing up to whatever has 
happened” 
– 1997 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
Discussion of leaders’ personality and leadership qualities is increasingly common following 
the 1992 election, featuring prominently in the two elections of the 1990s. This trend is not 
sustained into the early 2000s, though the number of comments remains higher than in pre-
1990s coverage. From 1992 onwards there is a greater focus on individual leaders’ personality 
and leadership skills, representing a change in the type of coverage and comment made by 
politicians. 
Theresa May’s lack of personality and robotic campaigning style during the 2017 
election has subsequently been identified as detrimental to the Conservative election 
performance (Bale and Webb 2018). Her ‘robotic’ personality is mentioned frequently 
throughout the 2017 broadcast. In turn, commentators describe how assessments of Theresa 
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May worsened over a Conservative campaign framed around her supposed trait of ‘strong 
leadership’. Post-1992, the 1997 election is the other election broadcast where comments 
regarding personality are more frequent than leadership traits. Positive assessments of Tony 
Blair’s personality in appealing to the electorate complement remarks about his leadership 
skills. His successful restructure of the Labour Party, turning it into a successful electoral force 
is widely credited throughout the programme.  
The 2010 and 2015 election broadcasts also focused significantly on leadership skills. 
The 2010 results compounded negative evaluations of Gordon Brown. Brown was considered 
to have lost the remainder of his authority as Prime Minister, following the predicted loss of 
Labour’s majority from the exit poll results. Conservative MPs then attempted to link Brown’s 
loss of authority to the negative personality trait of desperation, based on the assumption 
that Brown would attempt to remain Prime Minister. However, in 2015 Conservative MPs (in 
particular Michael Gove) claimed that the exit poll results, which did not predict a certain 
majority, were a personal endorsement of David Cameron’s leadership. The absence of more 
discussion regarding party leaders’ competencies and personality after the first hour of the 
2015 broadcast is noteworthy. This is noteworthy because the Conservatives had attacked 
Miliband’s personality for the entirety of his leadership of the Labour Party and was a point 
they emphasised in the 2015 campaign (Gaber 2017). Focus on leadership skills may be 
affected by the perceived closeness of an election, but there is no obvious relationship 
between the focus on different traits and the contextual factors of the elections. The salience 
of different leadership traits fluctuates across the period of elections covered. However, it is 




Leadership Succession and the Effect of Election Results on Political Capital 
 
Election results have the potential to generate political capital for leaders, and as a 
consequence, cements their control in government and their party. Alternatively, on a bad 
night, the political capital of leaders can be wiped out. Questions regarding the resignation of 
leaders or possible successors have become increasingly common during the broadcasts. 
Broadcast journalists recognise the wider effects election night will have once the outcome 
of the election has been established. Questions directed to politicians, commentators and 
other broadcasters regarding the future of leaders have grown steadily in recent times. 
Contemporary election coverage directs a substantial amount of attention to the discussion 
of potential changes in leadership after the election. During broadcasts in the 1950s or 1960s 
politicians were rarely asked about the future of their leaders. During this period, Alec 
Douglas-Holme was the only leader to receive attention regarding whether he could continue 
in his position, because he was regarded as significantly out of touch with the public. 
However, there is no sustained speculation about whether Douglas-Holme would resign, with 
greater emphasis on the circumstances in which he became Prime Minister and Conservative 
leader. 
Evidence suggests that broadcasters have recognised that parties are ready to replace 
leaders who preside over electoral failures (Andrews and Jackman 2008; So 2018). Leaders 
who have lost multiple elections, such as Ted Heath, would be unlikely to survive in the 
current political climate. The future of leaders has therefore become one of the key issues 
discussed in election night coverage. Questions about leadership succession were first asked 
in October 1974 but are more frequent from 1987 onwards. There is no doubt that the 
inclusion of forecasts and exit polls has accelerated the level of coverage given to leadership 
succession by providing earlier indications of the likely result. In some cases, exit polls can 
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lead to leadership succession speculation about the ‘wrong’ leader. Based only on the early 
forecast of the 1992 exit poll, broadcasters and Labour politicians prematurely speculated 
over whether John Major could continue as Prime Minister and Conservative Leader. As the 
1992 result became clear, the emphasis switched to whether Neil Kinnock will survive as 
leader of the Labour party after leading them to a second defeat under his leadership and a 
fourth consecutive defeat for the Labour Party. The following excerpts provide illustrations of 
broadcasters’ interest in who will replace leaders of parties that are expected to be defeated.  
 Peter Sissons: “Could I now put it to you that Neil Kinnock is now established as a loser 
and you could not risk fighting another election under his leadership”  
– Questioning Labour MP Paul Boateng, 1992 BBC Election Broadcast 
 
Robin Day: “…will you be a candidate for the leadership if Michael Foot decides to go?”  
– Questioning Labour MP Eric Varley, 1983 BBC Election Broadcast 
 
Robin Day: “If Labour does win comfortably, do you think this is the end of Edward 
Heath as a political leader?”  
– Questioning Conservative Lord Boothby, October 1974 BBC Election Broadcast 
 
The excerpts reflect how broadcast journalists frame questions about possible changes to 
party leadership when interviewing politicians. In some instances, broadcasters begin to 
speculate about possible successors, going beyond questioning whether an individual could 
remain leader. Discussion of leadership succession reached its peak in 2001 with Blair’s 
second landslide burying William Hague’s chances of remaining Conservative leader. On the 
basis of the exit poll, Hague resigning as Conservative leader is effectively understood to be a 
formality by broadcasters, even with only one constituency (Sunderland South), officially 
declared. In anticipation of the ‘silent landslide’, the BBC had commissioned polling on current 
and former Conservative voters in 2001 on which individual they would like to replace William 
Hague. Respondents were given Michael Portillo, Anne Widecombe, Ken Clarke and Ian 
Duncan Smith as possible successors. Peter Snow presents the analysis on possible future 
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Conservative leaders to viewers, showing Michael Portillo to be the favoured candidate 
among current Conservative voters. Extraordinarily, Jeremy Paxman uses this polling 
evidence to question Michael Portillo, who happens to be in the BBC studio as a participant 
in the broadcast, whether he is encouraged by the polling results to be a candidate to replace 
William Hague. Throughout the rest of the coverage, broadcasters work on the assumption 
that Hague is destined to be replaced. Fixation with a possible change in Conservative 
leadership is unsurprising considering how few seats changed hands in 2001 and leadership 
speculation was a subject to debate in an election with a clear outcome.  
Whilst it is not supported with polling evidence, there are suggestions throughout the 
1992 coverage that Labour would have been more successful if John Smith had replaced 
Kinnock as leader. Similar ‘what ifs’ are pondered with regard to Dennis Healey being a 
possible replacement for Michael Foot in 1983. What is clear from the coverage is that 
broadcast journalists raise the possibility that different leadership could have had an effect, 
either directly or indirectly, on the outcome of the election.  
Politicians interviewed on the programme are often asked if they would be interested 
in entering a future leadership election. Such questioning tends to elicit a scripted response 
that is either an outright rejection or a comment that there was ‘no vacancy’. Politicians are 
naturally cautious when responding to questions regarding new leadership and hesitant to 
declare their candidacy before a leader has resigned. Andrew Marr addresses this issue in 
2001:  
Andrew Marr: “I bet one prediction, any Conservative who says on this programme 
tonight that they would like the leadership and like William Hague to stand down will 
never be the leader, that’s why they’re all being so cautious.” 
–  2001 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
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As a result, broadcasters asking about leadership ambitions are usually swiftly rebuffed by 
politicians, generating little insight. However, asking participants such as political 
commentators and other journalists can generate more detailed speculation with regard to 
who may be likely to replace leaders in the coming weeks; with greater freedom to name 
individuals as possible replacements.  
While questions and discussion regarding leadership succession are predominantly 
negative, party leaders can also gain political capital, resulting in positive discussion and 
questioning. Nick Clegg’s performance in the 2010 campaign shielded him from speculation 
about potential succession following the Liberal Democrat’s disappointing results at the ballot 
box. Additionally, broadcasters evaluated that Ted Heath’s performance during the 1966 
election campaign was enough to solidify his position as Conservative leader even though 
Labour won a comfortable majority. 
Outperforming expectations going into election night can result in leaders gaining 
substantial political capital in what broadcasters frame as a make or break election for their 
leadership. Jeremy Corbyn in 2017 serves as the prime example of this, where his position at 
the top of the Labour party was secured after Labour gained seats and outperformed 
expectations. Despite internal troubles within Labour, speculation was that anti-Corbyn MPs 
were unlikely to challenge the leadership of the party until after the 2017 election results, 
where Labour widely expected to lose seats. Broadcasters directly accused Labour MPs of 
wanting poor election results to ensure the demise of Corbyn’s leadership of the party. 
However, based on the results in 2017, Laura Kuenssberg provides the following analysis of 
the impact of the result on Corbyn’s position as leader:  
Laura Kuenssberg: “One thing we can say for sure is that Jeremy Corbyn is safe as 
leader of the Labour Party, so long as he wants to be. He’s had a great campaign.”  
– 2017 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
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These election results were interpreted as a personal vindication for Jeremy Corbyn 
and the decisions he made as Labour leader. However, while the safety of Corbyn remaining 
leader was raised on ten separate occasions during the broadcast, the issue of whether 
Theresa May could continue as party leader was raised on twenty-five occasions. BBC 
broadcasters concentrate on whether Theresa May would be forced to resign, rather than 
Jeremy Corbyn solidifying his position as Labour leader. Broadcasters have become more 
detailed in their speculation of potential successors and this has become a key section of the 
narrative when assessing probable consequences of the election. Discussion about whether 
incumbents can continue as leader indirectly questions whether the election outcome can be 
attributed to their leadership. The next section examines the responsibility attributed to party 
leaders for the election result.  
 
“She has blown it” – Attributing Blame to Party Leaders 
 
Party leaders provide a clear figurehead for broadcasters, opponents and supporters 
to applaud when a party is successful and a clear target to blame when a party loses an 
election. Praising and blaming party leaders for election results is not done lightly, particularly 
early in election coverage, when the result can be unclear. I coded the transcripts for explicit 
and implicit blame and praise during the coverage. The magnitude of an election win is a 
significant factor that impacts the level of blame or praise of leaders. Election night coverage 
of landslide victories feature fewer comments that blame the losing party leader for the 
result. More frequent criticism of leaders is found in close elections, with the perception that 
the election was winnable. Moreover, the group of actors that engage in the process of 
blaming or praising leaders is noticeably different. Journalists and broadcasters are more 
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likely to attribute blame for poor results, while politicians are more likely to praise their own 
leaders.  
Responsibility for the election results attributed to leaders does not follow a steady 
trajectory for the elections covered. Evidence presented in Figure 6.6 demonstrates that 
blame and praise for leaders is rare in broadcasts before the 1980s. There is a considerable 
increase during the 1990s, before blame and praise dip in subsequent elections before 
resurfacing strongly in the 2015 and 2017 elections.  
Figure 6.6: Praise and Blame of Party Leaders for Election Result (1955-2017) 
 
The trend demonstrated in the graph demonstrates that praise and criticism does not 
follow a neat linear trajectory. Rather, this relationship is likely due to contextual factors that 
influence each election and the expectations leading into election night. Landslide election 
victories often produce substantial praise for the leader of the victorious party and little 























































achieved landslide victories are instinctively positive about their leader being an electoral 
asset. Praise for Blair in 1997 and Thatcher in 1983 provide two examples of this.  
Robin Cook MP: “…a tremendous achievement, if as it appears to be, we are on course 
for a great victory, an achievement above all by Tony Blair…”  
–  1997 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
Francis Pym MP: “…it’s quite clear that the country has expressed very strong 
confidence in the Conservative government under Mrs. Thatcher…” 
–   1983 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
Praise for party leaders is acknowledged both in their personal appeal and their skill in running 
a successful campaign. For instance, the Conservative win in 2015 was credited largely to 
David Cameron’s personal appeal over Ed Miliband, whereas Tony Blair was praised for 
showing the strong leadership skills of a potential Prime Minister in 1997. Leadership traits 
that were discussed in an earlier section are identified here as reasons why the leaders’ party 
were successful.  
In contrast, criticism for losing party leaders is less frequent during landslide defeats. 
Little blame is attributed to William Hague during the 2001 coverage. There is no sense from 
commentators or politicians that Hague should be blamed for the Labour victory. While the 
focus is on who will succeed Hague, there is little personal blame attached to him for the 
party’s defeat. Expectations of another substantial Labour victory, supported by opinion 
polling leading into election night, gave the impression that no Conservative leader could 
have changed the result. Likewise, the 1983 coverage places little personal blame on Michael 
Foot, aside from Foot himself publicly stating that he would need to accept personal 
responsibility for Labour’s defeat.  
Criticism of party leaders is more common when results are closer and the 
expectations before polling day are contrary to the actual results. In 2017, when opinion 
polling in the campaign suggested the Conservatives would likely win a stable majority, 
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Theresa May is attributed significant blame for the party losing seats. Another contributing 
factor to the blame received by May during the coverage was her campaigning style, which 
had been widely criticised (Bale & Webb, 2018). Lastly, through calling a general election 
earlier than the fixed election date of May 2020, after repeatedly ruling out an early election, 
Theresa May created a highly personalised narrative that translated into damning criticism 
and blame during the broadcast. Laura Kuenssberg offers the following criticism of May in 
2017: 
Laura Kuenssberg: “Tonight is a disaster for Theresa May. She called this election 
voluntarily. She didn’t need to. She thought she could steam-roller the opposition and 
cruise to a landslide victory and she is left tonight facing a disastrous election result.” 
– 2017 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
There is no doubt that the circumstances surrounding the election led to such cutting 
criticism. It is important to note that these comments were made based on exit poll 
projections and demonstrates how confidence in the forecasts have grown, with harsh 
criticism made early in the broadcast. May is blamed more than any party leader since 
broadcasts began but she is not the only leader blamed for election results.  
In 1992 Kinnock receives a notable amount of blame for the Labour Party losing their 
fourth successive general election, despite opinion polls and the exit poll indicating he might 
be Prime Minister by the end of the night. Due to the closeness of the result Kinnock receives 
both praise and criticism as politicians react to the exit poll and results in real time. At the 
beginning of the broadcast Labour politicians Jack Cunningham and Brian Gould were praising 
Kinnock’s leadership of the Labour Party, claiming the results as a personal victory for their 
leader. As the Conservative victory became apparent, broadcasters and politicians from rival 
parties began to become critical of Kinnock and sought to make him accountable for Labour’s 
defeat. Liberal Democrat Shirley Williams provided the following criticism of Kinnock: 
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Shirley Williams MP: “I think one reason for that was because of things like the 
Sheffield rally which suddenly showed Neil Kinnock in a triumphalist mode and I think 
many people even now are frightened of a Kinnock government” 
– 1992 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
Personal criticisms of Kinnock and May offer the most extreme examples of blame on election 
night following expectations that they would both win majorities. Brown and Miliband both 
received personal criticism for the elections that they lost but to a lesser extent. This level of 
criticism is interesting because while Labour may have not thought they would have an overall 
majority in 2015, there was an expectation that they could be the largest party. Conversely, 
leaders who produce unexpected election successes such as Major in 1992 and Jeremy 
Corbyn in 2017 are seen as responsible for their party’s success.  
Broadcasters, politicians, academics and journalists all have freedom to praise or 
criticise party leaders at various points throughout the election coverage. Table 6.2 provides 
a summary of the frequency of blame and praise from broadcasters and politicians for the 
election covered in the data set. Broadcasters are more frequent in blaming party leaders, 
whilst politicians are more likely to praise leaders. 
Table 6.2: Praise and Blame of Party Leaders from Broadcasters and Politicians 1955-2017 
Group of Actors Blame Praise 
Broadcaster 31 21 
Politician 23 35 
 
As highly partisan actors, politicians are swift to draw attention and heap praise on 
leaders when they have won. Often, they claim the party’s victory is a testament to their 
leadership. Of course, political actors also have personal reasons, such as career 
advancement, for praising their leaders. Praise from winning politicians is frequent from 
Conservative politicians in 1992 and Labour politicians in 1997, with both Major and Blair 
commended for their respective roles in these victories. Claiming a leader directly contributed 
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to the victory or loss of a close general election is an important aspect of the wider narrative 
that follows on from election night.  
Conservative politicians use these tactics both in 2010 and 2015 but in slightly 
different ways. The 2010 broadcasts see several Conservative politicians stress that Gordon 
Brown, rather than the Labour Party, has lost the election. Attributing blame to Gordon Brown 
for Labour’s projected losses is central to the Conservative Party attempting to shape the 
narrative that it would be inconceivable that Brown could continue as Prime Minister after 
the election. Labour MPs attempted something similar in 1992, arguing that Major no longer 
had the authority to continue as Prime Minister based on early projections of the exit poll. In 
2015 Conservative politicians employed a similar tactic to praise their own leader, David 
Cameron, as responsible for winning the election immediately after the exit poll was released. 
Comments made by Michael Gove illustrate this point: 
 Michael Gove MP: “It would be an unprecedented vote of confidence in David 
Cameron's leadership and in particular in the message that we have reinforced 
throughout this campaign.” 
 
Michael Gove MP: “If the exit poll is right, with caveats, then David Cameron has won 
a handsome victory.”  
–  2015 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
When Michael Gove made these comments, it was not yet clear that the Conservatives would 
win an overall majority based on the exit poll prediction. It appears that Conservative 
politicians respond to this uncertain outcome by attempting to head off any potential 
narratives that Miliband and Labour could claim a right to govern. This finding provides 
further detail to the argument made by Cowley and Kavanagh (2016), that during election 
night coverage Labour and Conservative politicians attempted to assert their party’s 
legitimacy to govern in 2015. The shock to Conservatives during the 2017 broadcast is 
apparent and questioning begins about Theresa May’s decision to call an early election. Blame 
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and praise for leaders is naturally framed around partisan lines, with politicians attempting to 
shape how the election result is processed by the media.  
 Broadcasters, journalists and academics are more likely to blame leaders for their 
party’s failings. Presenters are more implicit in their blame of party leaders. Often, they imply 
that the leader has performed poorly or load their questions with the assumption that 
leadership had a negative effect on the decisions of voters. For example, in 1997 John Major’s 
response during the ‘Cash for Questions’ scandal, is portrayed as a personal error of Major’s, 
which contributed to the perception of sleaze around the party. Not all broadcasters are 
implicit in their questioning and Jeremy Paxman provides an illustration of this when he 
summarises Labour’s poor results in 2010 to an ill-informed Ed Balls interviewed from his 
count: 
Ed Balls MP: “I don’t really know what’s happened in the last hour or so”  
 
Jeremy Paxman: “Well, let me tell you what’s happened, Gordon Brown has taken your 
party down to defeat” 
– 2010 BBC Election Night Broadcast 
 
Broadcasters, journalists and academics are freer to make criticisms of leaders, especially as 
politicians are careful not to pass judgement while the full set of results is still unknown. 2017 
provides a clear case of an election where a range of broadcasters were quick to blame 
Theresa May’s role in the election following the unexpected exit poll prediction. Broadcasters 
do also praise party leaders, especially when they have won unexpected elections or by a 
landslide margin.  
Party leaders are considered responsible for their party’s performance in 
contemporary election broadcasts. Contextual factors surrounding the election are crucial to 
understanding how much blame or praise is given to leaders, but it is demonstrated in this 
chapter how this can help shape the initial explanation of results. Different groups of actors 
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attribute responsibility to leaders in different ways and for different reasons, but they 
commonly share the view that actions taken by leaders are pivotal to understanding the 




Party leaders have developed from peripheral figures to the headliners of election 
night coverage. How election results are understood and initial explanations for victory and 
defeat provide the basis for the post-election narrative. While the primary purpose of the 
coverage continues to be to relay the results to viewers, this analysis of the content of BBC 
election night broadcasts has demonstrated a shift over time to more of a focus on the role 
of party leaders. Leaders are mentioned within the first seconds of modern coverage and are 
seen as central figures for framing the discussion of the election. Until 1992, party leaders 
engaged with the broadcast media directly on election night and, despite their more recent 
reluctance to do so, party leaders were followed increasingly closely as producers of the 
coverage considered it important to track their every move. In recent elections, party leaders 
are introduced quickly to viewers as key figures for interpreting the election result. This could 
have implications for how voters understand election outcomes as the emphasis shifts to the 
winning party leader and away from the winning party. Furthermore, with the coverage 
showcasing leaders, it has an impact on how initial explanations of elections are understood. 
Beyond descriptive reporting of the leaders’ whereabouts, substantive discussion of 
the leaders’ role in the campaign and their personal appeal have received greater attention 
during recent election night broadcasts. I find that broadcasters make strong links between 
the personal appeal of leaders and their performance in the campaign when explaining 
election outcomes. Changes in the way election narratives are framed shift from a battle 
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between two parties, to a battle between two leaders, which focuses on the office of Prime 
Minister. There is a greater understanding that the campaign has the potential to change the 
outcome of the election and broadcasters recognise the significant role of leaders in 
campaigns. In addition, election results have a marked effect on the political capital of 
leaders, and this is emphasised in more recent coverage. From 1997 onwards there is a wider 
expectation that if leaders preside over a defeat, they are very likely to be replaced. 
Speculation about potential replacements for party leaders becomes a subject of interest for 
participants to debate. Narratives of election night are developed beyond which party won 
and lost to which leaders will be replaced or have become untouchable. Responsibility for the 
election results is attributed with greater regularity to leaders in modern coverage. In 
contrast, coverage in the 50s, 60s and 70s placed little responsibility for the result on party 
leaders. Politicians are quick to praise the work of their leader when they win, while other 
participants readily blame leaders for their party’s defeat. 
 The analysis has detailed the nuances of individual elections within the broader 
findings, explaining how contextual factors are influential as to how the narrative is 
constructed during the program. For instance, if results are contrary to expectations leading 
into election night, greater blame is attributed to the leader expected to win for not being 
able to carry their party into office. Where pre-election expectations are confirmed early in 
the broadcast, such as the 2001 election, broadcasters attempt to keep the narrative 
interesting by focusing on potential consequences of the result. Importantly, narratives about 
leaders can also change as the results become clearer, as more results are announced. The 
exit poll has a clear and influential effect in this regard. With forecasts leading the early 
election night coverage, broadcasters can begin to focus on the implications of the results 
even before any actual constituency results have been officially declared. Exit polls also 
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facilitate greater discussion of party leaders during the first hour of the broadcast, beyond 
simple descriptive commentary on where leaders are located. 
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Chapter 7 : Conclusion 
 
Party leader effects are complex. The application of advanced quantitative techniques 
on panel data in this thesis has served to establish the relative stability of leader evaluations 
and pinpoint when leaders have an influential effect on vote choice. Chapter Four examined 
how evaluations of leaders change over time, including the impact of new leadership, rival 
leader evaluations and voter characteristics on the stability of evaluations. Chapter Five 
considered the effect of party leader evaluations on vote choice at two general elections by 
building on previous studies using campaign effects and the persuasiveness of leaders. This 
approach proved effective in measuring whether changes in leadership evaluations during 
the campaign could persuade voters and boost electoral prospects. The thesis then turned to 
examine party leaders within election night broadcasts, with Chapter Six investigating how 
leaders are understood to have affected election outcomes. Discussion of party leaders on 
election night was found to have grown steadily over time and their role increasingly takes 
centre stage during the analysis of election results. Taken together, these chapters contribute 
to existing research on party leaders via methodological advancement, the construction of 
original data, and their focus on research questions that have been underexplored in the 
existing literature.  
This conclusion reflects on the analysis contained in the previous chapters and 
summarises the findings in relation to the three main hypotheses. Presenting the findings in 
this way makes strong links to the theoretical and empirical literature on party leaders 
introduced in Chapter Two. The conclusion ends by presenting opportunities for future 
research on the subject of party leaders, based on the findings of this thesis. 
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Summary of Findings 
Rival leaders and new leadership provide better explanations of changes in leadership 
evaluations than the characteristics of voters 
Most voters’ evaluations of party leaders were found to be fairly stable and did not 
change drastically over the panel. How voters adjust their evaluations of party leaders over 
time has not been considered on the level of detail presented in this thesis. Individual-level 
changes in evaluations suggested voters re-evaluate leaders over time, but while these 
changes are noticeable, they are often only small changes. Few voters are likely to change 
their evaluation of a leader significantly between waves. Butler and Stokes (1969, 1974) 
suggested that evaluations of party leaders were a ‘short-term’ influence on vote choice. 
However, the stability of evaluations found in Chapter Four, suggest that leader evaluations 
should be considered a ‘long-term’ influence on voters. Voters may differ in what they 
consider to be an ideal-type leader, but the continuity in the evaluations of individual leaders 
suggests that overall assessments of leaders are unlikely to change dramatically after they are 
initially constructed.  
 New leadership caused the most substantial change in individual evaluations of party 
leaders. This is an important finding because it demonstrates voters distinguish between 
outgoing leaders and their replacements. The findings demonstrate that incoming leaders 
have the potential to develop their own appeal to voters, independent of their party, but that 
initial evaluations can be difficult to change later in their tenure as leader. This finding raises 
important questions about how long new leaders have to attract new voters after becoming 
leader, before evaluations become settled. Once evaluations of leaders stabilise, it may take 
a major political event for voters to change long-held assessments. No evidence was found 
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that leadership evaluations change more during general election campaign waves than in 
other waves of the panel. 
In addition, strong evidence was found that change in evaluations are made relatively 
to rival leaders, supporting previous studies that have highlighted this psychological effect 
(Goffin and Olson 2011; Mughan 2015). The effects of relative changes in evaluations were 
found in both Chapter Four and Chapter Five. Evidence of relative changes between the four 
leaders of the largest parties in British politics (at this time) suggests that evaluations not only 
reflect voter comparisons between Prime Ministers and Leaders of the Opposition, but also 
in relation to the leaders of smaller parties. While leaders of smaller parties have effectively 
no chance of becoming Prime Minister, they remain relevant and important to voters’ 
evaluations of leaders. As a result, it may be worthwhile reconsidering the effect of leaders 
of smaller parties in past elections. If voters’ feelings about the leaders of smaller parties 
contribute to how they feel about major party leaders, leaders of smaller parties may have a 
stronger influence than previously thought. Furthermore, previous research has found that 
voters associate particular leadership traits with the leaders of left-wing and right-wing 
political parties (Bittner 2014; Hayes 2005). While this study considered the effect of a new 
incumbent on general like-dislike assessments, it would be worthwhile investigating whether 
new leadership has the same effect on assessments of specific traits. 
Characteristics of voters were less convincing in explaining changes in leadership 
evaluations. Literature surrounding party identification and partisanship suggested that these 
voters would have the most stable evaluations about leaders because their partisanship has 
a strong effect on their evaluations (Barisione 2009; Bittner 2014). In turn, non-partisans’ 
leadership evaluations were expected to be more responsive. Another theorised relationship 
related to ‘unsophisticated’ voters, who were expected to change their evaluations more 
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often because they rely on leader assessments more heavily for deciding their vote choice 
(Gidengil 2013; Mughan 2015; Rico 2014). Additionally, voters who consumed more televised 
political coverage were expected to change their evaluations more frequently (Lenz and 
Lawson 2011; Rico 2014). Results found the effect of these variables were minor, and were 
inconsistent across the models, relative to new leadership and changes in the evaluations of 
other party leaders. In some cases, party identifiers were more likely than those without party 
identification to change their evaluations. These findings illustrated that the type of voter has 
little effect on changes in evaluations of leaders and that it is more likely other factors, such 
as comparing the performance of different leaders or new leadership that matter the most.  
 
Party leaders are crucial in understanding campaign effects and why voters convert during the 
campaign 
 Leadership evaluations made before general election campaigns are one of several 
important pre-campaign variables that can be used to make fairly accurate predictions about 
subsequent vote choice. The overall accuracy of predictive models was between 80-90% in 
the Labour and Conservative models in 2015 and 2017. This finding largely follows the 
expectations in the literature about the campaign having minimal effects on vote choice 
(Clarke et al. 2004; Finkel 1993; Finkel and Schrott 1995; Harrop and Miller 1987). In each 
case, evaluations of leaders had a net effect in producing more accurate predictions about 
the decisions that voters ultimately made. Most voters follow a predictable path for vote 
choice in general elections, but a substantial proportion of voters (10-20%) could not be easily 
predicted based on pre-campaign attitudes, indicating that the campaign is more influential 
on the decisions made by these voters.  
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 Based on the predicted values gained from these models, voters were isolated who 
were more likely to be persuaded by the campaign than other voters. For this reason, the 
group was labelled ‘goldilocks’ voters because their views indicated they had a realistic 
chance of being persuaded during the campaign. It was an important step to acknowledge 
voters’ pre-existing attitudes and who voters would realistically consider voting for during the 
campaign. I suggest this term as one that is more precise than ‘floating’ voters, ‘late deciders’ 
or ‘swing’ voters (Gidengil 2013; Mayer 2007; McAllister 2003; Russo 2014). This group of 
persuadable voters was found to be specific to both parties examined. Voters who were 
considered goldilocks voters for Labour, were not the same individuals who were considered 
to be goldilocks voters for the Conservatives. Positive changes in leadership evaluations 
during the campaign have a powerful effect in persuading goldilocks voters to move towards 
a party. Likewise, negative change in evaluations of rival party leaders has a noticeable effect 
in some of the models, while changes in partisanship over the campaign also have a strong 
effect on these voters’ eventual choices. The effect from rival party leaders was observed on 
goldilocks in voting for Labour and the Conservatives in 2017, with weaker effects from rival 
leaders found in the 2015 results. Comparing the effect of change in leadership evaluations 
in 2015 and 2017 was useful because of the distinctive differences in how leader evaluations 
changed at the aggregate level. While the 2015 campaign did not have the same dramatic 
storyline as 2017, changes in leadership evaluations continued to have strong effects for 
Conservative goldilocks voters but weaker effects for Labour.  
Calculating campaign effect categories led to some wider findings on the UK general 
election campaigns of 2015 and 2017. Findings suggested that the most stable vote was the 
Conservative vote in 2017, which exhibited the highest percentage of reinforcement effects 
from the four cases examined. Despite a campaign where there was little observable change 
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in evaluations or vote intention in 2015, 15% of the Conservative and Labour vote was 
considered to be from activation or conversion effects. Although, because effects were similar 
between the two parties, it resulted in little observable change at the aggregate level. In 
contrast, a third of Labour’s vote in 2017 came from activation or conversion effects, making 
the effects of the campaign highly observable. The case of Labour in 2017 illustrates that 
whilst conversion may be considered the holy grail of campaign effects, activation can be just 
as important (Erickson and Wlezien 2012). Nonetheless, the predominant effect of the 
campaign across all cases was reinforcement, reaffirming expectations from previous studies 
on US campaigns, that most voters’ pre-campaign vote choice remains consistent through to 
polling day (Wlezien and Erikson 2002).  
 
Explanations of the result in BBC election night broadcasts have moved party leaders from the 
periphery to the centre 
 Election night broadcasts have increasingly focussed upon party leaders to provide 
early explanations of election outcomes. Evaluations of party leader performance during the 
preceding campaign occupy a central role in BBC broadcasters’ attempts to explain electoral 
outcomes since 1987, especially when dramatic campaigns precede election night, or the 
election outcome was projected to be close. Broadcasters and politicians alike have a 
perception that either the campaign as a whole or specific campaign events could have had a 
decisive impact on the results. However, results presented in Chapter Five imply that changes 
in voters’ evaluations of party leaders during the campaign were unlikely to impact vote 
choice for the majority of voters. Furthermore, broadcast journalists and political colleagues 
identify leaders as a primary cause for why parties have won or lost an election. The tendency 
to examine how leaders contributed to the election result gives parties an opportunity to 
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maximise their political capital of party leaders, developing findings from previous studies 
that have highlighted how leaders gain from this coverage in the post-election environment 
(Cathcart 1997; Hale 1993; Mendelsohn 1998). Party leaders’ effect on the election outcome 
may be exaggerated during the broadcast, especially by politicians with obvious political 
interests. Endorsements or rejections of party leaders may become especially important with 
unexpected outcomes and close results, where the battle to control the election narrative 
becomes more important (Cowley and Kavanagh 2016, 2018; Kavanagh and Cowley 2010). 
This tendency was particularly evident among Conservative politicians in 2010 and 2015 to 
support their claims to have secured the legitimacy to govern, but also from some Labour 
politicians in 2017 arguing that Corbyn should continue as leader. 
 Coverage devoted to party leaders during election night broadcasts represents a 
transformation, from being minor features in the 1950s and 1960s, to defining them as key 
actors that results are framed around since the 1980s. Modern broadcast journalists mention 
party leaders mere seconds after the election night coverage has begun, placing them firmly 
in the centre of the unfolding narrative. The purpose of election night coverage has remained 
the same since its original conception (Crick 2018; Orr 2015) but there has been a clear 
development in the level of coverage centred on party leaders. Leaders are mentioned with 
increasing frequency and occupy a greater percentage of the opening hour of coverage. 
However, the overall focus on leaders has tailed off since 2001. Interest in leaders has been 
largely descriptive, especially during the 1980s and 1990s where the movements of individual 
leaders were reported on frequently. Discussion of leaders has since transitioned into more 
substantial questioning and more detailed debate about leaders in contemporary elections. 
After removing descriptive reporting of party leaders there has been a steady trend of greater 
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examination of leaders’ performance during the campaign, their traits and whether the result 
is ultimately their responsibility.  
The context and expectations for election results have an important effect for 
understanding leaders’ role in the outcome of elections and the level of attention given to 
leaders. From the 1992 election broadcast onwards, greater focus is placed on whether 
underperforming party leaders should stand down. The 2001 broadcast contains the greatest 
focus on leadership succession, because the result was (correctly) predicted to be a repeat of 
the 1997 landslide by the exit poll and broadcasters therefore chose to focus on William 
Hague’s future in detail. In contrast, the 2010 campaign which focused intently on the leaders 
of the three largest parties, attributed less focus on change in leadership because the 
projected result was the first hung parliament since February 1974. The dramatic campaign 
of the 2017 election and the reversal of fortunes for Theresa May, from looking likely to win 
a healthy majority to losing the slim majority she had, led to greater interest in leaders in the 
broadcast. From the 2001 broadcast onwards, there is a greater assumption from participants 
in the broadcast that leaders who oversee electoral failure will be replaced. More broadly, 
the trend of holding leaders individually responsible for the election result means that leaders 
are likely to only be given a single opportunity in persuading voters. Leaders are now more 
likely to be aware that they will be replaced if they are considered to have failed to deliver in 
elections. The findings presented in Chapter Four, that most voters’ evaluations of leaders 
are stable over time, provides good supporting evidence to justify the removal of party 
leaders if their party performs poorly.  
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Recommendations for Future Research 
In this section I outline seven recommendations for future research based on the 
findings presented in this thesis. My recommendations consider the theoretical, empirical 
and methodological points raised by the results presented in this thesis.  
My first suggestion is for regular data collection on voter evaluations of specific 
leadership traits. The British Election Study Internet Panel enabled several aspects of analysis 
in this thesis. However, when studying changes over time, I was limited to analysing the like-
dislike evaluations of party leaders. While like-dislike evaluations provide a powerful indicator 
of vote choice, confining examinations of leadership effects to this measure, is likely to 
conceal some of the nuances in leadership evaluations. While specific traits may have been 
highly correlated in the past (Clarke et al. 2009a), leading them to be dropped from British 
Election Study (BES) questionnaires, they may no longer be as highly correlated now or in the 
future. Previous research has indicated that the salience of leadership traits can fluctuate 
between elections (Evans and Andersen 2005), providing an additional reason to analyse 
individual-level changes in traits. The availability of such data would offer an opportunity to 
analyse the stability of these specific evaluations and whether new leadership has the same 
effect on specific traits as on general evaluations. Since November 2016, evaluations of 
leaders’ 'integrity’ and ‘competence’ have been included in some waves of the British Election 
Study Internet Panel. Although, as was the case with some predictor variables of interest in 
Chapter Four, ‘integrity’ and ‘competency’ are not recorded for every wave of the panel. 
Similarly, the irregularity in time between waves added further differences and caveats when 
comparing between models. This is no criticism of the BES, which deliberately structures 
waves around election events, but access to a source of data that is collected more regularly 
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would have added further consistency when drawing conclusions from the findings of 
empirical work. 
My second suggestion for future research is to reconsider party leader effects in previous 
campaigns. One potential leader to consider is Nick Clegg. Chapter Six highlighted how 
participants in election night broadcasts expected Nick Clegg’s campaign performance in 2010 
to translate into better results for the Liberal Democrats. While during the period of 
‘Cleggmania’, his approval ratings skyrocketed, this may not have been reflected in voters’ 
like-dislike evaluations of Clegg, as these evaluations were demonstrated to be fairly resilient 
to change when examined in a different time period in Chapter Four. Similar expectations 
were placed on Neil Kinnock on election night after his campaign performance in 1992. In 
other words, on the surface Clegg and Kinnock were seen to have performed well during their 
respective campaigns, but these performances were unlikely to change voters’ long-term 
evaluations distinctively. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile examining whether Clegg’s 
evaluations changed amongst voters who could have realistically been persuaded to vote 
Liberal Democrat in 2010. Establishing this baseline, as I did in Chapter Five for the 2015 and 
2017 general elections, distinguishes between voters who are already largely sympathetic to 
the party and those that switch because their opinions changed during the campaign. 
Additionally, the failure of Jeremy Corbyn to replicate Labour’s 2017 performance in 2019 
serves as another leader worthy of further research. Investigating how voters’ changed their 
evaluation of Jeremy Corbyn over the 2019 campaign and the effect of this change on vote 
choice would provide a significant point of comparison.  
The third recommendation for future research relates to relative leader effects. Findings 
in this thesis have shown that voters evaluate leaders relatively to their alternatives. As a 
result, there may be past instances where successful leaders may not have been particularly 
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appealing but were considered the clear favourite amongst the main alternatives. Applying 
some of the analytical techniques in this thesis on historical data could investigate relative 
assessments of past leaders. For instance, Tony Blair’s ratings stayed fairly high and were 
durable throughout his time in office, but he was competing against William Hague and Ian 
Duncan Smith for the majority of his time as Prime Minister. It raises the issue of whether 
Blair’s high ratings were reliant on poor evaluations of his Conservative rivals. Furthermore, 
results indicated that leaders of smaller political parties, beyond the Conservatives and 
Labour, were important to voters’ evaluations of party leaders. Therefore, third-party leaders 
may have been overlooked because of their importance in shaping how voters feel about the 
Conservative and Labour leaders. Perhaps these leaders are more important to the dynamics 
of voting during this period than previously thought. The appeal of Liberal, SDP, Alliance and 
Liberal Democrat leaders are consistently discussed in BBC election broadcasts since the 
1970s. In particular, Jeremy Thorpe may have been more important to the Wilson-Heath 
dynamic than he is credited with. Thorpe received significant attention during both 1974 
election broadcasts, where he is considered to have run a very successful campaign. 
Additionally, Paddy Ashdown could have been an important factor in the 1997 Labour 
landslide, helping facilitate the tactical voting that made the Labour landslide even larger.  
The fourth recommendation is that future research on leadership effects could take 
advantage of methodological developments that are utilised here. Chapter Five details a 
machine learning approach, using a LASSO regression, to investigate campaign effects for the 
two largest parties in the UK. However, the performance of this model was significantly 
weaker when attempts were made to apply this model to smaller parties. Initial models were 
very good at predicting who will not vote for smaller parties but unsuccessful in predicting 
those who will. The effect of leadership evaluations on the Liberal Democrat, UKIP and SNP 
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vote would have been of particular interest. Future research could consider other 
classification techniques, such as random forests, which could potentially perform better with 
the smaller proportion of respondents who vote for these parties. The interpretation of these 
models is more difficult than the LASSO regression selected in this thesis, which share 
similarities with standard statistical techniques. Analysing the effect of leadership evaluations 
and estimating campaign effects of reinforcement, activation and conversion for these parties 
would have not only investigated whether leader effects were important in these parties but 
would have enabled a comparative analysis between the two main parties and smaller 
parties.  
 Fifth, analysis in this thesis has shown that election night broadcasts are a valuable 
source of data, which could be utilised by researchers. Election night transcripts provided a 
unique aspect to examine how leaders are used in explaining election outcomes and how this 
trend develops over time. In addition to the spoken discussion about party leaders, election 
night broadcasts use visual images, graphics and charts relating to party leaders to aid their 
explanations throughout the night. For instance, it would be worthwhile investigating 
whether images of leaders have replaced party symbols over subsequent broadcasts. In the 
2019 BBC election night broadcast, images of Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn are front and 
centre in the coverage when the exit poll prediction is released. I considered this element 
somewhat because there is a natural link between the spoken discussion and visual images 
presented to viewers. However, concentrated investigation into the visual images of election 
broadcasts could add another layer of detail to the findings presented in this thesis. 
Sixth, there are a number of terms discussed by researchers that require more careful 
consideration in future. ‘Unsophisticated’ voters are theorised as being more susceptible to 
leadership effects, but I find little evidence to support these claims after factoring in 
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measurements of political efficacy to my analysis. The term holds little value because it is 
interpreted in different waves by scholars, who use a range of variables in an attempt to 
capture ‘sophistication’. Similarly, the terms ‘floating’ or ‘swing’ voters need careful caveats 
to be applied when discussing them in relation to campaign effects. As I demonstrate in the 
analysis there is a sizable number of these voters in the sample but voters who could be 
persuaded by Labour are distinctively different to those who could be persuaded by the 
Conservatives. Revised definitions of these terms, specifically about how these voters are 
theorised to respond to party leaders, would be a welcome addition. 
 My final suggestion relates to the significant opportunities that exist to analyse 
whether similar findings are found beyond the British context examined in this thesis. Much 
of the theoretical analysis about how voters evaluate leaders is based on a universal 
understanding of human psychology (Bittner 2014; Goffin and Olson 2011; Mughan 2015). 
Examinations of party leader effects in studies often include a comparative element, either in 
geographic region or between countries with similar political systems (Barisione 2009; 
Mughan 2015). Australia has been a frequent point of comparison with Britain for leadership 
effects because of the similarities between the political systems. However, Australian panel 
data that contains a similar number of waves to the BES is not yet available. While only a few 
countries’ national election studies currently have longitudinal data sets available, panel data 
is becoming increasingly common as internet panels become established. The BES has 
certainly continued its focus on its internet panel and the latest iteration has nineteen waves. 
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C89WQp6LJEA&t (Accessed 02 Apr 2018) 
The 1966 General Election: 2230 GMT - 2330 GMT 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYsnEYxQ4ZI&t (Accessed 02 Apr 2018)  
The 1966 General Election: 2330 GMT - 0030 GMT 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OipxPDhSUJk&t (Accessed 02 Apr 2018) 
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BBC Election 1992 (Accessed 1 June 2018) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4YY7KWJAtA  
 












BBC Election Coverage 2001 (Accessed 25/11/19) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-HGDplurdMQ&t=1s  
 
BBC Election Coverage 2005 (Accessed 25/11/19) 
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Research Methods Appendix 
1.1 Quantitative Analysis  
The quantitative analysis undertaken for this thesis utilises a range of methods to 
examine party leaders. All quantitative analysis was performed in RStudio and uses a range of 
‘packages’ to develop and model statistical data. Advantages of using R in contrast to other 
statistical programs such as SPSS and STATA are numerous, and I outline three advantages 
here. Firstly, R is open source and free to any researcher (non-expert or otherwise) with an 
internet connection, with basic functions enhanced by additional packages. Development of 
packages can come from the organisation itself or the wider community of users. 
Furthermore, regular updates to the software and packages keep pace with methodological 
developments. Secondly, the software was not developed specifically for social scientists but 
for the wider research community of varying disciplines. The result is a flexible program that 
can handle large amounts of different types of data and objects in a single environment. 
Lastly, the visualisation of data in R is superior to other programs, providing researchers with 
tools to convey their results to a variety of audiences by customising the figures produced. All 
graphs are produced by the popular ggplot2 package and model outputs are transformed into 
tables using Stargazer (Hlavac 2018). Throughout the thesis I chose the most appropriate 
statistical method for the area of research I was investigating. This means a range of statistical 
methods and models are used but were carefully selected based on the specifics of the 
hypotheses and the structure of available data. Throughout this thesis, I use descriptive 
statistics to provide an overview of the data before examining the results of more complex 
analysis. The descriptive statistics assist in understanding the structure of variables used in 
the analysis. In the remainder of this quantitative section, I provide a more detailed 
description of the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) data used in this thesis and 
then discuss each statistical method employed on this data. 
 
1.2 Structure of British Election Study Internet Panel Data 
Data used for quantitative analysis exclusively uses the British Election Study Internet 
Panel (BESIP) waves one to thirteen. The panel begins in February 2014 and fieldwork for 
wave thirteen finished in June 2017 (British Election Study 2018). Each wave of the data has 
approximately 30,000 respondents but the number of respondents who complete each wave 
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of the survey totals 5,300 (17.5% of respondents who originally took wave one). The 
uniqueness of the BESIP panel cannot be overstated. Most national election studies do not 
have a panel element, and those that do, are often limited to three or four waves. Only the 
German Election Study is comparable in the number of respondents and waves available 
(German Longitudinal Election Study 2017). Weights are provided for each individual wave as 
a cross-sectional study, in addition to panel weights that cover the entire thirteen waves or a 
subset of waves. There are a number of panel weights for respondents that complete a variety 
of waves and all possible waves. For example, one of the panel weights I utilise covers 
respondents who completed surveys immediately before, during the campaign and after the 
2015 General Election. The variety of weights available ensures that the largest sample of 
respondents are used in the analysis, whilst maintaining the representativeness of the data. 
For one point of cross-reference I use the 2005-2010 British Election Study panel which has 
similar characteristics but a fewer respondents and waves of the study.  
 Respondents within this sample are not randomly selected. In order to be selected, 
respondents must be signed up to YouGov’s access panel, which has over one million 
members (YouGov 2019). YouGov determines which individuals are sent the BES survey based 
on the information provided by the individual. This individual information is matched to 
population estimates with the purpose to achieve a representative sample. Not everyone in 
the UK population has a chance of being included in the online survey and those without 
internet access are automatically excluded (Fieldhouse and Prosser 2018). Nonprobability 
internet panels are known to differ from the underlying population researchers are 
attempting to examine (Hays, Liu, and Kapteyn 2015). Concern has been expressed about the 
usefulness of internet panels as Miller (2006) estimated that 30% of internet surveys are 
completed by 0.25% of the eligible population. Other researchers that conduct internet 
panels continue to randomly select respondents but individuals without internet access are 
provided with it by researchers for the purpose of completing the survey (Pollard and 
Mendelsohn 2016). This highlights how unrepresentative internet samples can be, though, 
there has been a rapid roll out of internet across the UK. The Office of National Statistics 
(2019) estimates that 93% of households in the UK have access to the internet, providing the 
opportunity for more people to participate in online studies. Due to the constraints of 
internet sampling, it is important that weights are applied to respondents before analysing 
results. Data gathered by internet panels can be extremely useful when analysing individual-
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level change over time and does so in a cost effective way (Fieldhouse and Prosser 2018). 
Given that several hypotheses in this thesis examine individual level change, BESIP data is 
highly appropriate to use and facilitates the analysis of sub-groups through the large sample.  
 
1.3 Path Models 
During Chapter Four I use path models using the Lavaan (Latent Variable Analysis) 
package in R (Rosseel 2018). Path analysis is a type of structural equation model (SEM) 
originally developed for cross-sectional data but is adaptable for use on individual level data 
collected over time (Singer and Willett 2003). In Chapter Four path analysis is used to assess 
the stability of leader evaluations across the panel. Path models allow researchers to examine 
the effect of variables between discrete time periods, whilst also controlling for other 
variables. This technique is effective for examining the stability of individual leadership 
evaluations over time. Following this model enables researchers to calculate the indirect 
effects of variables in the model whilst controlling for confounding variables. Indirect effects 
are the effect of an independent variable (x), through a mediator variable (m), on the 
dependent variable (y). An example visualisation of how indirect and direct effects work is 
presented in Figure A1. Indirect effects are estimated by multiplying the coefficients between 
variables. Adding the indirect scores to the direct score creates the total effect. Calculating 
the indirect effects of leadership evaluations provides the option of evaluating the total effect 
of each variable and understanding the ‘full’ effect of variables from previous waves. 
Estimating the effects of each variable this way provides a more complete understanding of 
long-term effects from previous leadership evaluations. Indirect effects can only be calculated 
with a mediating variable included. Providing the total effect of coefficients provides a 








Research Methods Appendix Figure A1: Visualisation of Indirect and Direct Effects in Path 
Models  
 
In contrast to standard regression techniques, the order of the independent and 
dependent variables cannot be reversed because there is a temporal logic to their ordering. 
For example, in this study, it does not make sense for future leadership evaluations to predict 
previous leadership evaluations. Path models are commonly used in psychological studies to 
examine the indirect or mediated effects of particular variables on a dependent variable 
(Holahan and Holahan 1987; Marsh 1990; Streiner 2005). In election studies, investigations 
relating to political efficacy have employed path models. McPherson, Welch and Clark (1977) 
have used path analysis to test the stability of political efficacy responses between two waves 
of the American National Election Study. Additionally, Finkel (1985) uses path analysis to 
study the causal effects of political efficacy on political participation. Path models are a long-
standing statistical technique and are effective in measuring the relationship between 
variables over time in a clear way. 
 
1.4 Multilevel Models and Hierarchical Models 
Multilevel models (MLMs) are used to provide a comprehensive model to analyse 
different levels of the data. A classic example of a data structure with multiple levels is medical 
data. Each patient (level one) is treated by a doctor (level two) who works within a hospital 
(level three). Failure to account for which doctor treated the patients or the specifics of the 























between each doctor or hospital. For this study, time and individual evaluations of leaders 
are treated as two different levels of the data. Leadership evaluations are made by 
respondents but each of these is nested within a discrete time frame, dictated by the 
fieldwork dates of the wave. Steele (2008) outlines that by viewing longitudinal data as a 
multilevel structure, researchers can take advantage of these advanced statistical methods in 
addressing research questions. MLMs are conventionally used to answer questions about 
within-person change at one level and between person change at a second level (Singer and 
Willett 2003). Employing a multilevel model on the BESIP data enables the analysis of wave 
level variables and individual level variables simultaneously for a comprehensive analytical 
model. MLMs have been used previously on BES panel data in studies that estimate how likely 
voters are to change vote choice over the electoral cycle (Ferrao Barbosa and Goldstein 2000; 
Yang, Goldstein, and Heath 2000). Furthermore, Andersen, Yang and Heath (2005) use MLMs 
to examine the effect of social class on vote choice at the individual-level, constituency-level 
and over time, concluding that the shrinking size of the working class has reduced the salience 
of social class in explaining voter behaviour. Critically, through using MLMs, researchers have 
the ability to ‘combine multiple levels of analysis in a single comprehensive model’ 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219). This was my objective in creating a single model that 
could examine each variable of interest. 
It is particularly important to use multilevel models instead of conventional regression 
models with panel data because linear models assume that all observations are independent. 
Panel data, by its very design, has inter-dependent observations because it contains repeated 
measures from the same individuals (Bell and Jones 2015). Examining within person change 
over a turbulent period provides insights into how leader evaluations develop. To account for 
the interdependence of observations, random effects are introduced for each individual 
leading the model to assume a different intercept for each respondent. Standard errors will 
be incorrect if dependence between individual evaluations is not accounted for (Bell and 
Jones 2015; Persson 2012). MLMs deal with the hierarchical nature of data, enabling 
predictors at different levels in the analysis to be modelled correctly on the dependent 
variable (Johnston et al. 2005; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Moreover, Collignon and 
Sajuria’s (2018) study of regional identification and preference for local candidates illustrate 
how MLMs can test causality between the different levels of observed data. Though my 
analysis does not focus on interactions between different levels of the model, interactions 
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between individual-level variables are introduced to the model. Examining interaction effects 
provides an understanding of the conditionality of particular variables   ̶ in this case examining 
change in individual evaluations of different leaders. 
MLM statistical analysis was completed in RStudio using the lme4 (Bates et al. 2015) 
and lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, and Christensen 2017) packages. A separate MLM is 
constructed for change in evaluations of each main party leader. Following some initial 
diagnostic testing that indicated a non-normal distribution of residuals, a log-transformation 
of the variable was computed to satisfy this condition of linearity in the model. Residual 
plotting indicated a normal distribution following the transformation of the variable. 
Transforming the variable for party leader change also alters the interpretation of the model 
because the values are much lower than the 0-10 scale of the original variable. The logarithm 
of party leader change ranges from 0-2.38, so while in some circumstances the coefficients 
and intercepts appear small, this is a reflection of the new numeric range of the variable.  
 
1.5 Machine Learning Approach 
The predictive models in Chapter Five use machine learning (ML) methodology. Here 
I provide an overview of ML and describe how I utilise this approach. In addition to providing 
a robust process of prediction, ML methods can be used for investigating causal effects (Baćak 
and Kennedy 2019). While some critics have assumed machine-learning to involve computer 
algorithms working at random, this is far from the reality and require the expertise of 
researchers to construct successful models (Boelaert and Ollion 2018). Generally, the ML 
process can be understood in three steps: data input, abstraction and generalisation (Lantz 
2015). The data input stage requires raw data, a range of observations and variables. 
Abstraction occurs when this raw data is summarised through a statistical technique, such as 
regression, random forest or K-nearest neighbour. The generalisation occurs through turning 
the abstracted knowledge to a wider action on new data. Many standard quantitative 
methods can be recognised within ML approaches but what differentiates ML is that a 
computer can ‘learn’ from an experience and utilize it (Boelaert and Ollion 2018; Lantz 2015). 
 It is important to remember that conventional statistical methods were designed 
during a time when researchers were limited by relatively small random samples of their 
population of interest. However, this situation contrasts to the current environment, where 
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many researchers are ‘drowning in the rising tide of large, non-random and dirty datasets’ 
(Boelaert and Ollion 2018, 3–4). Some researchers continue to deal with small random 
samples, but the availability of quality data is no limitation to this thesis. With a large and 
representative sample, I split the original BESIP data set into a training set and a testing set. 
This is a key difference that separates conventional methods from ML methods, especially 
when dealing with regression models. Naturally, many researchers would be hesitant to split 
their data, especially if they are working with a small sample. However, Hindman (2015) 
suggests that applying ML techniques to smaller samples provide the biggest gains compared 
to datasets with millions of observations. 
Machine learning has many benefits compared to conventional statistical techniques in 
the social sciences. By constructing the model on a separate sample of data and then applying 
it to previously unseen data, it ensures findings are generalisable beyond the observations 
that inform it and prevents models being overfitted to the available data (Hindman 2015). 
There are considerable opportunities to cross-validate the findings by randomizing different 
sections of the data and running the model again to assess the reliability of the findings. Cross-
validation increases the reliability of findings by evaluating the variation between different 
iterations of the model. In addition, advocates of machine learning have pointed to ‘super 
learner’ or ‘ensemble’ approaches that combine a range of machine learning algorithms. 
These techniques involve taking several prediction methods based on the structure of the 
data and examining which has the highest performance (Baćak and Kennedy 2019). There is 
less emphasis on diagnostic values such as p-values, R2, AIC & BIC as tests of reliability and 
the interpretation of coefficients. Instead the universal criterion for model quality is the 
accuracy of predictions. In other words, the better predictions from the model, the better the 
model. 
The development and acceptance of ML methods within political science is still 
growing but similarities are found between ML and conventional methods, meaning they 
remain accessible to those who know little about the specific methodology. Figure A2 
provides a ‘walk through’ of my ML approach with additional details at each stage. Firstly, I 
randomly split respondents in the sample into either being in the training set or the testing 
set. I construct a model of pre-campaign variables to predict reported vote intention after the 
campaign and apply this to the training set using LASSO regression (discussed below). The 
effects of variables in the model provide the information for making a prediction about how 
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an individual’s vote choice in the test data, based on the individual’s recorded responses for 
the same set of variables. These predicted values are then compared against the actual results 
for vote choice in the post-election wave to determine the accuracy of predictions. I 
randomise and repeat these steps a hundred times to cross-validate the findings between 
iterations. Coefficients are also examined at this stage to analyse the strength and direction 
of each variable in the model. More specific information relating to the data is reported within 
the chapter itself. ML analysis is conducted entirely in R using a variety of packages to model 
and analyse the data but primarily the glmnet (Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani 2010) and 
tidyverse packages. This approach provides several advantages but, most importantly, allows 
for hundreds of models to be run simultaneously in a single command and subsequently 





















•Beginning with the raw British Election Study lnternet Panel, the data is cleaned.
Identify 
Features
•Features of interest are identified after intital exploratory analysis.
•Dependent and independent variables are identified.
•Variables standardised if appropriate and dataset is ready to be split.
Split Data
•The full dataset is split into a Train and Test set.
•Respondents are randomly selected to be placed in either the Train or Test data set.
•Train set comprises 75% of the sample with the following 25% in the Test set.
Train an 
Algorithm
•A regression formula is used on the Train data using the LASSO method to estimate 
the effects of variables on vote intention.




•The Train model now has the information to try and predict vote intention in the 
Test set. 




•Every respondent in the Test set and the Train set now has their predicted vote 
intention and their actual vote intention.
•Correct predictions can be scored to see how effective the model is.
Cross-
Validate
•Results are then crossvalidated by returing to split the data stage and re-
randomizing respondents into test and train sets. 
•Accuracy can then be recorded to see how much predictive scores vary. 
•This process is repeated 100 times. 
 257 
1.6 LASSO Regression 
Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) regression is a form of 
penalised regression that is used to train the data in the machine learning process in Chapter 
Five. LASSO regression is similar to OLS regression in many regards, with additional constraints 
for model coefficients that assesses the importance of each variable (Tibshirani 1996). There 
are three advantages in using LASSO rather than standard regression approaches found in 
previous studies that study campaign effects and vote choice. Firstly, LASSO shrinks variables 
that have negligible effects to exactly to zero. Thus, these models avoid the pitfall of 
overfitting the model with variables that would have minimal or even no effect outside of the 
sample. Secondly, LASSO models produce parsimonious models. Constructing statistical 
models that are simple but explain the majority of variation in dependent variables and make 
accurate predictions. Thirdly, it avoids the ‘pet variable problem’ of researchers claiming their 
variable of interest is marginally statistically significant in one ‘traditional’ regression model. 
Due to the penalisation in the model and cross-validation process questionable ‘pet variables’ 
are likely to be eliminated (Andrews 2019). Greater focus is given to how additional variables 
add to the predictive accuracy of the model rather than explaining variation (Hindman 2015). 
Combined with machine learning, training and testing a LASSO regression model allows 
thorough cross-validation of the results and allows the model to be tested on data that were 
not involved when constructing the model. Again, this helps ensure that the model is not 
overfitted to the sample data. Methodological advantages, the availability of the data and the 
desire to make predictions about the data provide a comprehensive argument for using 
binomial LASSO regression in predicting vote choice and studying campaign effects. 
 
1.7 Limitations of Quantitative Data  
All data sources, particularly secondary sources, have limitations for researchers and 
the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) is no exception. Inconsistency in time 
between fieldwork dates provides a notable challenge for data analysis. This is particularly 
problematic when the research is focused on measuring change because the length of time 
may be influential in how much evaluations have changed. For example, fieldwork for some 
waves begins immediately after the last day of the previous wave, while in other cases there 
is an eleven-month gap before data for the next wave is collected (British Election Study 
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2018). Thus, the inconsistency in data gathering could influence the results and while the 
fieldwork dates cannot be changed it is important to be aware of the limitations they impose. 
The context of each wave is also an important consideration because this too could be 
influential in the extent to which opinions and evaluations change. As the British Election 
Study is a national election study, fieldwork mostly centred around significant electoral 
events. These electoral events are: the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, the 2015 
UK General Election, the 2016 Devolved Elections, the 2016 EU Referendum and the 2017 UK 
General Election. Three separate waves were dedicated to the main national electoral events 
in this period: the 2015 General Election, the 2016 EU Referendum and the 2017 UK General 
Election. The context of each wave was another mitigating factor to consider during the 
analysis and this was investigated and modelled during Chapter Four.  
Another challenge presented by using a secondary data source was the availability of 
relevant variables. As outlined in the methodology section of the thesis, the BESIP contains 
only one question included in all thirteen waves of the panel that asks respondents to 
explicitly evaluate leaders. Previous research has illustrated the effectiveness of this variable 
in capturing summaries of various leadership traits (Clarke et al. 2009a; Evans and Andersen 
2005) but the absence of other questions limited my ability to analyse the specific traits of 
leaders in more detail. Most questions in the panel are not asked for all thirteen waves of the 
study, meaning that predictor variable selection was somewhat limited by missing data 
(British Election Study 2018). Where variables are not available for the full thirteen waves of 
the data and therefore cannot constitute a time-varying variable inputted into the model, I 
aggregate the available data to create time-constant variables. For example, measurements 
that capture whether voters find it difficult to understand are only available for seven waves 
of the data, so I calculate the mean figure for each individual. Though this is not ideal, it allows 
these variables to be included in analysis, and their effect to be considered. Using only time-
varying analysis would have constrained the options for analysis. Missing data is a common 
challenge for researchers, but I have made every attempt to mitigate its negative effect where 
possible. 
Using data with missing variables and where the question selection is outside the 
control of the researcher presents challenges but, ultimately, these challenges do not detract 
from the possibilities offered by this dataset. The availability of high-quality survey data 
cannot be understated for the possibility of this research to be undertaken. Sample sizes in 
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the British Election Study could not be replicated or furthered by the resources available to a 
doctoral student. The same would be true of any representative cross-sectional study, let 
alone a multi-wave longitudinal study. The ability to generalise findings to the wider 
population provides a specific incentive for using this British Election Study data. In short, 
British Election Study data is imperfect but through managing its limitations, it becomes a 
powerful resource which is utilised throughout this thesis. 
 
2. Variable Selection and Manipulation 
 Variables were selected from the BESIP that were directly or indirectly related to the 
hypotheses outlined in the methodology. Each variable was cleaned to remove ‘don’t know’ 
or NA responses and standardised where necessary. Some variables are long-standing 
inclusions in the BES questionnaire, such as questions about party identification. Others are 
more recent inclusions, such as whether respondents find it difficult to understand politics. A 
full list of the original variables used is available in section 2.1. As outlined above, other 
variables are missing from specific waves. In order to use variables central to hypothesis 
testing, a level of flexibility was required when using the data. New variables were also 
created from the information available. A full list of new variables is presented in 2.2. A 
substantial focus of this thesis is on individual-level change, meaning that additional variables 
needed to be calculated from the available variables and these are outlined in section 3.3. 
 
2.1 List of BESIP explanatory variables used in Quantitative Analysis 
 Table 2A provides the variables that are used in this thesis and the original question 
asked in the British Election Study survey (British Election Study 2018). These variables are 
only cleaned or standardised when included in the analysis. 
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 Research Methods Appendix Table 2A: Key Variables Used in Quantitative Models 
Variable Name Question 
Leader Evaluation How much do you like or dislike each of the following 
party leaders… (Scale 0-10) 
Party Identification Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, 
Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what? 
Strength of Party 
Identification 
Would you call yourself very strong, fairly strong, or not 
very strong *insert party*? 
Level of Education What is the highest educational or work-related 
qualification you have? 
Vote intention (choice in 
post-election waves) 
And if there were a UK General Election tomorrow, which 
party would you vote for? 
Likelihood Party X will win in 
your constituency 
How likely is it that each of these parties will win the 
General Election in your local constituency? (Scale 0-100) 
Social Grade NRS Social Grade (A, B, C1, C2, D, E) 
Age How old are you? 
 
2.2 List of new variables created for Quantitative Analysis 
 Missing variables in the dataset created challenges but these were mediated through 
the creation of new variables that were incorporated into the analysis. Time-constant 
variables were created where there were missing variables for each wave. In addition, binary 
variables were created based on the wave information to capture the effects of particular 
types of wave. A list of the new variables created, along with a brief description is presented 










Research Methods Appendix Table 2B: New Variables Created for Statistical Analysis 
Variable Name Details 
Leadership Change 
Wave 
Binary variables used to test the effect of specific waves on change 
in leadership evaluations. The ConservativeLeadershipChange 
variable records Conservative and UKIP leadership change, wave 
ten is given a score of 1 with all other waves assigned a 0. 
LabLeadershipChange records Labour and Liberal Democrat 
leadership change as they occur in the same wave, which is wave 
seven and assigned a score of 1. 
Campaign Wave A binary variable used to indicate whether the wave takes place 
during a general election campaign. A score of 1 is given to waves 
five and twelve for the 2015 and 2017 general elections. 
Change in Party 
Identification 
This is another variable that records change in party identification 
between panel waves. This is a binary variable that records whether 
the respondent identifies with the same party as the previous wave. 
Responses coded as 1 indicate that the respondent has changed 
their party identification from the previous wave, with responses 




Measures the number of correct answers for individual respondents 
when answering built-in general knowledge questions. Respondents 
are asked to match incumbents to their political position and are 
awarded a score of 1 point for correct answers. A total of nine 
questions are used, meaning that responses range from 0-9. This 
variable is time constant as these questions are not asked 
throughout the panel. Respondents match the following politicians: 
Angela Merkel, John Kerry, François Hollande, Vladimir Putin, 
Benjamin Netanyahu, John Bercow, Bashar al-Assad, Theresa May 
(when she is Home Secretary) and the respondent’s local MP. 
Political efficacy 
(median) 
A time constant variable that measures the respondent’s median 
response to the original question ‘It is often difficult for me to 
understand what is going on in government and politics’. Responses 
range from 1-5 on a scale, from strongly disagree at 1 to strongly 
agree at 5. The median response of the respondent is taken from 






Time-constant variable that records the respondent’s most 
common response to using television as a source of political 
information. This variable uses the seven recorded responses in the 
panel to find the most common response. Responses remain on the 
same 1-5 scale that is found in the BESIP. With 1 - indicating that 
respondents don’t watch political content on television. 2 - the 
respondent watched less than an hour. 3 - half an hour to one hour. 
4 - one to two hours a day. 5 - indicates that they watched over two 




A new variable that combines party identification and strength of 
party identification. It is calculated for each party separately; 
Labour is used here as an example.  
The variable is scaled from -3 – 3. A value of positive three indicates 
a very strong Labour supporter. A value of minus three indicates a 
very strong supporter of any other political party. Those without 
party identification are placed at 0.  
 
2.3 Calculating individual-level change 
Changes in attitudes and evaluations between different waves of data collection are a 
substantial focus of this thesis. Often, focus is placed on change in evaluations of leaders and 
this is the dependent variable for Chapter Four, though change in other variables such as 
strength of party identification, is also calculated. To calculate change variables the following 
process was followed. Values for the previous wave were subtracted from the ‘current’ wave 
(i.e. W2 – W1) for each individual respondent in the sample. The result is a variable that can 
have both positive and negative values, reflecting the original range of values. This is what is 
referred to as a ‘change’ variable throughout the thesis. Change variables require two 
timepoints to be calculated, so are unavailable for the first wave of the panel. In some 
analyses where the direction of change is not of primary interest, but the magnitude of 
change is. Where it is desired absolute values of change variables are calculated, returning 
responses back to their original value range. 
Change variables are calculated for the following leadership evaluations: Labour, 
Conservative, Liberal Democrat and UKIP. New values range from -10 – 10. Two measures of 
change in party identification are used in this thesis. In Chapter Four, a simple binary variable 
is produced to measure whether a respondent changes their party identification from a 
categorical variable. A value of 1 indicates that the respondent has changed their party 
identification from the previous wave, with 0 describing no change in party identification. In 
Chapter Five, change in party identification is measured using the scaled variables described 
above. This change measure not only includes the party identification but also the strength 
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of party identification. A list of the new change variables created, along with a brief 
description is presented in Table 2C. 
 
Research Methods Appendix Table 2C: New ‘Change’ Variables Created for Statistical 
Analysis 
Variable Name Details 
Change in Leadership 
Evaluation 
Changes in leadership evaluations are calculated for Labour, 
Conservative, Liberal Democrat and UKIP leaders for each 
wave. 
Change in Party 
Identification Scale 
Changes to party identification (scale) are calculated for 
Labour and Conservative only. Changes potentially range 
from -6 – 6. 
Change in Chance of 
‘Party X’ winning in 
Respondents 
Constituency 
Changes in chance of ‘party x’ winning the constituency are 
calculated for the Labour and Conservative parties. The 
original variable is scored on 0-100, meaning that the new 
variable has a potential range of -100 -100.  
 
3.1 Qualitative Data Collection 
Qualitative data used in this thesis is a collection of BBC Election Night transcripts 
(ENTs) from 1955-2017. I compiled seventeen ENTs in total, every election since 1955, to 
investigate the changing role of party leaders at a macro-level. Though the first broadcast of 
British election results was transmitted for the 1951 UK General Election, no recordings have 
survived. Compiling textual data ‘by hand’ would be highly costly from either a monetary or 
time perspective. The ability to ‘scrape’ or ‘mine’ data from the internet is recognised in the 
social sciences as an effective tool for efficiently gathering substantial amounts of qualitative 
data. In the majority of cases in the social sciences this involves mining participant 
interactions on social media or public forums (Hewson and Stewart 2016). Previous studies, 
such as Wiedemann’s (2016) study of democratic discourse in German Newspapers, have 
demonstrated the capabilities of data or text mining with other technological developments, 
such as machine-learning, analysing substantial amounts of qualitative data using a learnt 
algorithm. Moreover, data mined from twitter has become widely used in political science 
with some studies analysing over thirteen million tweets (Burnap et al. 2016; Fincham 2019). 
I use seventeen different transcripts, compiling a total of over 1.2 million words which enables 
research into an underutilised aspect of UK elections. As outlined in the literature review, 
election night coverage has been largely omitted from research due to a general 
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acknowledgement in the difficulties of compiling masses of data. While the ENTs are 
secondary data there is a notable level of originality in using this type and the quantity of 
data. Previous research using this type of data has restricted analysis to one or two elections 
or only using sections of the broadcast (Lauerbach 2013; Marriott 2000; Schieß 2007).  
I utilised automatically generated transcripts from three sources to enable a long-term 
analysis of UK election coverage to analyse trends over a substantial period of time. Textual 
data was mined from YouTube, C-Span and Box of Broadcasts. YouTube broadcasts are 
uploaded by regular users with no transcript. YouTube technology generates transcripts of 
the majority of videos on its site through automatic-speech recognition technology, providing 
the user that uploaded the content has selected this option (YouTube 2018). Accessing the 
transcript of a particular YouTube video requires some searching around the YouTube 
interface but is a feature common to most videos. Numerous users have uploaded segments 
of election night coverage to YouTube, allowing textual data to be extracted and compiled 
into complete transcripts. The mined data collected did not create perfect transcripts as some 
videos did not contain a transcript or there were missing parts of the broadcast due to 
copyright issues. Soon after I had extracted transcripts, a user who had uploaded a number 
of election night broadcasts, deleted the uploads citing concerns over new copyright laws by 
the EU, but broadcasts could still be found on C-Span or Box of Broadcasts. Using this process 
to compile the transcripts provided the majority of data but led to noticeable amounts of 
omitted text. Smaller sections of missing data were transcribed manually by me, while two 
larger sections, totalling approximately five hours were professionally transcribed by ‘Way 
With Words’. Transcripts of the 2015 and 2017 UK General Elections were taken from ‘Box of 
Broadcasts’ who compile the subtitles used in the broadcasts to produce full transcripts. Box 
of Broadcast transcripts had the advantage of already being compiled into a single section of 
text because these transcripts are compiled from the subtitles from their original broadcast. 
While Box of Broadcasts has a video library of all of the previous election broadcasts it only 
had transcripts for the recent 2015 and 2017 elections. C-Span was used for the 2005 
transcript and had transcripts of similar quality to YouTube.  
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3.2 Qualitative Data Structure 
While there have certainly been technological advancements in the time period 
covered, the structure of BBC election night broadcasts has remained broadly similar. 
Programmes have a small number of primary contributors in the BBC studio, a wider range of 
secondary reporters in various locations across the UK, with a variety of political figures 
interviewed for comment and initial analysis on individual results and overall results. There 
are two significant structural changes in the broadcasts over time. The most notable change 
is the attempt to predict the outcome of the election using survey data gathered during 
polling day. While these techniques have changed and developed in sophistication over 
subsequent years, the first proto-exit poll was carried out for the October 1974 election. In 
1992 the BBC described the data collected as an exit poll for the first time. Exit polls have a 
considerable framing effect on the narrative during the coverage but have had varying 
degrees of accuracy (Wilks-Heeg and Andersen 2020).  
The second notable change to the format of election night is the amount of coverage. 
In 2017 BBC coverage began at 9:55pm on June 7th and dedicated coverage to the election 
results continued well into the late morning and early afternoon of the 8th of June. This is a 
considerable increase from the three hours dedicated to the 1955 results. In other elections 
coverage stops at night and resumes in the morning. To counter differences in time of 
coverage I employ the “Dimbleby rule”: the transcript ends when the original anchor, 
normally a Dimbleby, leaves the programme. David Dimbleby is a BBC journalist and 
broadcaster who has been the main presenter of every election night since 1979 and before 
this he was a constituency reporter. His father Richard Dimbleby also presented coverage of 
the election results during the 1960s, and as a consequence the name has almost become 
synonymous with election night programmes. The Dimbleby rule is designed to ensure a level 
of consistency between election nights that naturally vary in length. In recent elections, such 
as the 2015 and 2017 election, coverage essentially rolls into the morning news. The 
departure of the main anchor from the studio normally coincides neatly around 6am. In 
earlier elections where broadcasts end and resume with a morning section, only the over-
night section data is collected. Differences in the length coverage are stark between the first 
and last elections, demonstrating the incremental change over time.  
 Despite these changes, there is substantial continuity between elections, with the 
format of each election broadcast being extremely similar to the one that precedes or 
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succeeds it. The anchor of the evening who ,as previously indicated is normally a Dimbleby, is 
accompanied by several broadcast journalists or political experts who provide analysis 
throughout the night. Academics are important contributors on election night. Professor 
David Butler was a long-term contributor to early election broadcasts (Crick 2018). More 
recently, Professor Sir John Curtice has achieved an elevated position during broadcasts and 
knighted in part for his work on the exit poll and explaining results to the public (BBC News 
2017). A team of journalists are stationed at various politically significant counts such as 
marginal seats or ‘early declarers’. The continuity of the structure of election night broadcasts 
are best personified by some of the features in the programme, such as the ‘swingometer’ 
and presence of either David or Richard Dimbleby at the helm of proceedings. The 
consistencies in the broadcasts enable a comparative analysis of trends relating to party 
leaders from 1955 to 2017.  
 
3.3 Qualitative Data Limitations 
There were numerous limitations and challenges with the collection of broadcast data 
and analysis. Firstly, while the raw textual data was relatively easy to gather using the various 
techniques outlined above, automated transcripts do not produce perfect replications of the 
data, but rather an excellent starting basis. Repeated inaccuracies in spelling and in word 
choice were common. Rapid speech, phonetic reduction and speaking style are all likely to 
affect the word error rates of automated systems of transcription (Novotney and Callison-
Burch 2010). YouTube itself recognises the limitations with its automatically generated 
captions, which form the transcripts for videos. Sound quality, complexity of speech and 
language that the software does not recognise affect the accuracy of the transcript (YouTube 
2018). As professional broadcast coverage, the sound quality is typically high quality, in 
contrast to many amateur videos that are uploaded to YouTube. Moreover, there is greater 
recognition that YouTube’s auto-generated transcripts are improving in word accuracy 
through developing their acoustic models (Liao, McDermott, and Senior 2013). 
Another difficulty arises because broadcasts are live and thus fairly unscripted. As a 
result, individuals often talk over each other, especially during heated debates between rival 
politicians. Automated transcription struggles to deal with this complication in the broadcast 
and this is reflected in the raw data with confusing phrasing and sentences. Cleaning the 
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textual data surrounding the discussion of party leaders was nonetheless a necessary step to 
ensure that analyses such as word frequencies produced valid results. Focusing on data 
relating to party leaders within the transcripts prevents the unnecessary and time-consuming 
task of cleaning the entirety of the dataset, considering the breath of the data and volume of 
words. To clean the transcripts, I watched each election night program to cross-validate the 
data and correct any mistakes in the transcript. This ensured perfect accuracy around sections 
of particular interest to ensure there is no misinterpretation in the findings and ensure that 
relevant sections were not overlooked. The first hour of each transcript is a complete 
verbatim copy of each broadcast to ensure accuracy when comparing between elections. 
A further limitation of the automated speech technology used on YouTube is that it is 
not sophisticated enough to differentiate between different speakers. This limitation had the 
potential to cause some issues in correctly coding sections of the data by misidentifying 
participants in the coverage. More importantly, understanding which actors were speaking at 
what points was of central interest to the research. This limitation was addressed in two ways. 
First, as is convention in live news broadcasts, the guests and reporters are introduced by the 
presenters or reporters, giving some indication of who was speaking at what time, allowing 
the identification of individuals. Additionally, as transcripts were time stamped, cross-
referencing with the original video was an easy task that eliminated uncertainty. Considering 
the low-cost of collection of these data and the research opportunities it facilitated, using 
imperfect but selectively cleaned transcripts was an inevitable compromise for the research. 
Through focusing the analysis on the audio section of broadcasts, there is little 
appreciation of the visual elements of election night which is an equally important aspect of 
the coverage. As there is at least some literature regarding the visual elements of UK election 
night (Marriott 2000; Schieß 2007) this study provides a textual analysis. The visual 
prominence of party leaders during election campaigns has been widely documented but no 
study has analysed how leaders are used by broadcasters in election night coverage. Ideally 
this research would have expanded to coverage from a range of broadcasters, considering 
that the BBC, ITV and Sky produce their own coverage. Comparing these programs at the 
same election and over time would have yielded interesting research data to provide 
triangulation of results between different data sources. To keep the research ambitious and 
realistic, only BBC coverage is analysed. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the BBC have 
the longest running coverage of election night results since 1955, facilitating analysis over the 
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longest time period. ITV launched as a channel in 1955 and Sky News much more recently in 
1989. Secondly, in pragmatic terms, BBC general election coverage is repeated on BBC 
Parliament providing myself with opportunities to check the transcripts against high-quality 
coverage that is uploaded to BBC iPlayer. Lastly, BBC coverage is also the most watched 
coverage in comparison to other broadcasters (Press Gazette 2017; The Guardian 2015). 
These reasons provide a clear justification for exclusively using BBC coverage but 
acknowledges potential benefits of including coverage from other broadcasters. 
  
3.4 Coding Approach and Analysis 
The findings presented in Chapter Six provide a thematic analysis of ENTs. To 
synthesise the substantial content and complexity of the ENTs coding the data was a 
necessary research tool (Bazeley and Jackson 2013). Codes were developed inductively by 
examining a subset of four transcripts (1959, October 1974, 1997 and 2017) to provide a 
preliminary understanding of the data and develop initial codes to analyse the remaining 
data. Following preliminary analysis, the first version of the coding hierarchy was created, 
with codes remaining fluid throughout analysis. The structure of the codes was re-developed 
as each transcript was analysed with the final structure outlined below in Figure C3.  
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Research Methods Appendix Figure C3: Coding Hierarchy 
 
A combination of descriptive, attitudinal and explanative codes is used in the analysis. 
Sections of the data were coded simultaneously, meaning that several codes could apply to 
one section of text (Saldana 2012). This facilitated multileveled analysis of the data, necessary 
to investigate the hypothesis and sub-hypotheses of this thesis. Understanding which actors 
involved in election night was important to the research aims of the analysis. The coding 
hierarchy was refined several times throughout the process, a practise that is necessary to 
produce fully explanative codes (Bryman 2016). Rubin and Rubin (1995; 239) emphasise the 
importance of flexibility in the coding structure to ensure that data is not coerced into a rigid 
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coding system. Flexibility of coding is exemplified in Figure C3 with a group of election specific 
codes that relate to a specific issue or context relating to a single election. The final coding 
structure incorporates terminology from the existing literature on party leaders in the UK, to 
assist in bridging codes into themes and concepts. The final codebook above provides full 
details of each individual code. Below, Figure C4 displays the five main themes discussed in 
Chapter Six. Each of these themes was developed and abstracted from the various codes 
detailed above in Figure C3. Each of these themes directly address research questions and 
sub-hypotheses set out in the methodology section of the thesis, as is outlined in the main 
chapter. Here I provide some further details on how each theme was developed from each of 
the codes in the hierarchy.  
The first theme, increasing focus on leaders in elections, is used to describe the 
fundamental change in how much attention broadcasters give to party leaders on election 
night. Examining the number of questions about party leaders and frequency of mentions of 
party leaders help provide a picture of the transition. Dividing the discussion amongst leaders 
of different political parties gives a greater understanding of whether victors or losers are 
given more attention, overall and in specific elections. The style and framing of these 
questions look to have changed dramatically over time. Leadership and personality traits are 
recorded when specific elements of leaders are mentioned. Furthermore, I examine if leaders’ 
campaign performance is considered pivotal to the outcome of the election in modern 
broadcasts. The leadership succession and political capital theme is designed to capture data 
that relates election outcomes to the future. This can be both positive and negative but 
repeated questions about leadership succession often signify how broadcasters are ready to 
begin speculation on future leaders while the results are still coming in. On the other hand, 
results can bolster and provide authority to leaders whose parties have produced good 
performances. Blaming and praising leaders for election outcomes is a subtly different theme 
that looks for explicit or implicit attribution of the outcome to leaders. This is not done lightly 








Data coding and analysis was conducted in NVivo, a form of computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). While some critics believe using computer 
assisted software leads to an overquantifying of qualitative data, the benefits of managing 
the substantial amounts of data, organising codes and analytical queries in a single computer 
interface were highly beneficial to this study (Bazeley and Jackson 2013; Spencer et al. 2014). 
Documents, codes, memos and query results are all stored in relevant folders and subfolders, 
making switching between different aspects of the data easy. Silverman (2010) outlines the 
importance of the research convincing the reader that the themes identified in the findings 
are based on the entirety of the data. Presenting and visualising the thematic analysis is 
challenging but software can assist with this (Silverman 2014). In addition to descriptive 
statistics, NVivo can produce coding matrices to give concise overviews of coded data across 
multiple data sources, avoiding some of the generic frailties in qualitative research. NVivo 
provides tools to search data or run ‘queries’ where codes overlap, providing insights into the 
relationship between codes within the dataset (Saldana 2012). Retrieving data coded across 
seventeen transcripts that are coded by specified criteria into a results section demonstrates 
the capabilities of NVivo, an arduous task without the software.  
















Following the completion of coding the data, codes were abstracted into broader 
substantive themes. Thematically analysing the data was considered most appropriate to 
evaluate and identify macro-level trends within the data. The purpose of thematic analysis is 
to present and interpret sequences with the data, providing fundamental meaning of the data 
(Spencer et al. 2014). Furthermore, as the ENTs continue to have the same function, follow a 
similar format and are produced by the same television broadcasting company, analysing 
patterns across transcripts is an appropriate and achievable goal. The aim of the research, to 
analyse the discussion and presence of party leaders in election night broadcasts, naturally 
lends itself to a thematic approach. Thematic analysis is achieved through a reflective coding 
process that links codes together and constructs them into wider themes (Punch 2013). 
Criticism is levelled at researchers that fail to explicitly demonstrate how themes were 
identified from the data (Bryman 2016). The comprehensiveness of the coding structure with 
different levels of codes provides sufficient evidence for how themes were developed from 
the data. Additionally, it is important to recognise that this approach does not attempt to 
code the data in its entirety. Saldana (2012, 16) recognises that the majority of researchers, 
particularly those using secondary data, focus on the most salient portions of the data for 
‘intensive data analysis.’ As a result, data coding and analysis broadly centres on text relating 
to or involving party leaders in some description. Given the enormity of data there was ample 
justification for focusing on sections relating to party leaders. 
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3.5 Election Night Broadcast Codebook 
This section provides description of each individual code used to analyse BBC election 
night transcripts. As outlined above, the objective was to organise a substantial amount of 
textual data to gather insight from this original dataset. Here I make a purposeful distinction 
between analytical codes and descriptive codes that are layered to provide a richer analysis 
of the data. For example, ‘positive’, ‘competency’ and ‘Conservative leader’ provide a greater 
level of information, providing a context to which leaders are being evaluated by broadcasters 
and the type of comment that is being made. Codes are split into the following six areas: 
Election Specific Codes, Stylistic Codes, Framing of Discussion/content, Subject of Discussion, 
Leadership Codes and Attitude. Naturally, there are some parts of discussion that do not 
comfortably fit into any of the codes or are particularly noteworthy. In this instance an 
annotation is created, which can also be succinctly organised.  
 
Election Specific Codes 
Election specific codes are inductive codes developed when analysing a specific transcript. 
They relate to the unique events or contexts. These specific codes contain important 
information regarding the discussion of leadership and how analysis of party leaders is being 
framed by broadcasters.  
2017: May’s Personal decision to call a General Election 
This code is used in relation to comments or discussion regarding Theresa May’s personal 
decision to consult parliament and call an early general election. Discussion includes how the 
decision backfired substantially, she personally risked the small but stable majority and the 
understanding Theresa May needed her own personal mandate as Prime Minister. The 
emphasis on the election being solely her decision is notable.  
1992: The Enduring influence of Margaret Thatcher 
In the 1992 election transcript, the thoughts and comments of Margaret Thatcher are 
referenced substantially more than any other previous party leader. The broadcasters make 
a point to discuss her reaction to the incoming results as it becomes clearer and clearer that 
the Conservatives have won the election. Additionally, Thatcher is more than happy to give 




Stylistic codes are designed to capture changes in how party leaders, their role in the electoral 
process and their importance is presented and discussed. These codes attempt to establish 
whether discussion surrounding the electoral process has become more “presidentialised”. 
The codes are less focused on the specific comments of the broadcasters, concentrating on 
the language used by the broadcasters when discussing party leaders.  
“Presidentialisation” of Discussion 
The Presidentialisation code can be used in several instances when discussing the purpose or 
the outcome of the election. One example is when broadcasters use the name of Party leader 
interchangeably with the party itself, effectively portraying them to be the same. Similarly, 
this code is also used for when party leaders are discussed but under a parliamentary system 
the use of a party would be more appropriate. For example, ‘John 
Major over Neil Kinnock in the popular vote’. 
Step-by-step visual coverage of Leader 
This code is used when there is commentary regarding the movements of party leaders at 
various locations throughout election night. The data recorded by the code is often not very 
interesting in itself. However, the fact that the broadcasters clearly think it is important to 
follow the party leaders in such detail, especially when they offer no comment to journalists 
on election night.  
Leader ‘Ownership’ of Party 
This code records when leaders are understood as “owning” the political party that they lead. 
For example, Mrs May’s Conservative party. This gives some understanding on how the 
broadcasters frame the importance of part leaders and their control on the party they lead.  
Direct Interview with Party Leader 
This code identifies where there has been a direct interview with a party leader. The absence 
of this code from transcripts is as important as is presence. It provides a clear understanding 
of which party leaders of which parties engage with the media during election night.  
 
The Framing of Discussion and Content 
The following codes are important in understanding how the discussion of party leaders is 
produced by broadcasters. A range of codes are included in this section to analyse the 
importance of various components of the electoral system. These include broadcaster 
 275 
questioning/discussion of the performance of party leaders, the campaign being critical to 
the outcome, perceived importance of the party leaders to deciding elections.  
The importance of Party Leaders 
Text that relates to the perceived importance of party leaders and their role in general 
election campaigns and beyond in the campaign. This includes comments regarding which 
locations the party leaders have been visiting in an attempt to increase the vote in various 
constituencies.  
Exit Poll Framing Discussion 
Exit polls have a substantial effect on the election night discussion and how the performance 
of party leaders is framed. Depending on the closeness of the exit poll, there is an effect on 
the assessment of leadership performance in the transcript, as clear assessments from 
broadcasters are only given once there is an indication of a clear result. For example, in 1992, 
there was difficulty at the start of the night in understanding how John Major and Neil Kinnock 
performed.  
Campaign Critical to the Election Outcome 
This code is used to gather evidence from politicians and commentators that the election 
campaign was critical to the outcome and results of the election. It collects comments that 
regard decisions and events during the campaign as critical and effecting the voters party 
choice. The importance of this code is in relation to party leaders spearheading their party’s 
campaign. 
Broadcaster discussion or questioning about Party Leaders 
Broadcasters and interviewers discuss the performance of party leaders, asking politicians 
from various parties if they believe their leader performed well throughout the campaign, 
whether they have been in contact with their party leader and asking members of the panel 
(broadcasters & journalists) about the performance of party leaders.  
Repeated Questioning about Party Leaders 
Continual questioning to an interviewee on the future of a party leader, whether they will 
need to resign, if they can continue as leader, why their performance was so good or so poor. 
This code is a succession from the preceding code.  
‘Take away’ comment about Party Leader 
Comment from a politician taken from a previous interview regarding the leader of a political 
party is repeated by the broadcaster at a later stage or discussed by the panel following the 
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interview. This comment is deemed to be the most salient from the interview with the 
broadcasters, although a range of comments are usually made. 
Candidate Introduced in a Leadership Frame  
Candidates are sometimes introduced with a ‘leadership frame’, especially if they have made 
a memorable or noticeable comment about the leadership and/or are a backbencher. For 
example, supporting John Major’s leadership during his challenge from Redwood or being a 
prominent critic of Jeremy Corbyn. 
 
Leadership Codes 
The following codes capture text relating to comment, analysis and description of leadership 
qualities. They are designed to understand the evaluations of party leaders during election 
night. The codes in this section are: competency, personality, leadership succession, outcome 
of election caused by party leader (blame & praise), campaign performance and presidential 
campaign.  
Presidential Campaign  
This code is applicable to the data in two scenarios. First, when there is a clear focus that the 
leaders of a political party have been overwhelmingly at the forefront of their party’s election 
campaign. Secondly, when there is an understanding that the valence factor of leadership has 
been campaigned on by one or both major parties.  
Personality 
Comments relating to the features of a party leaders personality. For example, being 
honourable, caring, trustworthy. This code is usually used in conjunction with positive and 
negative codes to fully understand the assessment made.  
Competency 
Comments or mentions about a party leader’s leadership ability under the umbrella term of 
‘competency’. For example, being ‘Prime Ministerial’, decisive, experienced, ‘statesmanlike’. 
All of these examples can be treated as negatively or positively, as this code is almost always 
used in combination with positive and negative codes to fully understand the assessment 
made.  
Campaign Performance 
Any text that relates to an assessment or comment regarding the campaign performance, 
skills of campaigning, speaking, campaign strategy of a party leader. Again, this code is layered 
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alongside positive and negative codes to provide a more detailed overview of what this code 
is describing. 
Leader Succession 
Comment or discussion on how the results will affect the stability of the leader’s position at 
the head of their party. This includes speculation if they survive a leadership challenge or will 
resign following the outcome of an election? In contrast, this code can be used in a positive 
manner too as the election results could be important in securing the internal position of a 
leader within their party. 
Outcome of election attributed to Party Leader 
The outcome of the election in terms of winning seats is attributed to a party leader in some 
way. Either through their campaign performance, competency, campaign strategy and so 
forth. There is a personal attribution, focus on the individuals. This code is separated into 
praise and blame, dependent on whether the party has had positive or negative results.  
 
Attitude Codes 
These descriptive codes are designed to be layered onto the analytical codes to provide a 
more detailed understanding of how each code is used. The positive and negative codes also 
stop the replication of several codes dependent on how they are used or framed in the text. 
For example, there is no separation between competent and incompetent code as the 
attitude codes are layered on top to provide this context. 
Positive  
A layering code designed to give a description of whether an analytical code is used positively. 
Additionally, in comparison to the negative codes, it can provide an interesting overview of 
the predominant attitudes. 
Negative 
A layering code designed to give a description of whether an analytical code is used 
negatively. Additionally, in comparison to the positive codes, it can provide an interesting 
overview of the predominant attitudes. 
 
Subject of discussion 
The following codes are descriptive, designed to be used in conjunction with analytical 
themes to identify when the leaders of different political parties are being discussed. These 
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codes facilitate effective comparison between the leaders of different parties, providing 
clarity about which party leaders are being discussed and in what regard. Additionally, they 
provide information about who is making the comments regarding party leaders.  
 
Party Leaders 
This group of descriptive codes relate to various leaders of political parties.  
Conservative Leader 
This code is used to identify text that is related to the leader of the Conservative Party. 
Conservative leaders are separated into different codes in NVIVO, this allows comparison 
between elections. If a leader contests more than one election, they are separated into 
separate codes.  
Labour Leader 
This code is used to identify text that is related to the leader of the Labour Party. Party leaders 
are separated into different codes in NVIVO, this allows comparison between elections. If a 
leader contests more than one election, they are separated into separate codes.  
Secondary Conservative and Labour Party Leaders 
This group of codes are reserved for secondary party leaders post the devolution settlement. 
For example, the Scottish Conservative leader or Welsh Labour leader. This code is designed 
to acknowledge if they have grown in salience across recent UK general elections.  
Liberal Democrat/Liberal/SDP Alliance leaders 
This code is used to identify text that is related to the leader(s) of the Liberal Democrats, 
Liberal Party or Liberal/SDP Alliance. Party leaders are separated into different codes in 
NVIVO, this allows comparison between elections. If a leader contests more than one 
election, they are separated into separate codes.  
Minority Party Leaders 
This code is used to identify areas of text that relate to leaders of the following parties: UKIP, 
SNP, Green Party, Plaid Cymru, Northern Irish Parties. If a leader contests more than one 




This group of specific codes is used to identify which actors are making the comments towards 
or about party leaders. It aims to understand whether politicians or broadcasters are driving 
the conversation towards party leaders. 
Broadcaster(s) 
A broadcaster has made a judgement about the performance of a party leader, their character 
or competence etc.  
Politician 
A politician has made a judgement about the performance of a party leader, their character 
or competence etc.  
Academic  
An academic has made a judgement about the performance of a party leader, their character 
or competence etc.  
Member of public 
A member of the public has made a judgement about the performance of a party leader, their 




Model Output Appendix 
 
Model Output Appendix Table 1: Conservative ‘Typical’ Path Model Output 
 lhs op rhs label est se z pvalue 
1 likeConLeaderW4    0.040 0.124 0.319 0.749 
2 likeConLeaderW4 ~ likeConLeaderW3 a1 0.381 0.033 11.503 0 
3 likeConLeaderW4 ~ likeLabLeaderW4  0.020 0.012 1.746 0.081 
4 likeConLeaderW4 ~ AgeW1  0.003 0.003 1.145 0.252 
5 likeConLeaderW4 ~ PID4Conservative  0.785 0.107 7.303 0 
6 likeConLeaderW4 ~ likeConLeaderW2 b 0.294 0.034 8.700 0 
7 likeConLeaderW4 ~ likeConLeaderW1 b2 0.237 0.037 6.407 0 
8 likeConLeaderW3    0.172 0.072 2.373 0.018 
9 likeConLeaderW3 ~ likeConLeaderW2 a2 0.487 0.031 15.734 0 
10 likeConLeaderW3 ~ likeLabLeaderW3  0.051 0.013 3.834 0.0001 
11 likeConLeaderW3 ~ PID3Conservative  0.523 0.111 4.695 0.00000 
12 likeConLeaderW3 ~ likeConLeaderW1  0.410 0.032 12.895 0 
13 likeConLeaderW2    0.834 0.083 10.089 0 
14 likeConLeaderW2 ~ likeConLeaderW1 a3 0.770 0.017 44.877 0 
15 likeConLeaderW2 ~ PID1Conservative  0.763 0.123 6.228 0 
16 likeConLeaderW2 ~ likeLabLeaderW1  -0.059 0.013 -4.435 0.00001 
17 likeConLeaderW4 ~~ likeConLeaderW4  1.795 0.107 16.835 0 
18 likeConLeaderW3 ~~ likeConLeaderW3  1.887 0.095 19.764 0 
19 likeConLeaderW2 ~~ likeConLeaderW2  2.317 0.117 19.752 0 
20 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ likeLabLeaderW4  8.299 0   
21 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ AgeW1  -3.377 0   
22 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ PID4Conservative  -0.436 0   
23 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ likeConLeaderW1  -2.126 0   
24 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ likeLabLeaderW3  6.460 0   
25 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ PID3Conservative  -0.444 0   
26 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ PID1Conservative  -0.426 0   
27 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  6.361 0   
28 AgeW1 ~~ AgeW1  238.733 0   
29 AgeW1 ~~ PID4Conservative  1.099 0   
30 AgeW1 ~~ likeConLeaderW1  3.988 0   
31 AgeW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW3  -3.071 0   
32 AgeW1 ~~ PID3Conservative  1.084 0   
33 AgeW1 ~~ PID1Conservative  1.054 0   
34 AgeW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  -2.721 0   
35 PID4Conservative ~~ PID4Conservative  0.198 0   
36 PID4Conservative ~~ likeConLeaderW1  0.738 0   
37 PID4Conservative ~~ likeLabLeaderW3  -0.377 0   
38 PID4Conservative ~~ PID3Conservative  0.163 0   
39 PID4Conservative ~~ PID1Conservative  0.160 0   
40 PID4Conservative ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  -0.399 0   
41 likeConLeaderW1 ~~ likeConLeaderW1  9.181 0   
42 likeConLeaderW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW3  -1.756 0   
43 likeConLeaderW1 ~~ PID3Conservative  0.803 0   
44 likeConLeaderW1 ~~ PID1Conservative  0.832 0   
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45 likeConLeaderW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  -1.346 0   
46 likeLabLeaderW3 ~~ likeLabLeaderW3  7.727 0   
47 likeLabLeaderW3 ~~ PID3Conservative  -0.384 0   
48 likeLabLeaderW3 ~~ PID1Conservative  -0.378 0   
49 likeLabLeaderW3 ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  6.056 0   
50 PID3Conservative ~~ PID3Conservative  0.197 0   
51 PID3Conservative ~~ PID1Conservative  0.168 0   
52 PID3Conservative ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  -0.400 0   
53 PID1Conservative ~~ PID1Conservative  0.198 0   
54 PID1Conservative ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  -0.378 0   
55 likeLabLeaderW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  7.544 0   
56 likeLabLeaderW4    3.239 0   
57 AgeW1    33.971 0   
58 PID4Conservative    0.271 0   
59 likeConLeaderW1    3.578 0   
60 likeLabLeaderW3    3.136 0   
61 PID3Conservative    0.271 0   
62 PID1Conservative    0.273 0   
63 likeLabLeaderW1    3.288 0   
64 IndirecteffectW2onW4 := a1* a2 IndirecteffectW2onW4 0.186 0.022 8.635 0 
65 TotaldirecteffectW2onW4 := b+(a1* a2) TotaldirecteffectW2onW4 0.479 0.032 14.774 0 
66 IndirecteffectW1onW4 := (a1* a2* a3) IndirecteffectW1onW4 0.143 0.017 8.500 0 
67 totaleffectW1onW4 := b2+(a1* a2* a3) totaleffectW1onW4 0.380 0.035 10.948 0 
68 likeConLeaderW4 r2 likeConLeaderW4  0.817    
69 likeConLeaderW3 r2 likeConLeaderW3  0.797    




Model Output Appendix Table 2: Conservative ‘Transition’ Path Model 
 lhs op rhs label est se z pvalue 
1 likeConLeaderW10    1.747 0.185 9.427 0 
2 likeConLeaderW10 ~ likeConLeaderW9 a1 0.174 0.037 4.747 0.00000 
3 likeConLeaderW10 ~ likeLabLeaderW10  -0.087 0.019 -4.540 0.00001 
4 likeConLeaderW10 ~ PID10Conservative  1.021 0.139 7.349 0 
5 likeConLeaderW10 ~ AgeW1  0.032 0.004 8.251 0 
6 likeConLeaderW10 ~ likeConLeaderW8 b1 0.074 0.040 1.860 0.063 
7 likeConLeaderW10 ~ likeConLeaderW7 c1 0.295 0.042 6.946 0 
8 likeConLeaderW9    0.373 0.130 2.863 0.004 
9 likeConLeaderW9 ~ likeConLeaderW8 a2 0.537 0.035 15.246 0 
10 likeConLeaderW9 ~ PID9Conservative  0.639 0.158 4.047 0.0001 
11 likeConLeaderW9 ~ AgeW1  0.0001 0.003 0.022 0.982 
12 likeConLeaderW9 ~ likeLabLeaderW9  0.052 0.014 3.800 0.0001 
13 likeConLeaderW9 ~ likeConLeaderW7 b2 0.355 0.042 8.492 0 
14 likeConLeaderW8    0.216 0.135 1.601 0.109 
15 likeConLeaderW8 ~ likeConLeaderW7 a3 0.870 0.013 68.820 0 
16 likeConLeaderW8 ~ AgeW1  -0.002 0.003 -0.799 0.424 
17 likeConLeaderW8 ~ PID8Conservative  0.389 0.094 4.131 0.00004 
18 likeConLeaderW8 ~ likeLabLeaderW8  0.035 0.012 2.910 0.004 
19 likeConLeaderW10 ~~ likeConLeaderW10  4.767 0.148 32.175 0 
20 likeConLeaderW9 ~~ likeConLeaderW9  2.452 0.154 15.949 0 
21 likeConLeaderW8 ~~ likeConLeaderW8  1.753 0.076 22.931 0 
22 likeLabLeaderW10 ~~ likeLabLeaderW10  9.536 0   
23 likeLabLeaderW10 ~~ PID10Conservative  -0.499 0   
24 likeLabLeaderW10 ~~ AgeW1  -7.836 0   
25 likeLabLeaderW10 ~~ likeConLeaderW7  -2.646 0   
26 likeLabLeaderW10 ~~ PID9Conservative  -0.480 0   
27 likeLabLeaderW10 ~~ likeLabLeaderW9  7.461 0   
28 likeLabLeaderW10 ~~ PID8Conservative  -0.481 0   
29 likeLabLeaderW10 ~~ likeLabLeaderW8  7.754 0   
30 PID10Conservative ~~ PID10Conservative  0.207 0   
31 PID10Conservative ~~ AgeW1  1.188 0   
32 PID10Conservative ~~ likeConLeaderW7  0.825 0   
33 PID10Conservative ~~ PID9Conservative  0.175 0   
34 PID10Conservative ~~ likeLabLeaderW9  -0.465 0   
35 PID10Conservative ~~ PID8Conservative  0.170 0   
36 PID10Conservative ~~ likeLabLeaderW8  -0.548 0   
37 AgeW1 ~~ AgeW1  231.164 0   
38 AgeW1 ~~ likeConLeaderW7  4.757 0   
39 AgeW1 ~~ PID9Conservative  1.204 0   
40 AgeW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW9  -7.728 0   
41 AgeW1 ~~ PID8Conservative  1.048 0   
42 AgeW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW8  -7.755 0   
43 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ likeConLeaderW7  9.294 0   
44 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ PID9Conservative  0.803 0   
45 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ likeLabLeaderW9  -2.495 0   
46 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ PID8Conservative  0.790 0   
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47 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ likeLabLeaderW8  -2.923 0   
48 PID9Conservative ~~ PID9Conservative  0.202 0   
49 PID9Conservative ~~ likeLabLeaderW9  -0.441 0   
50 PID9Conservative ~~ PID8Conservative  0.172 0   
51 PID9Conservative ~~ likeLabLeaderW8  -0.513 0   
52 likeLabLeaderW9 ~~ likeLabLeaderW9  8.759 0   
53 likeLabLeaderW9 ~~ PID8Conservative  -0.438 0   
54 likeLabLeaderW9 ~~ likeLabLeaderW8  7.598 0   
55 PID8Conservative ~~ PID8Conservative  0.201 0   
56 PID8Conservative ~~ likeLabLeaderW8  -0.525 0   
57 likeLabLeaderW8 ~~ likeLabLeaderW8  9.490 0   
58 likeLabLeaderW10    3.172 0   
59 PID10Conservative    0.293 0   
60 AgeW1    34.603 0   
61 likeConLeaderW7    3.508 0   
62 PID9Conservative    0.280 0   
63 likeLabLeaderW9    3.133 0   
64 PID8Conservative    0.279 0   
65 likeLabLeaderW8    3.508 0   
66 indirecteffectW8onW10 := a1* a2 indirecteffectW8onW10 0.093 0.020 4.565 0.00000 
67 totaleffectW8onW10 := b1+(a1* a2) totaleffectW8onW10 0.167 0.036 4.594 0.00000 
68 indirecteffectW7onW10 := (a1* a2* a3) indirecteffectW7onW10 0.081 0.018 4.546 0.00001 
69 totaleffectW7onW10 := c1+indirecteffectW7onW10 totaleffectW7onW10 0.376 0.039 9.548 0 
70 likeConLeaderW10 r2 likeConLeaderW10  0.490    
71 likeConLeaderW9 r2 likeConLeaderW9  0.759    




Model Output Appendix Table 3: Labour ‘Typical’ Model Output 
 lhs op rhs label est se z pvalue 
1 likeLabLeaderW4    0.291 0.157 1.859 0.063 
2 likeLabLeaderW4 ~ likeLabLeaderW3 a1 0.340 0.033 10.289 0 
3 likeLabLeaderW4 ~ likeConLeaderW4  0.010 0.011 0.923 0.356 
4 likeLabLeaderW4 ~ PID4Labour  0.596 0.104 5.707 0 
5 likeLabLeaderW4 ~ AgeW1  -0.003 0.003 -1.089 0.276 
6 likeLabLeaderW4 ~ likeLabLeaderW2 b 0.260 0.031 8.293 0 
7 likeLabLeaderW4 ~ likeLabLeaderW1 b2 0.306 0.034 8.997 0 
8 likeLabLeaderW3    0.159 0.144 1.106 0.269 
9 likeLabLeaderW3 ~ likeLabLeaderW2 a2 0.453 0.029 15.505 0 
10 likeLabLeaderW3 ~ likeConLeaderW3  0.055 0.012 4.789 0.00000 
11 likeLabLeaderW3 ~ PID3Labour  0.859 0.129 6.680 0 
12 likeLabLeaderW3 ~ AgeW1  -0.002 0.002 -0.881 0.378 
13 likeLabLeaderW3 ~ likeLabLeaderW1  0.374 0.030 12.331 0 
14 likeLabLeaderW2    0.780 0.144 5.400 0.00000 
15 likeLabLeaderW2 ~ likeLabLeaderW1 a3 0.715 0.019 38.566 0 
16 likeLabLeaderW2 ~ PID2Labour  1.233 0.112 11.052 0 
17 likeLabLeaderW2 ~ likeConLeaderW2  0.039 0.015 2.701 0.007 
18 likeLabLeaderW2 ~ AgeW1  -0.009 0.003 -3.172 0.002 
19 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ likeLabLeaderW4  2.072 0.104 19.987 0 
20 likeLabLeaderW3 ~~ likeLabLeaderW3  2.070 0.114 18.199 0 
21 likeLabLeaderW2 ~~ likeLabLeaderW2  2.418 0.126 19.199 0 
22 likeConLeaderW4 ~~ likeConLeaderW4  9.882 0   
23 likeConLeaderW4 ~~ PID4Labour  -0.488 0   
24 likeConLeaderW4 ~~ AgeW1  4.833 0   
25 likeConLeaderW4 ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  -2.133 0   
26 likeConLeaderW4 ~~ likeConLeaderW3  8.317 0   
27 likeConLeaderW4 ~~ PID3Labour  -0.490 0   
28 likeConLeaderW4 ~~ PID2Labour  -0.503 0   
29 likeConLeaderW4 ~~ likeConLeaderW2  8.088 0   
30 PID4Labour ~~ PID4Labour  0.196 0   
31 PID4Labour ~~ AgeW1  0.249 0   
32 PID4Labour ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  0.654 0   
33 PID4Labour ~~ likeConLeaderW3  -0.441 0   
34 PID4Labour ~~ PID3Labour  0.161 0   
35 PID4Labour ~~ PID2Labour  0.163 0   
36 PID4Labour ~~ likeConLeaderW2  -0.440 0   
37 AgeW1 ~~ AgeW1  240.014 0   
38 AgeW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  -2.877 0   
39 AgeW1 ~~ likeConLeaderW3  3.159 0   
40 AgeW1 ~~ PID3Labour  -0.047 0   
41 AgeW1 ~~ PID2Labour  -0.032 0   
42 AgeW1 ~~ likeConLeaderW2  3.842 0   
43 likeLabLeaderW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW1  7.560 0   
44 likeLabLeaderW1 ~~ likeConLeaderW3  -1.805 0   
45 likeLabLeaderW1 ~~ PID3Labour  0.674 0   
46 likeLabLeaderW1 ~~ PID2Labour  0.671 0   
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47 likeLabLeaderW1 ~~ likeConLeaderW2  -1.766 0   
48 likeConLeaderW3 ~~ likeConLeaderW3  9.327 0   
49 likeConLeaderW3 ~~ PID3Labour  -0.436 0   
50 likeConLeaderW3 ~~ PID2Labour  -0.458 0   
51 likeConLeaderW3 ~~ likeConLeaderW2  7.923 0   
52 PID3Labour ~~ PID3Labour  0.195 0   
53 PID3Labour ~~ PID2Labour  0.168 0   
54 PID3Labour ~~ likeConLeaderW2  -0.431 0   
55 PID2Labour ~~ PID2Labour  0.196 0   
56 PID2Labour ~~ likeConLeaderW2  -0.461 0   
57 likeConLeaderW2 ~~ likeConLeaderW2  9.035 0   
58 likeConLeaderW4    3.745 0   
59 PID4Labour    0.267 0   
60 AgeW1    49.939 0   
61 likeLabLeaderW1    3.284 0   
62 likeConLeaderW3    3.702 0   
63 PID3Labour    0.265 0   
64 PID2Labour    0.268 0   
65 likeConLeaderW2    3.610 0   
66 IndirectW2onW4 := a1* a2 IndirectW2onW4 0.154 0.018 8.560 0 
67 TotalW2onW4 := b+(a1* a2) TotalW2onW4 0.414 0.029 14.169 0 
68 indirectW1onW4 := a1* a2* a3 indirectW1onW4 0.110 0.013 8.720 0 
69 TotalW1onW4 := b2+(a1* a2* a3) TotalW1onW4 0.416 0.031 13.561 0 
70 likeLabLeaderW4 r2 likeLabLeaderW4  0.751    
71 likeLabLeaderW3 r2 likeLabLeaderW3  0.733    




Model Output Appendix Table 4: Labour ‘Transition’ Model Output 
 lhs op rhs label est se z pvalue 
1 likeLabLeaderW7    2.229 0.289 7.720 0 
2 likeLabLeaderW7 ~ likeLabLeaderW6 a 0.223 0.050 4.494 0.00001 
3 likeLabLeaderW7 ~ likeConLeaderW7  -0.056 0.026 -2.184 0.029 
4 likeLabLeaderW7 ~ AgeW1  -0.016 0.005 -3.292 0.001 
5 likeLabLeaderW7 ~ PID7Labour  1.194 0.176 6.789 0 
6 likeLabLeaderW7 ~ likeLabLeaderW5 b 0.197 0.042 4.629 0.00000 
7 likeLabLeaderW7 ~ likeLabLeaderW4 b2 0.167 0.047 3.522 0.0004 
8 likeLabLeaderW6    0.901 0.256 3.521 0.0004 
9 likeLabLeaderW6 ~ likeLabLeaderW5 a2 0.483 0.031 15.545 0 
10 likeLabLeaderW6 ~ PID6Labour  0.648 0.179 3.619 0.0003 
11 likeLabLeaderW6 ~ likeConLeaderW6  -0.003 0.013 -0.205 0.838 
12 likeLabLeaderW6 ~ AgeW1  -0.010 0.004 -2.590 0.010 
13 likeLabLeaderW6 ~ likeLabLeaderW4  0.327 0.038 8.695 0 
14 likeLabLeaderW5    0.849 0.176 4.836 0.00000 
15 likeLabLeaderW5 ~ likeLabLeaderW4 a3 0.822 0.018 46.414 0 
16 likeLabLeaderW5 ~ likeConLeaderW5  -0.021 0.012 -1.787 0.074 
17 likeLabLeaderW5 ~ AgeW1  -0.003 0.003 -0.940 0.347 
18 likeLabLeaderW5 ~ PID4Labour  0.823 0.122 6.728 0 
19 likeLabLeaderW7 ~~ likeLabLeaderW7  5.183 0.234 22.159 0 
20 likeLabLeaderW6 ~~ likeLabLeaderW6  2.266 0.124 18.271 0 
21 likeLabLeaderW5 ~~ likeLabLeaderW5  2.371 0.106 22.317 0 
22 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ likeConLeaderW7  9.267 0   
23 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ AgeW1  4.570 0   
24 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ PID7Labour  -0.447 0   
25 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ likeLabLeaderW4  -2.090 0   
26 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ PID6Labour  -0.487 0   
27 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ likeConLeaderW6  8.406 0   
28 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ likeConLeaderW5  8.163 0   
29 likeConLeaderW7 ~~ PID4Labour  -0.425 0   
30 AgeW1 ~~ AgeW1  241.822 0   
31 AgeW1 ~~ PID7Labour  0.088 0   
32 AgeW1 ~~ likeLabLeaderW4  -3.818 0   
33 AgeW1 ~~ PID6Labour  -0.130 0   
34 AgeW1 ~~ likeConLeaderW6  5.672 0   
35 AgeW1 ~~ likeConLeaderW5  4.929 0   
36 AgeW1 ~~ PID4Labour  0.331 0   
37 PID7Labour ~~ PID7Labour  0.192 0   
38 PID7Labour ~~ likeLabLeaderW4  0.673 0   
39 PID7Labour ~~ PID6Labour  0.154 0   
40 PID7Labour ~~ likeConLeaderW6  -0.593 0   
41 PID7Labour ~~ likeConLeaderW5  -0.559 0   
42 PID7Labour ~~ PID4Labour  0.158 0   
43 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ likeLabLeaderW4  8.320 0   
44 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ PID6Labour  0.687 0   
45 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ likeConLeaderW6  -3.155 0   
46 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ likeConLeaderW5  -2.790 0   
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47 likeLabLeaderW4 ~~ PID4Labour  0.694 0   
48 PID6Labour ~~ PID6Labour  0.203 0   
49 PID6Labour ~~ likeConLeaderW6  -0.656 0   
50 PID6Labour ~~ likeConLeaderW5  -0.616 0   
51 PID6Labour ~~ PID4Labour  0.158 0   
52 likeConLeaderW6 ~~ likeConLeaderW6  11.299 0   
53 likeConLeaderW6 ~~ likeConLeaderW5  10.000 0   
54 likeConLeaderW6 ~~ PID4Labour  -0.591 0   
55 likeConLeaderW5 ~~ likeConLeaderW5  10.739 0   
56 likeConLeaderW5 ~~ PID4Labour  -0.564 0   
57 PID4Labour ~~ PID4Labour  0.197 0   
58 likeConLeaderW7    3.498 0   
59 AgeW1    50.099 0   
60 PID7Labour    0.259 0   
61 likeLabLeaderW4    3.312 0   
62 PID6Labour    0.282 0   
63 likeConLeaderW6    4.176 0   
64 likeConLeaderW5    4.126 0   
65 PID4Labour    0.270 0   
66 indirectW5onW7 := a* a2 indirectW5onW7 0.108 0.027 3.941 0.0001 
67 TotalW5onW7 := b+(a* a2) TotalW5onW7 0.304 0.042 7.265 0 
68 indrectW4onW7 := (a* a2* a3) indrectW4onW7 0.089 0.023 3.914 0.0001 
69 TotalW4onW7 := b2+(indrectW4onW7) TotalW4onW7 0.256 0.041 6.286 0 
70 likeLabLeaderW7 r2 likeLabLeaderW7  0.451    
71 likeLabLeaderW6 r2 likeLabLeaderW6  0.736    




Model Output Appendix Table 5: Liberal Democrat ‘Typical’ Path Model 
 lhs op rhs label est se z pvalue 
1 likeLibDemLeaderW4    0.324 0.162 2.000 0.046 
2 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW3 a 0.356 0.028 12.581 0 
3 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW4  0.044 0.010 4.233 0.00002 
4 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~ AgeW1  -0.001 0.003 -0.263 0.793 
5 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  0.431 0.127 3.397 0.001 
6 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW2 b 0.288 0.031 9.370 0 
7 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW1 b2 0.268 0.032 8.331 0 
8 likeLibDemLeaderW3    0.347 0.165 2.098 0.036 
9 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW2 a2 0.480 0.030 15.871 0 
10 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW3  0.033 0.012 2.712 0.007 
11 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~ AgeW1  -0.002 0.003 -0.805 0.421 
12 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~ PID3LiberalDemocrat  0.391 0.123 3.182 0.001 
13 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW1  0.390 0.030 13.143 0 
14 likeLibDemLeaderW2    1.102 0.165 6.662 0 
15 likeLibDemLeaderW2 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW1 a3 0.773 0.016 47.665 0 
16 likeLibDemLeaderW2 ~ PID1LiberalDemocrat  0.467 0.128 3.655 0.0003 
17 likeLibDemLeaderW2 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  -0.044 0.015 -2.892 0.004 
18 likeLibDemLeaderW2 ~ AgeW1  -0.007 0.003 -2.346 0.019 
19 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW4  2.004 0.091 21.945 0 
20 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW3  2.033 0.101 20.080 0 
21 likeLibDemLeaderW2 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  2.521 0.128 19.640 0 
22 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW4  9.738 0   
23 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~~ AgeW1  3.610 0   
24 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  -0.078 0   
25 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW1  -0.066 0   
26 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW3  8.039 0   
27 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~~ PID3LiberalDemocrat  -0.074 0   
28 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~~ PID1LiberalDemocrat  -0.067 0   
29 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  6.314 0   
30 AgeW1 ~~ AgeW1  237.768 0   
31 AgeW1 ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  0.163 0   
32 AgeW1 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW1  -1.711 0   
33 AgeW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW3  5.494 0   
34 AgeW1 ~~ PID3LiberalDemocrat  0.139 0   
35 AgeW1 ~~ PID1LiberalDemocrat  0.169 0   
36 AgeW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  5.520 0   
37 PID4LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  0.053 0   
38 PID4LiberalDemocrat ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW1  0.128 0   
39 PID4LiberalDemocrat ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW3  -0.071 0   
40 PID4LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID3LiberalDemocrat  0.037 0   
41 PID4LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID1LiberalDemocrat  0.034 0   
42 PID4LiberalDemocrat ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  -0.049 0   
43 likeLibDemLeaderW1 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW1  6.042 0   
44 likeLibDemLeaderW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW3  0.249 0   
45 likeLibDemLeaderW1 ~~ PID3LiberalDemocrat  0.148 0   
46 likeLibDemLeaderW1 ~~ PID1LiberalDemocrat  0.162 0   
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47 likeLibDemLeaderW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  0.887 0   
48 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW3  9.821 0   
49 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~~ PID3LiberalDemocrat  -0.064 0   
50 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~~ PID1LiberalDemocrat  -0.064 0   
51 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  6.980 0   
52 PID3LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID3LiberalDemocrat  0.048 0   
53 PID3LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID1LiberalDemocrat  0.036 0   
54 PID3LiberalDemocrat ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  -0.037 0   
55 PID1LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID1LiberalDemocrat  0.051 0   
56 PID1LiberalDemocrat ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  -0.030 0   
57 likeUKIPLeaderW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  8.416 0   
58 likeUKIPLeaderW4    3.141 0   
59 AgeW1    50.418 0   
60 PID4LiberalDemocrat    0.056 0   
61 likeLibDemLeaderW1    2.779 0   
62 likeUKIPLeaderW3    3.348 0   
63 PID3LiberalDemocrat    0.051 0   
64 PID1LiberalDemocrat    0.054 0   
65 likeUKIPLeaderW1    3.130 0   
66 IndirectW2onW4 := a* a2 IndirectW2onW4 0.171 0.018 9.560 0 
67 TotalW2onW4 := b+(a* a2) TotalW2onW4 0.459 0.031 14.963 0 
68 IndirectW1onW4 := (a* a2* a3) IndirectW1onW4 0.132 0.014 9.573 0 
69 TotalW1onW4 := b2+(IndirectW1onW4) TotalW1onW4 0.400 0.030 13.558 0 
70 likeLibDemLeaderW4 r2 likeLibDemLeaderW4  0.691    
71 likeLibDemLeaderW3 r2 likeLibDemLeaderW3  0.677    





Model Output Appendix Table 6: Liberal Democrat ‘Transition’ Path Model 
 lhs op rhs label est se z pvalue 
1 likeLibDemLeaderW7    1.970 0.356 5.528 0.00000 
2 likeLibDemLeaderW7 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW6 a 0.135 0.041 3.298 0.001 
3 likeLibDemLeaderW7 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW7  0.076 0.029 2.583 0.010 
4 likeLibDemLeaderW7 ~ AgeW1  -0.006 0.006 -0.974 0.330 
5 likeLibDemLeaderW7 ~ PID7LiberalDemocrat  1.152 0.196 5.876 0 
6 likeLibDemLeaderW7 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW5 b 0.167 0.039 4.287 0.00002 
7 likeLibDemLeaderW7 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW4 b2 0.178 0.043 4.115 0.00004 
8 likeLibDemLeaderW6    0.779 0.200 3.890 0.0001 
9 likeLibDemLeaderW6 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW5 a2 0.526 0.031 16.770 0 
10 likeLibDemLeaderW6 ~ AgeW1  -0.007 0.004 -1.838 0.066 
11 likeLibDemLeaderW6 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW6  0.069 0.012 5.614 0.00000 
12 likeLibDemLeaderW6 ~ PID6LiberalDemocrat  0.698 0.139 5.012 0.00000 
13 likeLibDemLeaderW6 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW4  0.376 0.035 10.851 0 
14 likeLibDemLeaderW5    0.714 0.188 3.791 0.0002 
15 likeLibDemLeaderW5 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW4 a3 0.812 0.017 46.648 0 
16 likeLibDemLeaderW5 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW5  0.060 0.015 4.003 0.0001 
17 likeLibDemLeaderW5 ~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  0.796 0.146 5.446 0.00000 
18 likeLibDemLeaderW5 ~ AgeW1  0.001 0.003 0.172 0.863 
19 likeLibDemLeaderW7 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW7  4.073 0.259 15.716 0 
20 likeLibDemLeaderW6 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW6  2.529 0.127 19.874 0 
21 likeLibDemLeaderW5 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW5  2.700 0.150 18.024 0 
22 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW7  10.287 0   
23 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ AgeW1  3.716 0   
24 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ PID7LiberalDemocrat  -0.114 0   
25 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW4  -0.136 0   
26 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW6  8.372 0   
27 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ PID6LiberalDemocrat  -0.103 0   
28 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW5  8.354 0   
29 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  -0.086 0   
30 AgeW1 ~~ AgeW1  241.558 0   
31 AgeW1 ~~ PID7LiberalDemocrat  0.120 0   
32 AgeW1 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW4  -1.978 0   
33 AgeW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW6  3.663 0   
34 AgeW1 ~~ PID6LiberalDemocrat  0.122 0   
35 AgeW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW5  4.658 0   
36 AgeW1 ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  0.199 0   
37 PID7LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID7LiberalDemocrat  0.064 0   
38 PID7LiberalDemocrat ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW4  0.177 0   
39 PID7LiberalDemocrat ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW6  -0.114 0   
40 PID7LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID6LiberalDemocrat  0.049 0   
41 PID7LiberalDemocrat ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW5  -0.110 0   
42 PID7LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  0.039 0   
43 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW4  6.933 0   
44 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW6  -0.394 0   
45 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ PID6LiberalDemocrat  0.203 0   
46 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW5  -0.174 0   
 291 
47 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  0.152 0   
48 likeUKIPLeaderW6 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW6  10.667 0   
49 likeUKIPLeaderW6 ~~ PID6LiberalDemocrat  -0.103 0   
50 likeUKIPLeaderW6 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW5  9.031 0   
51 likeUKIPLeaderW6 ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  -0.100 0   
52 PID6LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID6LiberalDemocrat  0.065 0   
53 PID6LiberalDemocrat ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW5  -0.092 0   
54 PID6LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  0.042 0   
55 likeUKIPLeaderW5 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW5  10.440 0   
56 likeUKIPLeaderW5 ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  -0.094 0   
57 PID4LiberalDemocrat ~~ PID4LiberalDemocrat  0.060 0   
58 likeUKIPLeaderW7    3.389 0   
59 AgeW1    51.278 0   
60 PID7LiberalDemocrat    0.069 0   
61 likeLibDemLeaderW4    2.974 0   
62 likeUKIPLeaderW6    3.522 0   
63 PID6LiberalDemocrat    0.070 0   
64 likeUKIPLeaderW5    3.318 0   
65 PID4LiberalDemocrat    0.064 0   
66 IndirectW5onW7 := a* a2 IndirectW5onW7 0.071 0.022 3.242 0.001 
67 TotalW5onW7 := b+(a* a2) TotalW5onW7 0.238 0.036 6.574 0 
68 IndirectW4onW7 := (a* a2* a3) IndirectW4onW7 0.058 0.018 3.207 0.001 
69 TotalW4onW7 := b2+(IndirectW4onW7) TotalW4onW7 0.235 0.038 6.124 0 
70 likeLibDemLeaderW7 r2 likeLibDemLeaderW7  0.310    
71 likeLibDemLeaderW6 r2 likeLibDemLeaderW6  0.691    




Model Output Appendix Table 7: UKIP ‘Typical’ Path Model 
 lhs op rhs label est se z pvalue 
1 likeUKIPLeaderW4    0.177 0.121 1.471 0.141 
2 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW3 a 0.474 0.030 15.837 0 
3 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW4  0.044 0.014 3.050 0.002 
4 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~ AgeW1  -0.004 0.003 -1.321 0.187 
5 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~ PID4UKIP  1.339 0.322 4.165 0.00003 
6 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW2 b 0.329 0.031 10.564 0 
7 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW1 b2 0.056 0.027 2.101 0.036 
8 likeUKIPLeaderW3    -0.008 0.106 -0.077 0.938 
9 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW2 a2 0.578 0.025 23.533 0 
10 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW3  0.051 0.014 3.549 0.0004 
11 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~ AgeW1  0.004 0.003 1.291 0.197 
12 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~ PID3UKIP  0.854 0.219 3.904 0.0001 
13 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  0.322 0.027 11.746 0 
14 likeUKIPLeaderW2    0.664 0.137 4.851 0.00000 
15 likeUKIPLeaderW2 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW1 a3 0.760 0.018 43.334 0 
16 likeUKIPLeaderW2 ~ PID2UKIP  1.673 0.212 7.894 0 
17 likeUKIPLeaderW2 ~ AgeW1  0.007 0.003 1.959 0.050 
18 likeUKIPLeaderW2 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  0.001 0.019 0.048 0.962 
19 likeUKIPLeaderW4 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW4  2.622 0.145 18.093 0 
20 likeUKIPLeaderW3 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW3  2.536 0.117 21.706 0 
21 likeUKIPLeaderW2 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW2  4.038 0.170 23.729 0 
22 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW4  6.468 0   
23 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ AgeW1  -2.150 0   
24 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ PID4UKIP  -0.094 0   
25 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  0.315 0   
26 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW3  4.944 0   
27 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ PID3UKIP  -0.117 0   
28 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ PID2UKIP  -0.119 0   
29 likeLibDemLeaderW4 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  4.841 0   
30 AgeW1 ~~ AgeW1  238.614 0   
31 AgeW1 ~~ PID4UKIP  0.052 0   
32 AgeW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  5.290 0   
33 AgeW1 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW3  -2.426 0   
34 AgeW1 ~~ PID3UKIP  0.159 0   
35 AgeW1 ~~ PID2UKIP  -0.197 0   
36 AgeW1 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  -3.190 0   
37 PID4UKIP ~~ PID4UKIP  0.059 0   
38 PID4UKIP ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  0.205 0   
39 PID4UKIP ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW3  -0.078 0   
40 PID4UKIP ~~ PID3UKIP  0.043 0   
41 PID4UKIP ~~ PID2UKIP  0.041 0   
42 PID4UKIP ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  -0.056 0   
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43 likeUKIPLeaderW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW1  8.457 0   
44 likeUKIPLeaderW1 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW3  0.367 0   
45 likeUKIPLeaderW1 ~~ PID3UKIP  0.265 0   
46 likeUKIPLeaderW1 ~~ PID2UKIP  0.261 0   
47 likeUKIPLeaderW1 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  0.247 0   
48 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW3  6.296 0   
49 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~~ PID3UKIP  -0.109 0   
50 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~~ PID2UKIP  -0.119 0   
51 likeLibDemLeaderW3 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  4.904 0   
52 PID3UKIP ~~ PID3UKIP  0.076 0   
53 PID3UKIP ~~ PID2UKIP  0.053 0   
54 PID3UKIP ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  -0.103 0   
55 PID2UKIP ~~ PID2UKIP  0.087 0   
56 PID2UKIP ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  -0.092 0   
57 likeLibDemLeaderW2 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW2  6.255 0   
58 likeLibDemLeaderW4    2.976 0   
59 AgeW1    34.319 0   
60 PID4UKIP    0.064 0   
61 likeUKIPLeaderW1    3.137 0   
62 likeLibDemLeaderW3    2.768 0   
63 PID3UKIP    0.083 0   
64 PID2UKIP    0.096 0   
65 likeLibDemLeaderW2    2.767 0   
66 IndirectW2onW4 := a* a2 IndirectW2onW4 0.274 0.021 13.132 0 
67 TotalW2onW4 := b+(a* a2) TotalW2onW4 0.603 0.026 23.147 0 
68 IndirectW1onW4 := (a* a2* a3) IndirectW1onW4 0.208 0.016 12.913 0 
69 TotalW1onW4 := b2+(IndirectW1onW4) TotalW1onW4 0.264 0.026 9.977 0 
70 likeUKIPLeaderW4 r2 likeUKIPLeaderW4  0.730    
71 likeUKIPLeaderW3 r2 likeUKIPLeaderW3  0.742    
72 likeUKIPLeaderW2 r2 likeUKIPLeaderW2  0.592    
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Model Output Appendix Table 8: UKIP ‘Transition’ Path Model 
 lhs op rhs label est se z pvalue 
1 likeUKIPLeaderW10    0.153 0.217 0.708 0.479 
2 likeUKIPLeaderW10 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW9 a 0.353 0.053 6.710 0 
3 likeUKIPLeaderW10 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW10  0.060 0.022 2.659 0.008 
4 likeUKIPLeaderW10 ~ AgeW1  0.012 0.005 2.337 0.019 
5 likeUKIPLeaderW10 ~ PID10UKIP  0.103 0.426 0.242 0.808 
6 likeUKIPLeaderW10 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW8 b 0.118 0.056 2.102 0.036 
7 likeUKIPLeaderW10 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW7 b2 0.192 0.052 3.700 0.0002 
8 likeUKIPLeaderW9    -0.106 0.175 -0.604 0.546 
9 likeUKIPLeaderW9 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW8 a2 0.575 0.050 11.393 0 
10 likeUKIPLeaderW9 ~ PID9UKIP  0.806 0.157 5.125 0.00000 
11 likeUKIPLeaderW9 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW9  -0.042 0.022 -1.881 0.060 
12 likeUKIPLeaderW9 ~ AgeW1  0.004 0.005 0.895 0.371 
13 likeUKIPLeaderW9 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW7  0.330 0.052 6.294 0 
14 likeUKIPLeaderW8    0.031 0.208 0.148 0.882 
15 likeUKIPLeaderW8 ~ likeUKIPLeaderW7 a3 0.890 0.020 43.811 0 
16 likeUKIPLeaderW8 ~ likeLibDemLeaderW8  0.025 0.024 1.017 0.309 
17 likeUKIPLeaderW8 ~ AgeW1  0.007 0.004 1.691 0.091 
18 likeUKIPLeaderW8 ~ PID8UKIP  0.937 0.181 5.175 0.00000 
19 likeUKIPLeaderW10 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW10  3.878 0.235 16.487 0 
20 likeUKIPLeaderW9 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW9  2.201 0.184 11.941 0 
21 likeUKIPLeaderW8 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW8  2.354 0.224 10.514 0 
22 likeLibDemLeaderW10 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW10  8.332 0   
23 likeLibDemLeaderW10 ~~ AgeW1  -4.546 0   
24 likeLibDemLeaderW10 ~~ PID10UKIP  -0.152 0   
25 likeLibDemLeaderW10 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW7  -2.309 0   
26 likeLibDemLeaderW10 ~~ PID9UKIP  -0.148 0   
27 likeLibDemLeaderW10 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW9  5.857 0   
28 likeLibDemLeaderW10 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW8  5.155 0   
29 likeLibDemLeaderW10 ~~ PID8UKIP  -0.197 0   
30 AgeW1 ~~ AgeW1  225.904 0   
31 AgeW1 ~~ PID10UKIP  0.248 0   
32 AgeW1 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW7  0.791 0   
33 AgeW1 ~~ PID9UKIP  0.060 0   
34 AgeW1 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW9  -6.424 0   
35 AgeW1 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW8  -3.170 0   
36 AgeW1 ~~ PID8UKIP  -0.229 0   
37 PID10UKIP ~~ PID10UKIP  0.064 0   
38 PID10UKIP ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW7  0.366 0   
39 PID10UKIP ~~ PID9UKIP  0.043 0   
40 PID10UKIP ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW9  -0.138 0   
41 PID10UKIP ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW8  -0.125 0   
42 PID10UKIP ~~ PID8UKIP  0.047 0   
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43 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ likeUKIPLeaderW7  11.751 0   
44 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ PID9UKIP  0.334 0   
45 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW9  -1.495 0   
46 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW8  -0.380 0   
47 likeUKIPLeaderW7 ~~ PID8UKIP  0.475 0   
48 PID9UKIP ~~ PID9UKIP  0.069 0   
49 PID9UKIP ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW9  -0.167 0   
50 PID9UKIP ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW8  -0.123 0   
51 PID9UKIP ~~ PID8UKIP  0.052 0   
52 likeLibDemLeaderW9 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW9  7.734 0   
53 likeLibDemLeaderW9 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW8  5.443 0   
54 likeLibDemLeaderW9 ~~ PID8UKIP  -0.172 0   
55 likeLibDemLeaderW8 ~~ likeLibDemLeaderW8  7.148 0   
56 likeLibDemLeaderW8 ~~ PID8UKIP  -0.107 0   
57 PID8UKIP ~~ PID8UKIP  0.083 0   
58 likeLibDemLeaderW10    3.412 0   
59 AgeW1    34.907 0   
60 PID10UKIP    0.069 0   
61 likeUKIPLeaderW7    3.461 0   
62 PID9UKIP    0.074 0   
63 likeLibDemLeaderW9    3.688 0   
64 likeLibDemLeaderW8    3.735 0   
65 PID8UKIP    0.092 0   
66 IndirectW8onW10 := a* a2 IndirectW8onW10 0.203 0.036 5.699 0 
67 TotalW8onW10 := b+(a* a2) TotalW8onW10 0.321 0.049 6.558 0 
68 IndirectW7onW10 := (a* a2* a3) IndirectW7onW10 0.181 0.032 5.691 0 
69 TotalW7onW10 := b2+(IndirectW7onW10) TotalW7onW10 0.372 0.052 7.199 0 
70 likeUKIPLeaderW10 r2 likeUKIPLeaderW10  0.561    
71 likeUKIPLeaderW9 r2 likeUKIPLeaderW9  0.823    





Model Output Appendix 10: 2005 – 2010 Multilevel model on change in leadership 
evaluations 
Multilevel Model Results 2005-2010 BES Panel (Nine Waves) 
 Dependent variable: 
 Labour Model Conservative Model Liberal Democrat Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GenderFemale 0.001 (0.010) 0.014 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) 
LabourPartyIDYes 0.116*** (0.011)   
ConservativePartyIDYes  -0.024** (0.011)  
LDPartyIDYes   -0.031** (0.014) 
partyIdStrengthFairly strongly 0.060*** (0.012) 0.084*** (0.012) -0.032*** (0.012) 
partyIdStrengthNot very strongly 0.083*** (0.013) 0.089*** (0.013) -0.032** (0.014) 
partyIdStrengthDon't know 0.092** (0.045) 0.013 (0.045) -0.048 (0.049) 
scale(AgeInW1) -0.024*** (0.005) -0.003 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) 
AttentiontoPolitics -0.015*** (0.002) -0.004* (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002) 
GEvoteChangeYes   0.018** (0.009) 
ChangePartyIdYes 0.040*** (0.010) 0.038*** (0.010) 0.021** (0.010) 
InfluenceonPolitics 0.012*** (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002) 
ConLeaderChangeLog 0.055*** (0.007)  0.070*** (0.007) 
LabLeaderChangeLog  0.053*** (0.007) 0.066*** (0.007) 
LDLeaderChangeLog 0.060*** (0.006) 0.071*** (0.007)  
LabourLeadershipChangeYes 0.322*** (0.033)   
LabourMostImpIssueYes 0.010 (0.011)   
ConservativeLeadershipChangeYes 0.069** (0.033) 0.308*** (0.031)  
ConservativeMostImpIssueYes  -0.008 (0.011)  
FinancialCrisisYes  0.150*** (0.032)  
MingCampbellNewYes   0.240*** (0.058) 
NickCleggNewYes   0.110* (0.059) 
LibDemMostImpIssueYes   -0.041** (0.017) 
Constant 0.388*** (0.025) 0.448*** (0.024) 0.603*** (0.031) 
Observations 22,200 22,200 20,640 
Log Likelihood -18,388.120 -18,522.220 -17,767.380 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 36,812.250 37,080.430 35,572.760 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 36,956.390 37,224.570 35,723.530 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
 
